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INTRODUCTION 
I. The Problem 
The problem of this dissertation is to discover the 
place of religion in teacher education as implied in three 
value theories and to develop an axiological system, showing 
its implications regarding the role of religion in the 
training of public school teachers. 
Since the beginning of American education, the problem 
of how education and religion shoul d be related has repeated-
ly been raised and discussed . In spite of the voices which 
have cried that religion is irrelevant to education, or that 
all religion is sectarian and hence must be carefully separated 
from public education, or that religion is merely superstition 
or an opiate of the people, religion in one form or another 
has been part of school curricular patterns and extra-class 
activities . This concern about religion in our schools has 
caused some critics to say that religion has a too significant 
place; others have maintained that the type of religion in 
most schools is out of harmony with the ideals of American 
freedom, does injustice to religion, is incongrous with secu-
lar education, or is illegal. 
It would be convenient for purposes of research if 
one could determine when tpe question has received the most 
penetrating attention. Any survey, however, reveals the 
difficulty of pointing to such a single period. Yet at 
least a resurgence of interest has manifested itself since 
the beginning of the second world war, gaining momentum 
with the widespread attention given to the McCullum case 
in the Champaign, Illinois schools in 1948. Since that time 
dozens of books and hundreds of articles have been published 
dealing with the problem from a multitude of perspectives. 
ii 
Whenever there is controversy over public school 
policy, the same issues soon become of paramount importance 
in teacher training institutions. This is as it should be. 
Although the local school is under the direction of each com-
munity, the total philosophical orientation, the aims of 
education, the curricular content, and the methods of teach-
ing in teacher education institutions will ultimately be of 
profound influence on the public school. 
For five years this writer was on the faculty of a 
mid-western teachers college and participated in a voluntary 
weekly seminar with twenty colleagues. The problems of re-
ligion in education were vehemently discussed. Gradually 
the members became convinced that solutions would be pos-
sible only after general agreement upon basic terms and 
after an agreement upon an axiological frame of reference. 
Any superficially developed solution, it was felt, would be 
without roots and if put into practice, would wither into 
innoxious fads. 
Furthermore, articles on religion in education in 
professional journals, popular magazines, and newspapers 
have added data to support the hypothesis that universally 
acceptable and educationally sound solutions will only be 
found as these solutions grow out of clearly understood 
philosophical bases. 
This dissertation, therefore, is an attempt to deal 
with the problem of the role of religion in education through 
an analysis of three contemporary philosophical systems, to 
discover the value theories inherent in these systems, and 
to clarify the implications of such axiological views for 
the function of religion in teacher education. 
iii 
This study does not attempt to minimize the metaphysics 
or epistemology within each system investigated. Yet it is 
assumed that the category of value is that from which most 
religious ideas, ideals, and behavior patterns emerge. What-
ever else religion has been to man throughout civilization, 
it has been a search for and a devotion to whatever men be-
lieved to be of supreme importance--of highest value. 1 
1This broad definition of religion is used as a work-
ing hypothesis for this study. It is taken with full aware-
ness of the limitations of a descriptive definition; thus a 
more comprehensive and normative definition of religion is 
developed in Chapter Six. 
The assumption that religion is identified with values does 
not exclude the fact that in all theistic approaches, the 
religious quest is also an effort to understand and relate 
oneself to the power or powers believed to create and sus-
tain these values. 
2. The Method of Investigation 
After a discussion of the problem of education and 
religion on the American scene in the past ten years, the 
major portion of this study is concerned with .three value 
theories and the implications of each for religion in teach-
er education. 
Chapter Two deals with the philosophy and value 
theory of John Dewey. The investigation begins with Dewey, 
since his influence upon the American school, for good or 
for ill, can hardly be disputed. The implications for 
religion in teacher education are shown, followed by an 
evaluation of Dewey's axiology. 
Chapter Three examines the philosophy of E. s. 
Brightman with emphasis on and evaluation of his axiology 
and its implications for religion in teacher training in-
stitutions. A similar analysis is made of the writings of 
H. N. Wieman in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Five is a synthesis of the value theories 
previously discussed. Its purpose is to develop a value 
theory which may be meaningful for educational leaders, 
especially as they face the task of training teachers. 
Finally, this investigation includes a program for 
implementing the concluding value theory into a program of 
curricular offerings and extra-curricular opportunities for 
prospective teachers. 
3. The Selection of Philosophers 
The selection of the three philosophers, Dewey, 
Brightman, and Wieman has not been arbitrary, but has been 
made according to defi nite criteria. They are: 
1. Philosophers who have made ·an impact upon American 
thought and upon educational theory. 
2. Philosophers who have carefully developed a theory 
of value. 
3. Philosophers who have shown a concern for the re-
ligious implications of their general systems, and 
especially of their value theory. 
4. A Survey of Other Investigations 
Several other investigations have contributed to the 
wri t er's sense of urgency that this study be made. J. Donald 
Butler's penetrating work, Four Philosophies and their 
l Pract ice in Education and Religion has been helpful, 
lJ. Donald Butler, Four Philoso hies and their Practice 
in Education and Religion ( r nee on, .J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 1952). 
v 
although he did not concentrate upon value theory nor did 
he deal with the problem of religion in public education or 
teacher education. Sir Walter Moberly's monumental volume, 
The Crisis in the University1 has been, in all probability, 
the most significant single volume in awakening the American 
college teacher to the need of examining value assumptions 
and exploring the possibilities of an ideal university. Al-
though he uses British universities as illustrations of his 
thesis, his criticisms resound with familiarity in our o~~ 
colleges and universities. 
Numerous other books and articles are referred to in 
footnotes, each dealing with a specific aspect of the problem 
of religion in education, though none falls within the speci-
fic scope and limits of this investigation. Especially 
noteworthy studies have been made by Kenneth I. Brown, 
Merrimon Cuninggum, Hoxie Fairchild, Christian Gauss, Virgil 
Henry, F. Ernest Johnson, Paul Limbert, Bernard E. Meland, 
Clarence P. Shedd, Seymour Smith, Huston Smith, Henry P. Van 
Dusen, Nels Ferre~ ward Madden, and Amos Wilder. 2 
1sir Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the Universi~y 
(London: The S.C.M. Press, LTD, 1949}~-- ------
2see bibliography for complete data. 
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5. The Source Material 
Source material for Chapter One includes a host of 
books and articles by educational leaders, official publi-
cations of The National Education Association, The American 
Council on Education, The American Association of Colleges 
for Teacher Education, and The North Central Association for 
Colleges and Universities, plus mimeographed materials from 
important conferences on teacher education. 
Many of John Dewey's books and articles were found 
to provide relevant material for Chapter Two. Especially 
significant were Experience and Nature, Logic: The Theory of 
Inquiry, Essays in Experimental Logic, How We Think, Experi-
ence and Education, Democracy and Education, The Quest for 
Certainty, Theory of Valuation, Human Nature and Conduct, 
Ethics, Problems of Men, Reconstruction in Philosophy, and 
A Common Faith. 
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All of Brightman's books and many of his articles were 
found to deal with a theory of value or the special area of 
religious values. Especially significant for this investi-
gation were the following: Religious Values, The Problem of 
God, An Introduction to Philosophy, A Philosophy of Ideals, 
A Philosophy of Religion, Nature and Values, and Persons and 
Values. Numerous articles in The Journal of Religion, Religion 
in Life, The Philosophical Review, and The Philosophical Forum 
provided important data on Brightman's philosophy. 
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Each of Wieman's books and many articles were found 
to deal with religion or axiology. Those books which deal 
most precisely with his key concepts are as follows: Reli-
gious Experience and Scientific Method, The Wrestle of Re-
ligion with Truth, Normative Psychology of Religion, The 
Issues of Life, The Source of Human Good, and The Directive 
in History. His important articles relevant to this study 
were printed in The Christian Century, The Journal of Philos-
ophy, and The Journal of Religion. 
Sources for the last two chapters include quotations 
from various philosophers, books and articles of numerous 
philosophers and educators who have influenced this writer, 
the identification of which has long been forgotten, and the 
investigator's own experience as an instructor at Kansas 
State Teachers College, Pittsburg, Kansas. Some of the 
theories and practices proposed have grown out of a faculty 
seminar on Religion and Teacher Education at Kansas State 
Teachers College in 1954 and 1955, of which the writer was 
chairman. 
CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM OF RELIGION IN EDUCATION 
1. The Setaration of Church and State 
n American History 
One of the persistent problems throughout the entire 
history of the United States has been that of understanding 
the theory of separation of church and state. This doctrine 
grew out of the complex problems of colonial America, as the 
founding fathers were convinced that the United States Con-
gress should umake no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."1 
Although this amendment has often been referred to as 
a "wall of separation" between church and state, a wealth of 
evidence points to the fact that this wall is either mythi-
cal, or else surmounted easily within individual states. 
Documents substantiating this judgment were gathered in a 1946 
research bulletin of the National Education Association. 2* 
Another study was published ~y James M. O'Neill in 1949.3 The 
lTaken from Article I of the Bill of Rights of the 
U.S. Constitution, passed by Congress, September 25, 1789. 
2National Education Association Research Bulletin, 
24 (1946), 7- • 
*Because of the variety and complexity of documents 
used in Chapter One, footnotes on each page will give complete 
bibliographical data. 
3James M. O'Neill, Religion and Education Under the 
Constitution {New York: Harper and Bros., 1949). 
1 
2 
whole issue is commented upon by justices of the United States 
Supreme Court whenever a decision is handed down which is based 
on the amendment. 1 These studies indicate close ties of state 
and federal governments with religion; yet these same govern-
ments have rejected relationships with any particular sects. 
An obvious example of the relationship of the United States 
Government to religion is the long-standing tradition of 
prayers in the Congress~ and of chaplains in the armed forces~ 
in federally supported hospitals~ and in military academies. 
A thorough understanding of the relationship of church 
and state has been especially crucial for political and educa-
tional leaders, many of whom, like Horace Mann and Thomas 
Jefferson, were convinced that organized religious groups must 
not control or dominate public institutions. Yet a sketchy 
look at the past two hundred years in the United States shows 
that non-sectarian religion has always been a part of our tra-
dition~ especially in education. 2 
The historian William Warren Sweet observes that there 
has actually been a "sarcasm in American History" when~ for 
example, Maryland, founded for the sake of religious freedom 
lsee especially decision on the McCullum case, No. 90, 
October term, 1947~ 333 U.S. 203. 
2see Walton Bean, 11 Historical Developments Affecting 
the Place of Religion in the State University Curriculum," 
Religious Education, 50 (1955), 275-284. 
by Roman Catholics, found the state open to all Christians 
but themselves. 1 In spite of such examples, the American 
free public school, at its best, has attempted to find ways 
in which the ideals common to the American way of life could 
be taught without indoctrination in any particular religious 
creed or dogma. 2 The same intent has been true in state col-
leges and universities.3 
Furthermore, it is often claimed that as the American 
tradition has unfolded over the decades, the term "separation 
of church and state" has not been interpreted to mean that 
public institutions and religion shall be forever incompatible, 
but that neither the United States, through its agencies of 
national government, nor the several states shall establish a 
church or foster sectarianism, and that no sect shall control 
governments. Likewise this doctrine has been interpreted to 
mean that governments may not interfere with the free exercise 
of religion on the part of their citizens. With this inter-
pretation assumed, a majority of educators have been concerned 
with the separation between state and institutional churches, 
1William W. Sweet, The Study of Religion in America 
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1930), p. 64. 
2Ellwood P. Cubberly, Public Education in the United 
States (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934), Ch. VI. 
3see Walter Bean, "Historical Developments Affecting 
the Place of Religion in the State University Curriculum," 
Religious Education, 50 (1955), 275-284. 
3 
1 
not between state and religion. 
However, actual practice has been strangely diverse 
and without definite pattern. South Dakota permitted Bible 
reading until 1929; Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma now permit the use of the Bible in the public 
school. Delaware, Maine, and New Jersey permit use of the 
Lord 1 s ~rayer. A long list of further diversities is avail-
able in research documents. 2 
Although this study is primarily concerned with philo-
sophical bases for an understanding of the problem of religion 
in public education and teacher education, 'there would be 
less confusion in the implementation of programs if the legal 
aspects were clearly defined. Such definition is lacking. 
Although the Supreme Court decision concerning the McCullum 
case in 1948 drew widespread attention,3 an opposite decision 
by the same court on the Zorach case concerning released-time 
religious education in New York City again opened the .question 
of the legality of the programs. Thus the background of 
4 
1F. J. Brown, ''Studies of Religion in Public Education, 11 
Phi Delta Kapftan, 36 (1955), 252. See also Lawrence Little, . 
"Syllabus oneligion in Public Education, 11 Religious Education, 
44 (1949), 3-16. 
2see National Education Association Research Bulletin, 
24 (1946), 14-
3specific documentation would be lengthy. For one 
comment see paragraphs by Mr. Justice Douglas in Decisions 
and q:inions filed April 28, 1952 (New York: Bar Press Inc., 
1952 ' pp. 1-8. 
ideology and practice concerning released-time religious · 
education has been and remains a complex one without any 
single pattern of approval or disapproval. 
2 . Recent Interest in Religion and Criticisms of Public 
Education 
One of the noticeable characteristics of the nineteen-
fifties which has drawn such widespread printed comment is 
that which has -been variously called the "religious renais-
sance_," "a new era for religion_," or "a turn to religion." 1 
This period is characterized by 60.3 percent of the population 
of this country belonging to a church--a 2.8 percent gain 
over the previous year. This gain is larger than that of the 
total population. 2 These years have included the period of 
"Billy Grahamism_," a time of rapid growth of the cults_, and 
a time when popular religious books have consistently topped 
best-seller lists. Furthermore_, according to Nathan M. Pusey_, 
am~dst the variety of types of religious revival_, religious 
leaders believe that 
there is also being seen a lively new interest 
in religion founded less in fear than in hope 
and deeper understanding LWhich7 bespeaks the 
1Paul Hutchinson_, "Have We a New Religion; 11 Life_, 38 
~April 11_, 1955)_, 138-140/. See also Richard Niebuhr, 
'Varieties of Religious Revival, 11 New Republic_, 133 (1955)_, 
13-16. 
2Yearbook of the American Churches (New York: The Round 
Table Press)_, Vol. 24_, p. vi. 
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presence of faith and gives the lie to those 
who would see only defeat and frustration in 
the present time. 1 
At the same time that writers have been elaborating 
on the new religious interest of this decade, other com-
mentators on the educational and religious scene have called 
2 this period in our history one of secularism. These two 
views of our age--religious on the one hand and secular on 
the other--along with hard hitting criticisms of public edu-
cation,3 have made it inevitable that educators re-examine 
the aims of education and the place of religion and spiritual 
values within the tax-supported school. It is especially the 
cry of "secularism11 and the accusation that the school is 
totally secular4 which poses the main problem for this study. 
6 
lNathan M. Pusey, nReligion's Role in Liberal Education," 
Religion and Freedom of Thought (New York: Doubleday and Com-
pany, Inc., 1955), p. 46. 
2F. Ernest Johnson (ed.), American Education andRe-
ligion (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), pp. 4-6. 
3see Arthur Bestor, Educational Wastelands (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1953). A s~ry of criticisms 
from leading journals is given in c. W. Scott and c. M. Hill 
(eds.) Public Education Under Criticism (New York: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1954). 
4The term ••secular11 in this study is used to mean that 
outlook on life which regards religion as irrelevant and mean-
ingless to the main business of education and life. Note 
especially that 11 secularism11 is not here used to mean a lack 
of church control. The term usea:in the latter sense may re-
fer to the renaissance, to a period when religious concepts 
were freed from domination by the church, and to an emphasis 
on man's dignity. See E. E. Aubrey4 Secularism A Myth (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 5-76. 
Those who fear secularism come from within the ranks 
of Protestants, Jew~ and Roman Catholics, many of whom are 
deeply devoted to public education. They do not want the 
churches to control public schools. Yet, they fear that 
secularism is the greatest sickness in our American culture, 
and as the secular cult gains power, it may well convince 
great segments of population that religion is irrelevant to 
democratic life. According to George Thomas, "secularism" 
consists of a preoccupation with the interests 
and values of the world of the senses, with the 
here and now, to the exclusion of eternity. 
Though it may not be based upon a formal re-
jection of religious beliefs, it relegates re-
ligion to a periphera l place in life. 1 
Dr. Thomas suggests tha t secularism does not usually 
show opposition to religion, but is indifferent to it. The 
result is that all aspects of religion are omitted from edu-
cation, since it has no significant part, according to 
secularist thought. 2 
The tragic result of secularism, one critic points 
out, is the weakening of concern for moral, ethical and 
1George F. Thomas, "Problems and Principles," Religious 
Pers ectives in Colle e Teachin , ed. Hoxie Fairchild (New 
York: Ronald Press, 1952 
2Hoxie Fairchild (ed.), Religious Perspectives in 
College Teaching, Ch. I. 
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spiritual values . J. Hillis Miller therefore suggests that 
vJhile it is the responsibility of government to protect the 
right s of persons, 11 time vJill come vvhen there wil l b e nothing 
for the sovereign state to protect 111 if secul arism continues 
to be the dominant philosophy in American education . 
Supporters of the secular school have not been silent 
concerning the criticisms . 2 Although the questions have not 
been settled, the controversies and proposed answers have 
called a ttention to the problem which this invest igator as -
sumes to be crucial on the American scene, the proper role 
of religion in public educa tion . 
3 . Recent Attempts to Enrich Public Education 
In an effort to enrich public education and to cope 
with a l leged weaknesses i n it, several movements of a religious 
nature have deve l oped, the background of which is significant 
for this entire investigation . These three movements are as 
follows : ( a ) Released- time religious education, an approach 
outside of the school ; ( b ) An approach through moral and 
spiritua l values ; ( c ) and the attempt to teach about religion . 
1J. Hillis Miller, 11 Responsibility not Immunity, 11 The 
Teachin · of Religion in Ameri can Hi ·her Education, ed . Christian 
Gauss New York : The Ronald Press , 1951 , p . l l . 
2see essays in c. w. Scott and C. M. Hill ( eds .) ~ 
Pub l i c Education Under Crit i ci sm ( New York : Prent ice - Hall, 
Inc . ~ 1954 ) . . 
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The latter two movements have been developed as an integral 
part of the school program . 
a . Rel eased-t ime Programs 
Great diversity is seen in the programs of released 
time religious education . Frank N. Trager refers to the com-
plex and controversia l developments as a "big blooming buzzing 
confusion 11 as he borrows vlilliam James 1 phrase . 1 But whether 
one takes an appreciative or a depreciative view of this de -
development ~ its growth has been rapid.. From the beginning of 
released -time programs in 1913 in Gary~ Indiana~ the movement 
spread through the country until by 1932 ~ 218 communities in 
35 states had such p l ans . 2 By 1947, 2200 communities had de-
veloped some type of week day religious teaching in cooperation 
with the pub l ic schools involving approximately two mi llion 
pupils . 3 
The pattern and administration have taken on a 
variety of forms . However, the system in general is a p l an 
by which the school cooperates with a group of religious 
1Frank N. Trager , "The Blooming Buzzing Confusion~" 
Religious Education, 46 (1951 ), 82- 99 . 
2The State of Reli ·ious Zducation in the Public Schools~ 
Research Division, N. E. A. Washington, D. C., 19 9 , p . 4. 
3Erwin L . Shaver , "Trends in Weel<:day Religious Educa -
tion," Religious Education, 44 (1949 ), 32f . The data were com-
piled by the International Council of Re ligious Education . 
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organizations in the community. At the request of parents, 
pupils are released usually for one period a week to receive 
instruction from a person of their own religious faith. The 
Department of Weekday Religious Education of the International 
Council of Religious Education gave aid to such programs 
through suggested materials and plans of organization, but 
at no time has it professed to promote the released-tLffie plan. 
The I.C.R.E. used only two per cent of its funds over the 
years for such effort, according to its director, Erwin L. 
Shaver. 1 
In spite of the widespread movement of released-time 
religious education, there is no evidence that there has been 
any universal belief among churchmen that this is a panacea 
for all ills. Neither is there agreement among schoolmen. 2 
At best it gives a boost to the efforts in religious education 
of the individual churches and solves no problem concerning 
the responsibility of the school. It was not until the 
famous decision was handed down by the United States Supreme 
Court concerning the unconstitutionality of the weekday re-
ligious program in Champaign, Illinois (March 8, 1948) that 
1Erwin L. Shaver, "Trends in Weekday Religious Educa-
tion, Religious Education, 44 (1949), 32f. 
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2A thorough study was made by the Research Division of 
the N.E.A. in 1948 through the technique or submitting question-
naires to school administrators where released-time programs 
were in operation. Results revealed no strong opinion in favor 
of the program. The Status of Religious Education in the Public 
Schools (Washington, D.C., 1949), pp. 17-20. 
the issues for and against such programs assumed nation-
wide importance. 
After the controversy had simmered in journals such 
as Religious Education, School and Society, The Christian 
Century, Religion in Life, Education, Christianity and Crisis 
and many others, two general points of view emerged, the 
first represented by Erwin L. Shaver and the second by R. 
Freeman Butts. It was Shaver's view that the legal action 
in the Champaign case outlawed only certain specific practices, 
not weekday religious education programs generally. In a re-
search study three years after the decision, he found that 
there were still over two million school children involved 
in released-time programs in twenty-five hundred communities. 1 
On the other hand, R. Freeman Butts interpreted the 
decision as proving that the practice of releasing students 
from public schools for religious instruction in public 
school buildings is unconstitutional. 2 He further suggested 
that good judgment on the part of Americans will push us in 
the direction of less intermixture between church and state. 
1see Erwin L. Shaver, "Three Years after the Champaign 
Case," Religious Education, 46 ( 1951), 33-·38 . 
2R. Freeman Butts, The American Tradition in Religion 
and Education (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950), pp. 4, 190. 
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In summarizing the controversy concerning this type 
of religious program, arguments for and against weekday re-
ligious education which were given by Lawrence C. Little 
in 1949 are listed below. 
Arguments supporting the program: 
1. It is the most practicable and effective plan for 
relating religion to public education in the light 
of our present understanding of church-state re-
lationships. 
2. It is conducted in close relationship to the child's 
every-day experiences and identifies religious knowl-
edge and ideals with other aspects of living. 
3. It relates religion effectively to other fields of 
study. 
4. It reaches a high percentage of otherwise unreached 
children. 
5. It increases the time for religious instruction, the 
time being on the average three times as great as in 
the Sunday School. 
6. It maintains higher standards than other agencies of 
religious education and thus has a greater chance 
of effectiveness. 
7. It provides an excellent medium for inter-faith co-
operation. 
8. It helps to correct a too materialistic emphasis in 
public education. 
9. It is a needed corrective in the trend toward greater 
federal control of education in that it provides for 
a large degree of local autonomy. 
Arguments against the program: 
1. It violates the principle of separation of church 
and state. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5· 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9· 
10. 
It tends to be divisive and is therefore sectarian 
in the basic meaning of that term. 
It tends to disrupt the organic unity of the public 
school and thus retards the growth of democracy. 
It takes valuable time from public school work and 
tends to impair school discipline. 
The teaching time is too short for effective results. 
It is "socially coercive" in the enrollment of pupils. 
Its zeal for "reaching the unreached" presents a 
ha zard for minority groups, particularly those not 
connected with any religion. 
Most of the cooperation achieved is among Protestant 
groups and is rarely inter-faith. 
It is integrally related neither to life in the 
school nor to life in the church and therefore in-
troduces just another atomistic element into the al-
ready broken experience of children. 
Concessions of this type may prove to be "entering 
wedges" for further concessions to pressure groups 
of various kinds and thus tend to undermine the 
public school. l 
In~ite of arguments pro and con, whenever two million 
children are involved in any kind of week day religious in-
struction, it is safe to assume that some kind of learning 
is taking place. The wide-spread use of released-time pro-
grams indicates its popularity in hundreds of communities. 
Nevertheless, it is not an answer to the problem of finding 
1Lawrence c. Little, "Syllabus on Religion in Public 
Education," Religious Education, 44 (1949), 11. 
13 
the place of religion within the public schools. In fact, 
released-time programs are outside of the schools, being 
sponsored and maintained by the local churches. An answer 
to the desirable place of religion in public education will 
have to be found elsewhere. 
b. An Approach through Moral and Spiritual Values 
The group of educators who have been leaders in this 
approach to religion in education are, generally speaking, 
within the pragmatic tradition of John Dewey; hence their 
position is discussed more specifically in Chapter II. How-
ever, the theoretical basis of this movement has also been 
clearly set forth by such men as Brubacher, Thayer, Bower, 
Chave and others. It deserves brief attention at this 
point. 
One of the notable writings in this area during the 
period of the second world war was done by a group of scholars 
in the John Dewey Society. Following the 1943 executive board 
meeting, a book was projected which was subsequently to be 
1 printed as the seventh yearbook of the John Dewey Society. 
This small volume is significant in that it sets forth, on 
the theoretical plane, that which has been the basis of the 
experimental projects in such centers as Kentucky, Kent State 
lJohn s. Brubacher (ed.), The Public Schools and 
Spiritual Values (New York: Harper and Bros., 1944). 
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University Workshops, and the Los Angeles schools. 
Now the spiritual values which the authors discuss 
may be spoken of equally well as 11higher values 11 --those 
wants which have been critically evaluated and judged good 
for individuals and the community. The following are spir-
itual values which are taught in the thorough school. All 
these values ought to be fostered in all schools, the author 
maintains, since they are the common body of values in our 
democratic society. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
Coqperation. 
Self-denial. 
Self-sacrifice. 
Courage. 
Kindness. 
Understanding of other people. 
Gel?erosity. 
A sense of duty. 
I Loyalty. 
Respect for personality. 
Freedom. 
Self-fulfillment in play, creative arts 
and work. 
Mental effort. 
Community living. 
Increased control over one's destiny. 
Moral fiber. 1 
Moreover, the committee did not satisfy itself with 
setting forth the above values and illustrating them, but it 
asked, "How can these values be taught in the school? 11 The 
1John s. JBrubacher (ed.), The Public Schools and 
S~iritual Values (New York: Harper and Bros., 1944), pp. 11-23, 
1 6-128. 
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various authors agreed that values could not be taught through 
mere verbal repetition or memorization. Hence even if the 
community could agree on natural or supernatural support of 
these values~ this would make no difference in their being 
learned. It was concluded that values are learned only as 
they are lived~ as they become part of the total experience 
of the child.1 Thus the school~ if it is to be a community 
where spiritual values are to be learned~ must be a place 
where a high quality of living is cultivated and where the 
spiritual values mentioned above will become part of the con-
scious experience of each person. 
This same concern which was voiced ·by the John Dewey 
Society was seen again in 1950 when the Educational Policies 
Commission of the National Education Association published 
its book~ Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public Schools. 2 
A representative statement is given early in the volume 
which is the thesis of the document: 
The American people have rightly expected the 
schools to teach moral and spiritual values ••• 
By moral and spiritual values we mean those 
values which~ when applied to human behavior , 
exalt and refine life and bring it into accord 
with the standards of conduct that are approved 
1 John S. Brubacher~ (ed.)~ The Public Schools and 
Spiritual Values (New York: Harper & Bros.~ 1944). (A thor-
ough development of this thesis is found in Chapter VI.) 
2Educational Policies Commission~ Moral and Spiritual 
Values in the Public Schools (Washington~ D.C.~ 1951). 
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in our democratic culture ••• No society can 
survive without a moral order. A system of 
moral and spiritual values is indispensable to 
group living ••• No social invention however in-
genious, no improvements in government struc-
ture however prudent, no enactment of statutes 
and ordinances however lofty their aims, can 
produce a good and secure society if personal 
integrity, honesty, and self-discipline are 
lacking. 1 
Throughout the Educational Policies Commis sion report, 
one va lue is held to be fundamental to all others. This is 
the supreme importance of the individual persona lity. This 
value, the authors suggest, is basic to Christianity, to 
other religions, and is agreed upon by the American people. 
It is a value which challenges every kind of oppression and 
.~ 
implies that each human being should have every possible op-
portunity to achieve a feeling of security and competence in 
dealing with the problems arising in daily life. 
Subservient to this 11 primary11 value are those of 
moral responsibility, a r e cognition that institutions are 
the s e rvants of persons, the confidence that mutual consent 
is better than violence, a devotion to truth, a respect for 
excellence, the moral equa lity of all people, brotherhood, 
opportunity for all people to pursue happiness, and the 
1 
Educatiopa l Policies Commission, Mora l and Spiritua l 
Value s in the Public Schools (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 
3- • 
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belief that all persons should be offered spiritual experi-
ences which transcend the material concepts of life.1 
Since this investigation is intended to be representa-
tive rather than inclusive of all the recent trends, one 
final important effort will suffice to characterize the move-
ment stressing moral and spiritual values. This is the 
"Kentucky Program for the Discovery and Development of Moral 
and Spiritual Values, 11 which· began in a tangible way in 1946 
when the Kentucky State Department of Education appointed a 
committee to explore the problem and reco~nend procedures. 
This early explor~tion, followed by conferences and study 
groups, led to the actual program of six pilot experimental 
schools in cooperation with six sponsoring colleges of 
Kentucky. Behind this project was the constant philosophical 
support and interpretation of William Clayton Bower, whose 
personal ideas and evaluation of the project are clearly 
stated in his book, Moral and Spiritual Values in Education. 2 
After a thorough exposition of the n.ature of experi-
ence , Dr. Bower asserts that 11moral and spiritual values are 
1Educationa l Policies Commission, Moral and Spiritual 
Values in the Pubtic Schools (Washington, D.C., 1951), Ch. II. 
2William c. Bower, Moral and S iritual Values in Educa-
tion (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1952 • 
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indigenous to the relations and functions of the school 
itself."1 These specific, high qualities of living, or 
values, are isolated in almost an identical fashion to that 
seen in the John Dewey Society volume, the Educational Poli-
2 cies Commission book, and those listed by E. J. Chave. 
In Dr. Bower's words: 
Wherever a response is being made to a situa-
tion in the relations and activities of the 
school, potential moral and spiritual values 
are involved. • • • The problem of moral and 
spiritual education is therefore twofold. On 
the one hand, it is to help pupils to experi-
ence these values by making choices that are 
moral and spiritual in nature and carrying 
through their decisions from intention to ac-
tion in specific and concrete situations. 
On the other hand, it is to help the pupils 
to build up their many specific decisions 
and actions into generalized attitudes toward 
all situations and into dependable patterns of 
behavior. 3 
These value potentials, Bower goes on to point out, 
are to be looked for in every specific relation and activity 
in the school experience. And it was for this practical 
task that the Kentucky pilot centers were established. The 
details of the program are discussed thoroughly in published 
pamphlets. 4 
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tion 
lwilliam C. Bower, Moral and Spiritual Values in Educa-
(Lexington: The University ot KentuckY Press, 1952), p. 76. 
2E. J. C~ave, A Functional (Chicago: The Un~v~e~r~s~~y~o~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ tion 
3Bower, ~· cit., p. 77. 
4see especially, Em hasizing Moral 
in a Kentucky High School e ng on: e 
Press, September, 1952), Vol. 25, No. 1. 
Whatever may be said about the above- mentioned pro-
grams ( and a survey of leading educational and religious 
journals since 1911-6 revea ls a host of penetrating articles 
of praise and criticism) their adequacy rests upon the assumed 
concepts of "religion" and "value . 11 A critical evaluation 
of these concepts wi ll be attempted later in the present 
study . 1 
c . Teaching about Religion 
In order to correct what has been called the "b l ind 
spot in pub l ic education, 11 or at other times "a secul ar school 
through an exclusion of religion, 11 a third sol ution has been 
presented to the American public . Justice Jackson's statement, 
following t he United States Supreme Court ' s decision on the 
Champaign, Illinois released-time case, has been quoted often 
as a point of departure by advocates of teaching religious 
sub ject-matter : 
One can hardly respect a system of education 
that would leave the student who lly i gnorant 
of the currents of religious thought that move 
the worl d society for a part in which he is 
being prepared . 2 
1see Chapter 3 , page 92 of this study . 
2Justice J ackson in his dissenting opinion i n the 
McCullum case, 333 U. S . 203 (1948). 
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Likewise few people, if any, would disagree with the 
statement made by Paul Blanshard1 that the public school 
should be completely free from sectarian strife. Rather, 
· those persons and agencies concerned with this approach to 
"improving the schools 11 have been convinced that the American 
tradition, as well as sound educational theory, permits no 
sectarian indoctrination in the tax-supported school. It 
was with this point of view in mind that the Committee on 
Religion and Education of the American Council on Education 
issued its statement in 1947. 2 This committee, composed of 
leading educators and religious leaders, in cooperation with 
the National Conference of Christians and Jews, indicated 
that it was well aware of the usual criticisms directed 
against any plan of teaching religion in the public schools.3 
Nevertheless, the committee stated firmly that 
failure of the schools to play a part in 
acquainting the young with the role of re-
ligion in the culture while at the same time 
accepting such responsibility with reference 
to other phases of culture, is to be unneutral 
--to weigh the scales against any concern with 
religion. 4 
1Paul Blanshard, Communism, Democracy and Catholic 
Power (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951), p. 132. 
2American Council on Education, The Relation of Re-
li~ion to Public Education: Basic Principles (Washington,D.C., 
19 '7). 
3A thorough list of such criticisms is given by 
Virgil Henry in his book, The Place of Religion in Public 
Schools (New YorM: Harper & Bros., 1950), pp. 7-8 . 
4American Council on Education, op. cit . , p. 29. 
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The committee went on to emphasize the opinion that any 
school which £ails to deal fairly and objectively with re-
ligious data, whenever they are relevant to a particular 
learning experience, is guilty of distorting teaching. In 
fact, the committee said, those who are dogmatic against re-
ligion are equally un-American and ~ poor educators1 as are 
those who indoctrinate religious ideas. 2 
The conclusions from the A.C.E. report were restated 
by Clarence Linton as £ollows: 
1. The problem is to find a way in public education 
to give due recognition to the place of religion 
in the culture and in the convictions of our peo-
ple while at the same time safeguarding the separa-
tion of church and state. 
2. The separation of American public education from 
church control was not intended to exclude all 
study of religion from the school program. 
3. Teaching a common core of religious beliefs in the 
public schools is not a satis£actory solution. 
4. Teaching "moral and spiritual values" cannot be 
regarded as an adequate substitute for an appro-
priate consideration of religion in the school 
program. 
5. Teaching which opposes or denies religion is as 
much a violation of religious liberty as teaching 
which advocates or supports any particular re-
ligious belief. 
lrtalics added by this author. 
2virgil Henry, The Place of Religion in Public Schools 
(New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 17. 
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6. Introducing factual study of religion will not 
commit the public schools to any particular re-
ligious belief . 
7. The role of the school in the study of religion 
is distinct fromJ though complementary toJ the role 
of the church. 
8 . The public school should stimulate the young toward 
a vigorousJ personal reaction to the challenge of 
religion. 
9 . The public school should assist youth to have an 
intelligent understanding of the historical and1 contemporary role of religion in human affairs . 
Following the above statementsJ nmnerous articles have 
appeared in educational and religious journals which have 
given support to the same point of view. Selected portions 
from a few articles will illustrate this movement . John Q. 
SchislerJ for exampleJ writing in Religion i n LifeJ 2 suggests 
that while the public schools must not become sectarianJ yet 
they can be encouraged to throw off the bias against religion 
which characterizes a large percentage of them. 
Frank H. Lindhorst similarly writes that 11 if religion 
is to influence the educational development of societyJ {re-
ligious leader~ must find a working relationship for ethical 
1L91arence Linto~ American Council on EducationJ The 
Function of the Public Schools in Dealin with Reli ion (Wash-
ingtonJ D.C.J 1953 • pp . 2-3. 
2
winter editionJ 21 (1951-52)J 83~93 . 
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and religious teachings in the public schools. 111 In 1950 
a series of lectures was given at the Institute for Religious 
and Social Studies of the Jewish Theo logica l Seminary of 
Ameri ca in New York . These published lectures give the 
diverse views of eleven educators and religious leaders con-
cerning the role of religion in public education . The points 
of view range from those of V. T. Thayer who is skeptical 
about any religious teaching in the schools to those of N. C. 
Harner who maintains that t he public schools 11 can and should 
inc l ude non-sectarian religious teaching as an organic part 
of their curriculum . 11 2 
Another important vo lume appeared in 1950. This was 
called The Place of Religion in Publ ic Schools and was written 
by Virgil Henry. 3 Henry's published doctora l project had 
as its purpose to offer guidance to communities desiring to 
experiment with an objective study of re l igion in public 
schools. Its uniqueness li e s in it s thorough statement of 
techniques of community cooperation . Likewise, his curriculum 
proposals in Chapter Two mak e explicit possibilities of 
1Frank H. Lindhorst_, 11 Re lig i on in the Educational De -
ve lopment of Society, 11 Religious Education, 4-5 (1950 ), 271. 
2F . Ernest Johnson ( ed .) , American Education and Re -
ligion (New York: Harper and Bros ., 1952 ) • 
...., 
JVi r gil Henry_, The Place of Religion in Public Schools 
( New York : Harper and Bros . , 1950 ). 
24 
teaching about religion in literature, social studies, music, 
art, and drama. He also shows the relevance of religion to 
counseling , extra-curricular activities, and library materials. 
In comparison to Henry's work which was primarily 
normative, a thorough investigation and descriptive study 
was made by Dr. Clarence Linton for the Committee on Religion 
and Education of the American Council on Education. This 
study had as its purpose to secure data through conferences, 
questionnaires and opinionnaires concerning actual practices 
and attitudes of educational and religious leaders. The con-
eluding interpretation of these data, as presented by Dr. 
Linton and his staff, is as follows: 
The public school is limited by the consti-
tution, statutes and interpreta tions of the 
states as well as the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States ••• On the other hand, 
to be silent about religion may be, in effect, 
to make the public school an anti-religious fac-
tor in the community. Silence creates the im-
pression in the minds of the young that religion 
is unimportant and has nothing to contribute to 
the solution of the perennial and ultimate prob-
lems of human life. This negative consequence 
is all the more striking in a period when soci-
ety is asking the public school to assume more 
and more responsibility for dealing with the 
cultural problems of growth and development. 
Therefore it is vitally important that the 
public school deal with religion. There are many 
ways in which this may be and indeed is being done . 
Some are good; others, in our judgment , may be 
dangerous to a greater or lesser degree. All pub-
lic schools, however, can provide for the factual 
study of religion both as an important factor in 
the historical and contemporary development of our 
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culture and as a source of values and insight 
for great numbers of people in finding the 
answers to persistent personal problems of liv-
ing. Religion can, and in our judgment should, 
be studied--not as something on which the Ameri-
can public school must settle all arguments and 
say the last word, but as something which is so 
much a part of the American heritage and so 
relevant to contemporary values that it cannot 
be ignored. 1 
The result of the extensive investigation by the 
Linton committee may be summed up in several statements as 
follows: 
The illustrations of practice at all levels 
of public education strikingly reveal the fact 
that there is no clear-cut and generally ob-
served policy with respect to the relation of 
religion to public education. The concerns ex-
pressed by educational administrators • • • in-
dicate that factual study of religion in the 
public schools is desirable. 2 
Many leaders in all sections and in most commu-
nities think that the present state of affairs 
with respect to religion and public education 
is not satisfactory and that the problem should 
be studied until a satisfactory solution is 
found. 3 
We believe we have found the most promising ap-
proach to a further study of this problem, namely 
factual study of religion when and where intrinsic 
to general education on all levels. 4 
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1L91arence Lintog( American Council on Education, The 
Function of the Public Schools in Dealing with Religion (Wash-
ington, D. c., 1953), p. 6-7. 
2Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
3 Ibid., p. 71. 
4 Ibid., p. 83. 
Finally it vms recommended that the American Council 
on Education sponsor experimental projects to gather more 
data on the desirability and feasibility of factual study 
of religion in the pub l ic schools . 
Although not growing out of the A. C. E. report, the 
public schools of Indianapolis, I ndiana have set up such an 
experimental project . All students of the seventh and 
eighth grades have a special unit in which the teacher, with 
the help of an approved syllabus, endeavors to teach the 
basic values of religion while avoiding any semblance of in-
doctrination . Essential to the program is the cooperation 
of the Roman Catholic , Protestant, Jewish, and Christian 
Science churches . Furthermore, it is reported that the sylla-
bus has been furnished to school officials in fifty cities 
of over two hundred thousand population . 1 
In a mimeographed report from the office of the 
General Superintendent of Education of Indianapo l is, it is 
stated that the seventh grade unit is entitled, "Our Re ligious 
Heritage . " This unit is described as follm'ls : 
The development of an understanding and apprecia-
tion of the religious contributions of the early 
people (Circa 2,000 B. C." ; our religious heri -
t age from the "old world'; the search of the 
Europeans for religious freedom; the effect re -
ligion had upon the foundi ng of America ; the 
part played by early religious l eaders ; religious 
1The Christian Century, 7 2 (1955) , l02f . 
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faiths of the early American colonies; the 
role religion has played in exploration, 
architecture, calendar making, education, 
writings, and government; and to understand 
the impact that the recognition of the worth 
of the individual and his freedom to worship 
has had on our democracy. 1 
A similar outline is given for the eighth grade unit called 
"Religious Influences in the Development of Liberty. 11 
In a recent letter from William A. Evans, Assistant 
to the General Superintendent, he indicates that the greatest 
obstacle to progress in this area is the ignorance on the 
part of teachers of the "other person• s•• religion. He goes 
on to say: 
I believe our teacher training institutions must 
include some instruction for prospective teachers 
regarding the major faiths of America and must 
stress the importance of the teacher's a~quiring 
an understanding of some of the doctrines of the 
various religions and the major religious holi-
days and customs. Certainly, every teacher should 
be highly ethical in regard to treating every 
child 1 s religion with the utmost respect. 2 
The Indianapolis project of teachi ng about religion 
is one example of an approach to religi on whi ch deserves 
careful observation. Future evaluatory reports may point 
in the direction of further experimentation. 
1 11 Teaching About Religion in the Indi anapolis Public 
Schools, 11 Prepared in the office of the General Superintendent 
of Education, September 14, 1955, (Mimeographed). 
2Letter from William A. Evans, Assistant to the 
General Superintendent, Indianapolis Public Schools, Indianapo-
lis, Indiana, November 3, 1955. 
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4. Studies Regarding the Place of Religion in 
Teacher Education 
Students of public education are in general agreement 
concerning the function of teachers colleges. Yet there are 
few data available as to what these colleges are doing to 
prepare teachers to deal with religious issues in whatever 
manner is deemed desirable by their school authorities. Such 
limitation of information is pointed out in the report of 
The American Council on Education. 1 According to the author, 
the available evidence indicates the probability that 
teachers colleges and teacher education departments of uni-
versities are doing little to prepare teachers to deal with 
religion in the public schools. 2 
With a concern for teachers who are competent in all 
areas, including religion, Nevin Harner points out two ob-
vious hazards which must be overcome, assuming that the 
teachers colleges must accept the primary task of developing 
teacher competency: 
First is the danger inherent in t he fact 
that there are large numbers of teachers who 
are not adequately informed in matters of re-
ligion and who lack interest in the study of 
1 /!Clarence LintotliAmerican Council on Education, The 
Function Uf the Public sehools in Dealing with Religion (WRSh-
ington, D.C.), p. 15. 
2Ibid., p. 38. 
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religion. Secondly~ there is the danger aris-
ing from the fact that teachers with deep re-
ligious convictions are tempted to teach re-
ligion merely along sectarian lines. 1 
a. Preliminary Studies 
At the close of the second world war~ officials of 
the American Association of Teachers Colleges beeame inter-
ested in discovering the actual practices of teachers colleges 
in dealing with religion in both curricular and extra-cur-
ricular ways. As a result they sponsored a commi ttee to 
make a survey. Under the chairmanship of William Vaughan 
of George Peabody College, Nashville, Tennessee, such a com-
mittee was organized. 2 Information received from question-
naires sent to every member institution indicated that the 
American philosophy of separation of church and state was an 
influential deterrent to the teaching of religion. In many 
cases, that doctrine was interpreted as a ban on all religious 
instruction or even religious extra-curricular activities. 
Over half of those colleges, or 75 of 139 replying~ discour-
aged denominational groups. One-fifth, or 29 of 137 replying~ 
discouraged even interdenominational activity. Ninety-five 
offered no courses whatsoever in either Bible or religion, 
1Nevin c. Harner~ Reli ion's Place in General Education 
(Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press~ 19 9 , p. 1 
2william H. Vaughan, "Religious Practices in State 
Teachers Colleges," 26th Yearbook of the American Association 
of Teachers College, 1947, pp. 114-118. 
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and only thirty-eight had any faculty committee designed to 
encourage or supervise extra-curricular activities of a 
religious nature. 
committee. 
One hundred and eight had no such 
Furthermore, this study indicated that the only 
generally approved method of dealing with religion was 
through bringing clergymen or outstanding religious leaders 
to the campus for a day or two for special addresses. 
However, the investigators expressed their unwilling-
ness to arrive at definite conclusions, hoping only to secure 
initial data which might be used for further study. 
Such a further study was reported on in 1950 by 
1 
0. T. Richardson of Ball State Teachers College. Dr. 
Richardson's study was made from the college catalogues of 
all the state teachers colleges of the North Central Associa-
tion, and suffers the limitation of the inaccuracy of such 
bulletins. Nevertheless he discovered that in 65 state 
teachers colleges, 26 or 40 per cent offered courses in 
religion. The others did not. 
A more thorough research project was undertaken by 
Edith Whitford, also of Ball State Teachers College, in an 
lo. T. Richardson, "A Study of Teaching of Religion 
and :Philosophy in State Teachers Colleges," North Central 
Association Quarterly, 24 (1950), pp. 305-310. 
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effort to study the colleges in the North Central Association 
which were offering courses in religion and philosophy. Her 
investigation was made through a questionnaire sent to 160 
colleges and universities, state colleges and liberal arts 
institutions, all of which have teacher training programs. 
One hundred and eleven institutions responded, and her summary 
report gave the following relevant data: 
1. It is legally possible to teach objective, non-
sectarian courses about religion in state con-
trolled schools in all states of the area covered 
by the study. The final decision on offering such 
courses seems to rest with the school and its in-
terpretation of what constitutes a "non-sectarian 
course related to religion." 
2. Courses related to religion are taught ••• in 46 
per cent of the state colleges. 
3 . Leaders in teacher training institutions of the 
North Central Association are determined that 
there shall continue to be a sharply drawn line 
between sectarian teaching and education, but 
there is evidence of a concern that the realm of 
values shall not be completely separated from the 
training of future teachers. 1 
b. Conferences 
The lack of evidence about current philosophies of 
teacher education and practices concerning religion, gave rise 
1Edith L. Whitford, "The Teaching of Religion and 
Philosophy in the Teacher Training Institutions of the North 
Central Association," (Anderson, Indiana: mimeographed by 
author, 1951). 
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to the calling of a National Study Conference on Religion in 
state Teachers Colleges in December, 1951. This conference 
was convened by the Department of Religion in Higher Educa-
tion of the Yale University Divinity School and the New Haven 
State Teachers College. Over one hundred teachers and admin-
istrators from thirty states met together for three days to 
hear lectures and to discuss such issues as "legal problems 
regarding religion in teacher education," "religious courses," 
"the relation of religion to other academic disciplines," 
"religious counseling," and other areas of special interest. 1 
A careful investigation of the proceedings of this 
conference reveals no conclusions or programs of action. 
However, several points of view were repeatedly expressed 
which indicate a direction of thought--that more adequate 
training of teachers is needed to deal with religion. 
The following statements summarize significant 
conference opinions and apparent agreements from the dele-
gates: 
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1. Throughout the history of American higher education, 
including teacher training institutions, colleges and uni-
versities have been free to deal with religion in a far more 
thorough manner than have the elementary and secondary public 
1Religion in State Teachers Colleges, A report of the 
National Conference on Religion in State Teachers Colleges 
(New Haven: Yale University Divinity School--Mimeographed, 
1951). 
schools. This freedom, granted by the public, has not al-
ways been utilized, but it has been available. 1 
2 . A large part of the content of many disciplines 
in higher education is pertinent to religion; as, for example, 
his tory, literature, psychology, social science, music, art, 
and phi losophy. It follows that both professiona l competence 
and personal integrity demand that the teacher face a nd not 
evade the emergence of religious considerations in his own 
field. 2 
3 . A statement made several months earlier by the 
Educat i onal Policies Commission of the N.E.A. was reaffirmed: 
The public schools can teach about religion 
without advocating or teaching any religious 
creed. That religious beliefs are controversial 
is not an adequate reason for excluding teaching 
about religion. 3 
In order that teachers might have the knowledge 
to teach adequately about religion, there was common agree-
ment among delegates that non-sectarian courses should be 
offered in the curriculum of sta te teachers colleges. 
1A statement in 1949, given as part of an address 
by Dr. Clarence P. Shedd at a conference on the University of 
Minnesota campus, documented the above thesis with thirty 
historical sketches of state supported institutions. The ad -
dress wa s subsequently published under the title, "Re ligion 
in the American State University." Religion in the State 
Universit : An Initial Ex loration (Minneapolis: Burgess Pub-
ishing Co., 19 9 , pp. 12-3 • 
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2Religion in State Tea chers College, 2£· cit ., p. 27. 
3Educati ona l Policies Commission, Moral and Spiritual 
Values in the Public Schools (Washington, D.C., 1951), pp. 77,78 . 
4. Finally, emphasis was placed upon the programs 
of religious activity often sponsored by denominational 
groups. It was felt that these provide a vital condition 
for the total growth of the student. This assertion is sup-
ported by a study, made by this investigator, through a ques-
tionnaire sent to five hundred graduates of the classes of 
1947 through 1949 of Kansas State Teachers College. Results 
of this study indicate that extra-curricular religious activ-
ities had over twice the beneficial religious influence as 
1 
any other one single factor. 
Although the Yale conference was the first of its 
kind, the thinking was not revolutionary but was a descrip-
tion of what was already being attempted in one way or another, 
by widely separated teacher training institutions. An ind~-
cator of this fact was seen in the results of a study made 
by Dr. Seymour Smith in preparation for the meeting. After 
receiving reports from two-thirds of all teachers colleges 
in the United States, he discovered that every institution 
responding had some kind of voluntary student religious extra-
curricular organization. This study also revealed that 44 
institutions, or 37 per cent of those responding, offered 
lT. William Hall, "An Alumni Opinion on Religious In-
fluences at Kansas State Teachers College" (Pittsburg, Kansas: 
K.S.T.C.--Mimeographed, 1951). 
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one or more courses in religion or Bible. An additional nine 
colleges offered courses in ethics. 1 
Even though such a study cannot discover how religion 
is dea lt with in any course with the 1110rd "religion11 in its 
title~ it is clear that in the years from 1947~ when the 
first study was made by the American Association of Teachers 
Colleges~ 2 to 1951~ considerable additions were made in 
teacher education institutions in religious courses and extra-
curricular activities. 
c. A.A. C.T . E. Teacher Education and Religion Project 
In 1951~ under the direction of a sub-committee of 
the Studies and Standards Committee of the American Associa-
tion of Colleges for Teacher Education~3 the Teacher Educa-
tion and Religion Project originated and was developed. In 
December~ 1953 the committee published its statement concern-
ing the nature and scope of the project as follows: 
The committee recommends that the chief 
purpose of this study of Teacher Education and 
Religion be to discover and develop ways and 
means to teach the reciprocal relation between 
1seymour Smith ~ An Explorat~ry Study of Religious Pro-
visions in State Teachers Colleges ~ (New Haven: Yale University 
Divinity School--Mimeographed, 1951). 
2william H. Vaughan, 11Religious Practices in State 
Teachers Colleges, 11 26th Yearbook of the American Association 
of Teachers Colleges, 1947. 
3The A. A.C.T.E. was formed in 1948 as the result ot: a 
merger of three national teacher education associations. 
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religion and other elements in human culture in 
order that the prospective tea cher, whether he 
teach literature, history, the arts, science 
or other subjects, be prepared to understand, 
to appreciate, and to convey to his students 
the significance of religion in human affairs. 1 
Furthermore, the committee agreed that the primary 
aim of the project would be to discover to what extent 
teacher education institutions are dealing directly and ob-
jectively with religion, whenever and wherever it is rele-
vant to learning experiences in the various fields of study; 
t o discover how this can more adequately be accomplished; and 
to provide opportunity for selected colleges to assist one 
another in the development of this kind of tea ching . The 
committee took the position that the emphasi s on teaching 
about religion offers the most i mmediate opportunity for de -
veloping programs which are both appropriate to the responsi-
bilities of colleges preparing teachers and consonant with 
legal and pract i cal limitations upon the colleges. 2 
Early in 1954, fifteen colleges and universities 
were selected as pi lot centers to conduct the study for a 
period of five years . Since that time two national workshops 
1Prospectus, Teacher Education and Religion Project, 
American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education 
(Oneonta , New York, 1953), p. 1. 
2Eugene E. Dawson, "Religion in Teache r Education," 
Religious Education, 50 (1955), 238-42. 
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and three regional conferences have been held for partici-
1 pating schools. 
It is not the purpose of this investigation to de-
scribe all phases of the A.A.C.T.E. project, nor to analyze 
its accomplishments and weaknesses. Yet since the investi-
gator is the coordinator of the project in one of the fifteen 
pilot centers, he hopes that this dissertation will make a 
contribution to the current national study of teacher educa-
tion and religion. 
5. Lack of Direction and Need for Further Study 
Current practices, which are known through research, 
conferences, study groups, faculty discussions, and a host of 
articles and volumes, indicate that there is a lack of agree-
ment on a direction to be followed in the preparation of 
teachers to deal with religion, just as there is a similar 
lack of agreement on a direction for the lower levels of 
public education. Should prospective teachers be immersed 
in an emphasis on moral and spiritual values alone, being 
taught, though sometimes not experiencing in their own edu-
cational life, values such as a respect for personality, 
honesty and loyalty? Should teachers have a working knowledge 
lcomplete mimeographed reports are available from the 
national coordinator, A.A.C.T.E., Oneonta, New York. 
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of all the great religions? If so, how should they gain 
this? Should the relationship of religion to every subject 
be stressed? Should democracy be the religion of public edu-
cation? Is Robert Ulich right in urging that 
we stop allowing our students who may have 
educational responsibilities as teachers, ad-
ministrators, psychologists and counselors, to 
go out into the world with a heap of scholarly 
knowledge, and with less than a minimum of in-
sight into the great spiritual wisdom of the 
human race? 1 
It is significant that these questions are being 
raised. The bulk of material previously referred to and that 
which is included in the bibliography verify this interest. 
Yet all questions presuppose possible answers--answers at 
least giving direction to action if not absolute in nature. 
Two possible outcomes may follow such widespread 
questioning. In the first place, public schools and tax-
supported institutions which train teachers may institute 
programs of religious teaching which are haphazard, incongru-
ous with general educational theory and practice, and re-
ligiously superficial. 
The second possible approach, and clearly preferable 
to the first, is that educators will thoroughly examine the 
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aims of education which they profess. In so doing they will 
need to evaluate the basic assumptions of their philosophies 
at fundamental points--metaphysical, epistemological, and 
axiological. From this basis, then, they will be able to 
see the direction in which they should move in the area of 
religion. 
Such investigation may even demand that some educators 
modify in whole or in part their philosophy--not so that a 
particular brand of religion may be 11 brought inu but because 
critical thinking demands it. 
Moreover, it is the thesis of this investigation 
that a philosophy of religion is closely related to value 
theory, implicitly or explicitly held by any person. If 
this is a valid assertion, then there is a special demand 
for educators to clarify their axiology if religious impli-
cations are to be in harmony with their deepest convictions 
about the meaning and purpose of life. 
It is the contention of this investigator, then, 
that if the philosophy, and especially the value theory, of 
contemporary leaders in American thought is examined, and 
the implications regarding religion are clarified, a contri-
bution will be made to the complex problem of the place of 
religion in teacher education. 
In order to begin this study, it is here assumed 
that the philosophy which has a hold on the American 
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educational1 world, and hence upon the religious outlook in 
teacher education, is that of pragmatism which has grown out 
of the writings of John Dewey. Since an understanding of 
the public school and institutions which train teachers rests 
on a broader knowledge of Dewey and his general philosophical 
system, this study t urns next to the theoretical task of 
sketching the philosophy of John Dewey and its implications, 
not only for education but for a philosophy of religion for 
teacher education. 
1By 11 educational 11 is here meant those concerned with 
the profession of education--educational philosophers, educa-
tional psychologists, educational administrators, etc. 
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CHAPTER II 
DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 
1. John Dewey 
When one man teaches in leading universities for 
nearly a half-century, publishes over fifty books, and writes 
hundreds of articles stating a philosophical point of view 
in unorthodox terms, his impact on the nation will likely be 
felt. The influence is most probable when the person deals 
with concerns of the common man: education, politics, and 
religion. On the occasion of John Dewey's ninetieth birth-
day, then, it is not surprising that the following lines were 
included in an editorial honoring him: 
If any other individual has equaled Dewey's 
effect on the intellectual life today, we do 
not know his name. Education in the United 
States has been transformed by him, and he 
has influenced even school masters to whom 
his concepts a re anathema and who take his 
advice while imagining that they repudia te 
it. 1 
John Dewey wa s born in Vermont in 1859, and at fifteen 
entered the University of Vermont, complet i ng h i s under-
gr aduate work there before going to Johns Hopkins University 
for his Ph.D. studies. His first university teaching posi-
tion was at the University of Michigan, followed by a brief 
1The New Republic, 121 (1949), 10. 
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teaching period at the University of Minnesota. His name 
first became well known during the time he was at the Uni-
versity of Chicago. There Dewey and his wife established 
the Laboratory School, an experimental effort to develop his 
new theories in progr essive education. 
In 1904 he left Chicago for Columbia Univers ity where 
he taught until his retirement in 1930. By this time he had 
already published enough articles and books that a compiled 
bibliography filled a book of one hundred and thirty pages. 1 
Professor Dewey died on June 1, 1952. 2 
2. Foundations of Dewey's Educational Theory 
At least two questions are usually asked about any 
philosopher: (1) What is his concept of reality? (2) What is 
his theory of knowledge? These questions are asked because 
the nature of philosophical thinking demands that ontological3 
issues be dealt with and that a theory of knowledge be made 
1Milton H. Thomas and Herbert W. Schnei·der, A Biblio-
graphy of John Dewey (New York: Columbia Univer sity Press, 
1929). 
2For a more lengthy biographical sketch, see Paul A. 
Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of John Dewey (Evanston: North-
western University, 1939), pp. 3-45. 
3Throughout this study, the terms "ontology11 and 
11metaphys i cs" will be used interchangeably. Both will refer 
to the question: What is reality and what category or cate-
gories best describes "being11 ? 
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explicit. Thus an examiner must isolate these two aspects 
of the philosophical system he is studying. 
a. Metaphysics 
Dewey's metaphysics is characterized by a dissatis-
faction with traditional philosophers from Aristotle to the 
present. All of them have insisted on some single reality as 
being the ontological fact or else have bifurcated reality 
into form and matter, body and spirit, or other separate 
substances. 
Dewey's dissatisfaction appears to be based on two 
objections. First, he believes that many philosophers have 
tried to split up nature's unity into some false division. 
Secondly, whether or not the former was attempted, these 
philosophers have conceived of reality as unchanging, abso-
lute, or fixed. 
In this dissatisfaction with traditional philosophers 
who have chosen a substance metaphysics, Dewey observes that 
each one has tried to convert an eventual function into its 
antecedent existence. 1 This conversion is seen, for example, 
in the idealist who is aware of thought and the importance 
of mentality upon his environment. But rather than consider 
1John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1925), p . 68. 
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mind as functionally related to the object of his perceptions, 
he makes mind a metaphysically existent reality. However, 
Dewey is convinced that mind is only a function of a larger 
• whole, and believes that its reality as an organism is func-
tionally related to its environment. 
Furthermore, he believes that materialists bifurcate 
reality in a way which does not conform to actual experience. 
Materialists fail to recognize that the traits which charac-
terize thinking, such as uncertainty, alternatives, and am-
biguity, are also part of the character of the world in which 
thinking occurs. According to Dewey, the fact is that every 
existence is a totality of many factors, including those 
which the idealist talks of and those which the materialist 
talks of. 
Reality for Dewey is a structure, but it is not a 
static structure. On the contrary, it involves change, move-
ment, and creation. Everything that we know, he says, in-
volves relations with other things. Even the most stable 
thing that we can think of is not free from conditions im-
posed upon it by other things. 
At first reflection it would seem that so-called 
material things are permanent. Dewey believes that the solid 
earth, mountains, and other emblems of constancy and perma-
nence are only held in a kind of temporary equilibrium in 
the economy of nature's compromises and adjustments. 
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Yet throughout his writings, Dewey is careful to point 
out that although change is basic to reality, there is order 
and structure in the change . And this structure which he 
considers so important is defined in the following manner: 
Structure is what makes construction possible 
and cannot be discovered or defined except in 
some realized construction, construction being, 
of course, an evident order of change. 1 
Furthermore, an error in metaphysics results from a 
false basis of classification, according to Dewey. Among the 
dualistic positions, Dewey dislikes most the one which divides 
existence into the supernatural and the natural. In fact, he 
says that even more sophisticated philosophical dualisms, 
such as the Platonic division of ideal archetypes and physi-
cal events, Aristotle's form and matter, Kant's phenomenal 
and noumenal are only counterparts of the rough and crude 
notion of the natural and supernatura1. 2 
Thenmo, Dewey believes that there are no universa l 
realities, no universal mind, or matter, or mechanisms. 
Rather, reality is to be found only in concrete experiences. 
To explain this conception, he again suggests that to believe 
all reality is matter, or to believe that reality is basically 
mind, is only to convert an eventual function to its antecedent 
1 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago : Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1925 ), p. 72. 
2Ibid., p. 56. 
existence. Matter and mind are both functions. Mind comes 
to be~ only in the functional relationship of organism and 
environment. To say that mind is an entity in its own right 
is to fail to see that mind has no being apart from the en-
vironment which shares in making it real. 
Dewey's world view is not teleological. He does not 
argue that experiences do not terminate. Rather he suggests 
that endings are not ordained by some superhuman power. 
Dewey insists that when modern philosophers believe in 
teleology~ they are copying the Greek metaphysicians who 
picked those ends which they liked and gave them metaphysical 
status. 1 
Summarizing his arguments against a purposive uni-
verse~ Dewey says: 
Like those who regard a happy escape from a 
catastrophe a s a providential intervention~ 
neglecting all who have not escaped~ popular 
teleology regards good objects as natural ends, 
bad objects and qualities being regarded as 
mere accidents or incidents, regrettable 
mechanical excesses, or defects. 2 
Thus Dewey rejects teleology and finds it unnecessary to 
posit any purpose beyond man and his ends-in-view. 
1The distinction between ends i n nature and the ends-
in-view of personal choice is important for Dewey's value 
theory and is discussed in Chapter 2, page 74. See biblio-
graphical references in Chapter 2, page 14, footnote 2. 
2Joseph Ratner, The Philosopher of John Dewey (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1928), p. 37. The primary source 
is in Dewey's Exoerience and Nature, p. 103. 
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Another fallacy in many ontologies, and one which 
has plagued the traditional metaphysician, is the confusion 
of a cause with its results. Reality, Dewey believes, cannot 
be reduced to an existential cause. Cause is not more im-
portant, nor can it be separated from the result. The truth 
of existence, according to Dewey, is that cause and effect 
are on the same level of importance. They are actually part 
of the same historical process. 
Another important aspect of Dewey's metaphysics is 
its naturalistic quality. For him, all that is belongs to 
the natural world--the universe. This is the universe which 
modern science describes. Dewey believes that any effort to 
find one single substance, as did the older philosophers, is 
both impossible and dangerous for an intelligent vie\'r of the 
universe. Moreover, current difficulties in idealism, 
materialism, and dualism can be overcome only if we begin 
to think of reality as a structure of change, or in other 
words, as a functional relationship of all aspects of the 
universe. 
Such a metaphysical position, Dewey suggests, is 
difficult for some traditional thinkers; yet 
nothing but unfamiliarity stands in the way 
of thinking of both mind and matter as differ-
ent characters of natural events, in which 
matter expresses their sequent ial order, and 
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mind the order of their meanings in their 
logical connections and dependencies. 1 
b. Epistemology 
Arthur E. Murphy believes that Dewey's theory of 
knowledge, like his metaphysics, is basic to his entire 
philosophy, although neither is developed by Dewey in a 
traditional manner. 2 Theory of knowledge is of crucial im-
portance in Dewey's philosophy since his concern for the edu-
cational process is so prominent. 
Dewey's epistemology can best be related to three 
questions: First, what is the relation between the knower 
and the known object? Second, what is the phenomenon we 
call thinking and what is its use? Third, what is truth and 
how do we arrive at it?3 
Let us consider first the relation between knower and 
object known. Dewey holds that in any perception, a person 
cannot possibly say that the knowledge is all in the mind. 
1 John Dewey, Exoerience and Nature, p. 71t. 
2see Arthur E. Murphy, 11 Dewey 1 s Epistemology and 
Metaphysics, 11 The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul A. 
Schilpp. 
3In dealing with any aspect of Dewey's theory of 
knowledge, it must be remembered that for him, knowledge has 
no meaning apart from active inquiry and is to be understood 
as the appropriate outcome of inquiry. This thesis is dis-
cussed in John Dewey, Lo~ic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1938 , Chapter I. 
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Nor can he maintain that the most important fact is the ob-
ject. Both mind and the real object are necessary factors 
in perception. This simple experience of perception, then, 
is not a dualistic one of two facts, one an object and the 
other a perceiver. It is rather a relation of organism and 
environment. According to Dewey, perception actually comes 
as the two are functionally related. Yet in this relationship, 
the organism, that is, the person, is a part of the perceptive 
experience. That is to say, the self is concerned in it all. 
It would be much more correct to say that a 
self is contained in a perception than that 
a perception is presented to a self. That is 
to say, the organism is involved in the occur-
rence of the perception in the same sort of 
way that hydrogen is involved in the happening 
••• producing ••• of water. 1 
Dewey jocularly uses the example of the 11 foodist 11 and 
the 11 eaterist 11 to illustrate the relationship between the 
knower and the object. If the world were divided into these 
two camps, the eaterist (idealist) would contend that no 
objects exist except in relation to eating. The foodist 
(realist) would argue that to be an eater is to be an eater 
of food, and to take away the independent existence of food 
is to deny the existence and possibility of an eater. 
1A statement by Joseph Ratner in summary of several 
of Dewey's own statements, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 
149. 
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Dewey suggests that both viewpoints are wrong. 
Rather the object modifies the knower and the knower the ob-
ject. Not only does the perception change the self, but 
11 things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable 
qualitative change. 111 
Therefore, Dewey has only one answer to the problem 
of the relationship of knower and object. He is realist 
enough to say that the object is actually there and real. 
But he believes that in a knowing situation, meaning comes 
through the relationship of the human organism and its en-
vironment. To put it differently, all knowing requires a 
person, but also there must be a stimulus in the world out-
side of human personality. 
The second and third epistemological questions, re-
l a ted to the nature of thinking and the tests of truth, are 
so closely related that they can best be discussed together. 
In the first chapter of How We Think, Dewey asserts 
that thinking is not a matter of spontaneous combustion. 
Nor does it occur on general principles. Rather 11 there is 
something which makes it. 112 Nor is knowledge granted 
1John Dewey, Essays i n E6)erimental Logic (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 191 , p. 280. 
2 John Dewey, How We Think (New York: D. C. Heath and 
Co., 1938), p. 12 . 
) 
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intuitively to the mind. Thinking occurs only after a per-
son is aware of a problem. As he tries to solve the problem, 
so-called mental activity occurs. 
General appeals to a child to think, irrespective 
of the existence in his own experience of some 
difficulty that troubles him and disturbs his 
equilibrium, are as futile as advice to lift 
himself by his boot-straps. 1 
After the problem has been raised, the next step is 
to discover a possible plan or theory for a solution. The 
sources of this hypothesis are past experiences and prior 
knowledge, as well as "funded experience of the race." The 
hypothesis is subjected to all possible new evidence and data . 
Then, after careful deliberation, a decision is made as to 
whether or not the plan should be tried in action. 
It is at this point of action that knowledge emerges. 
The knowledge is verified when the plan of action is carried 
out successfully. Knowledge for its own sake, or knowledge 
existing for itself, is meaningless for Dewey. Knowledge 
exists only as an instrument of action, and it is verified 
when an anticipated solution is reached through the action. 
3. Dewey's Educational Theory 
Dewey at no time has attempted to organize his philos-
ophy i nto a system. This omission apparently results from 
1John Dewey, How We Think {New York: D. C. Heath and 
Co ., 1938 ), p. 12. 
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his opposition to systems and the fear that such tightly 
1 knit theories will become static. Thus he has not developed 
a metaphysical system and an epistemological theory and then 
drawn out implications of these theories into every phase of 
philosophical thought. Furthermore, each individual aspect 
of his total philosophical pattern seems to be partially 
autonomous. Nevertheless, implications of his general views 
concerning reality and knowledge appear in his various writ-
ings. These implications are especially clear in his philos-
ophy of education. 
The basis of Dewey's ontology, as has been pointed 
out, is the premise that the ultimate principle of reality 
is the functional event. Seen from a more personal view, ex-
perience is the key to reality. 
Two words, then, are important in Dewey's concept of 
reality, functionalism and experience. They likewise are 
clues to his theory of knowledge, since for Dewey, all knowl-
edge stems from an experience of relationships between 
organism and environment, out of which problems emerge, de-
manding hypotheses and plans of action. 
Several implications of these principles are seen in 
Dewey's educational theory. Since reality is ever changing 
lsee John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," 
Contemporary American Philosoph~, ed. George P. Adams and 
Wm. P. Montague (New York: Theacmillan Co., 1930), II, 22. 
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and since knowledge is a plan of action, Dewey does not hold 
that a static block of truth has been discovered once in 
the past and is to be transferred to each new generation. 
Neither does he think that innate in man is knowledge which 
under guidance will unfold. On the other hand, Dewey be-
lieves that the educational process presents the pupil with 
problems; efforts to solve them r esult in learning. 
In educational practice as in scientific theory, a 
hypothetical solution of a problem is tested by its workability . 
Dewey continually emphasizes his assertion that the testing 
of theories is made real to a pupil only as he has a problem, 
proposes a plan of action, and tests the plan out in his own 
experience, either in practice or imagination. 
Probably the most complete and concise statement of 
Dewey 's philosophy of progressive education is seen in his 
Kappa Delta Pi lectures of 1938. 1 This book not only out-
lines his educational vie\'IS, but also presents criticisms of 
be liefs erroneously attributed to him. 
In order to describe and defend his educational views, 
Dewey compares traditional education with progressive educa-
tion. According to Dewey's interpretation, the chief task 
of the traditional school is to transmit to each new genera-
tion information which was discovered in the past . Likewise 
rules of moral conduct have been developed which are "true," 
1John Dewey, Experience and Education (New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1938). 
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and the "older" school must develop habits in the student 
in conformity with the rules. 
Furthermore, Dewey believes that the curriculum of 
the traditional school is out of harmony with other social 
institutions in which the pupil lives. Because of this dif-
ference, Dewey maintains that it is difficult, if not im-
possible, for school life and school teaching to have appli-
cation in the student's everyday life. 
Within the framework described above, the purpose of 
the older school is to prepare the pupil for future life re-
quiring him to learn fixed bits of information and to develop 
proper habits of conduct. The pupil must accept subject mat-
ter with obedience, since it comes from the wisdom of the 
ages. Books are the main representatives of knowledge. The 
teacher is the medium through which knowledge is communicated, 
skills are developed, and rules of conduct are enforced. 
Furthermore, this type of education rests on the assumption 
tha t truth is static. The future is thought to be a repeti-
t i on of the past. 1 
Progressive education, on the other hand, varies 
widely with traditional education, according to Dewey. The 
1John Dewey, Experience and Education. This material 
is based on Chapter I. It is relevant to a sk, however, if 
Dewey has realistically described all traditional education, 
or if he has presented the most extr eme type for polemic 
purpos es? 
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"new" school helps the student to make the most of his present 
opportunities rather than to prepare him for the far distant 
future. Instead of believing in a static world of fixed 
truth, progressive educators recognize the fact of a chang-
ing world, new problems continually arising, and the need for 
new knowledge. 
Progressive education is also strong in that a free 
relationship between pupil and teacher is substituted for 
authoritarian control. Thus he believes that learning comes, 
not primarily from books and teacher, but in and through the 
child's own experience. In opposition to the development of 
isolated skills, a development of skills is desired which 
will have direct and important use to the student. This edu-
cational ideal in Dewey's thinking rests on hi s conviction 
that a close relationship exists between the process of actual 
experience and education. 1 
For example, Dewey points out that though pupils in 
the traditional schools had experiences--plenty of them--
often these experiences were unrelated to the l ife of the 
student outside of the class . Also many experiences were 
negative in character , that is, the pupil became bored with 
reading or his experience taught him not to have a question-
ing mind. 
1see John Dewey Democracy and Education (New York: 
The Macmill an Co ., 1916), Chapters 11 and 14. 
56 
Dewey believes that a student will have experiences 
in any kind of educational system. But if the "new" educa-
tion is to be an improvement over the old, experiences in the 
progressive school must be of the highest quality. By 
"highest quality," Dewey means that experiences must be im-
mediately enjoyable and at the same time promote future ex-
periences. 
Dewey actually qualifies his first requirement by 
suggesting that a student should be permitted to experience 
the unhappy results of his own illogical, anti-social, or 
disruptive behavior. The second quality deserves special con-
sideration. 
The theory that experiences are educative when they 
produce further experiences is called the "category of con-
t i nuity."1 In making this concept a norm, Dewey means that 
experiences should be of the quality that foster new experi-
ences. They should never stifle desire for other experiences. 
In order that the student may have experiences which 
are instrumental to further growth, the teacher can be the 
guide to see that there is an adequate interaction between 
the internal (the student's interests and needs) and external 
(sub ject matter) factors, keeping both in balance. Such a 
1John Dewey, Experience and Education, 23f. 
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balance, Dewey maintains, was not known in traditional edu-
cation. As a matter of emphasis Dewey writes: 
Failure of 
capacities 
ence to be 
ure of the 
material. 
adaptation of material to needs and 
of individuals may cause an experi-
non-educative quite as much as fail-
individual to adapt himself to the 
1 
One crucial problem in progressive education is to 
discover the place of text books and other formal subject 
matter. Dewey is definite in his criticism of the progressive 
school which throws out all text books and gives the student 
freedom to do as he pleases. He maintains that the school 
which changes the center of interest from subject matter to 
student does not have to remove academic content. Rather, 
subject matter becomes a means toward meeting problems of 
experience. History, for example, is not an end in itself~ 
The task of the educator is to 
discover the connection which actually exists 
within experience between the achievements of 
the past and the issues of the present. 2 
As the student grows older, and as his range of experiences 
broadens, it 
becomes the office of the educator to select 
those things within the range of existing ex-
perience that have the promise and potentiality 
of presenting new problems which, by stimulat-
ing new ways of observation and judgment will 
expand the area of further experiences. 3 
lJohn Dewey, Experience and Education, p. 23f. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
3Ibid., p. 90. 
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Furthermore, the teacher and the student need to 
recognize that knowledge already gained is not a fixed pos-
session. It is rather an agency and instrumentality for 
opening new fields which make new demands upon the person. 
The concept ucontinuity of experience" with its ref-
erence to instrumental experiences, has given to progressive 
education and the philosophy of John Dewey the name 11 instru-
mentalism.11 Moreover, critics have been especially severe 
in their evaluation of Dewey's educational theory at this 
point. It does seem appropriate to ask: ltWhat is the end, 
the final goal, the purpose of education and life?"1 
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Dewey answers that the question is one which is rooted 
in the traditional philosophies--in the theories of a static 
universe where a set of truths and values is thought to be 
discovered at one time and to apply for all the future. 
Dewey's educational philosophy, on the other hand, 
is based on the view that all life is experience, creativity, 
growth, and change. At each point in life new problems are 
found which demand solutions. New experiences enrich life, 
opening still newer experiences with deeper meanings. To 
set any artificial end would be to block the "continuity of 
experience" and stop the process of education. For Dewey, 
then, experience is not only the means of education it is the 
lThis problem is explored more thoroughly in the 
section on value theory on pages 62-78. 
only end there is.1 
4. Dewey's Value Theory 
If education is to be more than a haphazard process, 
its theory must go beyond an examination of the nature and 
tests of knowledge. A philosophy of education must also in-
clude more than conclusions about the nature of reality. 
The most important question to ask is: What is the purpose 
of education?2 Subsequent questions follow: What should 
be taught? What values--aesthetic, intellectual, moral, 
and religious--should permeate the atmosphere of the school 
community? 
Answers to each of the above questions defy super-
ficial opinion, habitual 9liches, or local mores. Rather, 
each question demands answers in terms of a philosophy of 
values. What is the good life and what aim of education sup-
ports it? What subject matter should be taught? In what 
atmosphere can teaching and learning best be accomplished·? 
The specific problem of this study, that of discover-
ing the place of religion in teacher education, will find 
1The title of Chapter 8, Etherience and Education, 
carried this theme: rtExperience, e means and goal of 
education." 
2 See Harry s. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of 
Education (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 29. 
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solution through answers to the questions listed above. 
However, an approach to religion rests upon value theory 
for still another reason. Religion, whatever else it 
may be, includes a concern for highest values, a dedica-
tion to them, and appropriate behavior resulting from 
such commitment. Therefore the most significant way to 
investigate the role of religion in education is through 
axiology. An examination of Dewey's value theory, in-
cluding his religious views, may serve to illustrate a 
method of looking at religion through axiology. At the 
same time it should suggest to Dewey's followers and op-
ponents a philosophy of religion in teacher education 
which is implied in his theory of value. 
Dewey's own writings on epistemology and meta-
physics seldom deal with values. Nevertheless, Dewey 
has been called a 11moral philosopher."1 If moral values 
are defined as those principles upon which man ought to 
act, 2 then Dewey was profoundly concerned with such values. 
He showed this interest, for example, through his writings 
about the United States' obligation in world affairs and 
York: 
1 See Morton White (ed.), The Age of Analysis (New 
The New American Library, 1955), p. 173. 
2This is, in fact, Dewey's own meaning when he 
writes: •tMoral values ••• designate whatever is taken to have 
rightful authority in the direction of conduct. 11 Quest for 
Certainty (New York: Minton Balch and Co., 1929), p. 258. 
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in domestic problems. His deep interest in education re-
fleets a similar concern for values. Thus there are a 
number of indications that Dewey drew normative principles 
1 
out of his own experience and from his philosophy. 
In examining Dewey's axiology# one does not have 
to make a blind assumption that the value theory is in-
tegrally related to his metaphysics and epistemology. Two 
brief affirmations indicate Dewey's awareness of such con-
nections: 
We find no room for a theory of values separate 
from a theory of nature. 2 
Discussion of the subject of values is profound-
ly affected by epistemological theories. 3 
Dewey recognizes, then, that he makes ultimate and 
methodological assumptions in developing his theory of 
value. The fact that these presuppositions are not clari-
fied by Dewey's writing makes it difficult fully to under-
stand his axiology. Such clarification will be part of 
the task of this chapter. 
1see bibliography in Paul A. Schilpp {ed.), The 
Philosoph! of John Dewey (Evanston: The Northwestern-rrni-
versity, 9390} 
2John Dewey, E~erience and Nature (Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Co.# 25), p. 395. 
3John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation, •r International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, ed. Otto Neurath, Vol. II, 
No. 4, p. 1. 
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What, then, are the basic characteristics or the 
Dewey theory of value? A negative approach may first ex-
tract what his theory is not and clear the way for a more 
precise statement. 
In the first place, literally speaking, there are 
no such things as values ror Dewey. Rather there are many 
1 
experiences which may have a quality or value. Dewey likes 
to think or nvalue" as an adjective, describing a trait or 
quality or some noun. When he uses the word "value" it is 
only a shorthand word to mean experiences which have quali-
tative meaning, which enhance, enrich, viviry and ennoble 
life. 
Secondly, Dewey maintains that value is not just any-
thing which gives pleasure, as the hedonists insist. Nor 
is man's moral choice that or calculating the amount or 
pleasure in given alternatives. Rather, decisions go deeper 
than satisfaction of immediate desire. Decisions which men 
race demand intelligent choices beyond the quantity of pleas-
ure anticipated. Fundamental conrlicts between alternative 
actions demand answers which may alter the whole future or 
the persons involved. "What kind or a person am I to become?" 
"What sort of a self is in the making?" "What kind or a 
1John Dewey, "Values, Liking, and Thought," Journal of 
Philosophy, 20 (1923), 617. This point of view is also dis-
cussed in Dewey's "The Field of Va.lue," Value: A Cooperative 
Inquiry, ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1949 ) ' p. 66. 
world is making?" 1 These, Dewey believes, are questions of 
value which man cannot avoid. They are questions regarding 
the nature and destiny of man and his world. Thus Dewey 
shows clearly that his theory of value transcends the hedO.- ·· 
histic or utilitarian scheme, as well as emotive theories of 
value. 
Thirdly, just as Dewey insists that metaphysical ef-
forts will fail if one is looking for a single ultimate 
reality, likewise, the 
search for a single, inclusive good is doomed 
to failure. Such happiness2 as life is capable 
of comes from the full participation of all our 
powers in the endeavor to wrest from each chang-
ing situation of experience its own full and 
unique meaning. 3 
Dewey also rejects what he calls an empirical approach, 
the view that values are independent of thought and judgment. 
For the empiricists, values are totally constituted by liking, 
feeling, and enjoyment. Such subjectivity Dewey rejects. 4 
On the positive side, Dewey's position at first eludes 
categorization. He seems, on the one hand, to assume the 
1John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1922), p. 217. 
2considering the context of this passage, the term 
"value" is more accurate than "happiness," especially in view 
of Dewey's criticism of hedonistic ethics. 
3John Dewey, A Credo (New York: Simon Schuster, 1934), 
p. 7. 
4John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Part 3, Ch. 5. 
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sociologist's view~ popularized by Sumner, 1 that morality is 
the codification of mores of any society. For example~ in 
one of Dewey's early writings he says: 
When we take the socia l point of view we are 
compelled to realize the extent to which our 
moral beliefs are a product of the social en-
vironment. 2 
Yet in the same book he adds that we must realize 11 also the 
extent to which thinking new ideas can change the environ-
ment . 11 3 
Or again, Dewey sounds like the realist G. E. Moore 
in declaring~ as did the latter~ that 
Value as such, even things having value, cannot 
in their immediate existence be reflected upon; 
they either are or are not ; are or are not en-
joyed • • • In themselves values may be just pointed 
to. 4 
Until the subjective quality in his view is seen~ one 
might suppose that Dewey believes va l ues to be things~ abso-
lute, eternal, and transcendent . For example ~ he believes 
that when anything is enjoyed~ and after careful intellectual 
criticism is found to have enjoyab le consequences~ it is of 
value.5 There is at least a strong subjectivistic quality 
lwilliam G. Sumner~ Folkways (Boston; Ginn and Co . ~ 
2John Dewey and J • H. Tufts ~ Ethics (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1908), p. 290 . 
3 Ibid . ~ p. 348 . 
4 John Dewey~ Ex2erience and Nature, p. 398. 
5paraphrased from the Quest for Certaint~~ pp. 27lf . 
1906). 
in Dewey's concept of value. 
In view of the apparent contradictions in Dewey's 
axiology, some other approach than that of placing his beliefs 
in a specific historical tradition will have to be made. Only 
specially built categories will fit Dewey. One can imagine 
that it is in this way that Dewey would want a student to 
view his philosophy. 
a. Intellectual Criticism in Valuation 
Dewey speaks often of the process of valuation. This 
emphasis immediately calls to attention~s view that a value 
is not an autonomous reality. It is a quality of experience 
which emerges under certain conditions. The term "valuation" 
suggests that the most important condition of a value situation 
is that of criticism. By criticism Dewey means a process of 
reflective estimation or judgment. 1 
For Dewey, all human activity begins through some 
experience--a problem, an enjoyment, a startling episode, an 
interest. In the course of a choice among possible experiences, 
one may be instantly overwhelmed by a pleasurable sensation. 
Again, one may come face to face with some human predicament. 
But whatever happens, there is no value in sensory experience 
by itself. The experience takes on a quality of value only 
1John Dewey, "The Problem of Values," Journal of 
Philosophy, 10 (1913), 269. 
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after the person uses his intellectual faculties to the full-
est--when he inquires as to the consequences of the act, 
wish, or thought. 
If, after careful reflection, the experience is seen 
to be an instrument for securing approved consequences, it 
has value. It is, then, in relation to testing, that a value 
potential becomes an actual value. In order to make this 
distinction, Dewey uses the terms de facto values and de jure 
values. 1 
Furthermore, in his discussion of valuatio~Dewey 
suggests that there is a genuine difference between a false 
good--a spurious satisfaction--and a true good. Often our 
experiences cannot be immediately tested by bodily activity. 
Nevertheless, there is an empirical test for discovering the 
truth or falsity of a potential _value: 2 
To make a valuation, to judge appraisingly, is 
to bring to conscious perception relations of 
productivity and resistance and thus to make 
value significant, intelligent and intelligible. 
In becoming discriminately aware of the causal 
conditions of the object liked and preferred, we 
become aware of its eventual operations. 3 
The above references concerning critical judgment have 
come from writings in Dewey's middle years. A look at his 
1John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open 
Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 4o6. 
· 
2John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1922), p. 210. 
3John Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 430. 
earlier writings, however~ shows the same view. For example~ 
in his Ethics he makes the distinction between 11esteem11 and 
11 estimation. 11 The first is spontaneously to prize~ hold 
dear~ or admire, whereas to estimate is to reflect upon an 
esteemed experience and to judge it worthy--to decide it to 
be valuable. 1 
Dewey calls the critical investigation of value-claims 
11 operational thinking." Such thinking~ he insists, must be 
applied to the judgment of values just as it has finally been 
applied to conceptions of physical objects through the sci-
ences. 11 Experimental empiricism in the field of ideas of good 
and bad is dernanded." 2 
Furthel~ore, critically to evaluate some enjoyed ex-
perience or thing is to look at it in its relations with other 
things. When thus examined, the context may reveal that candy~ 
for example, may produce sickness and hence is not a value. 3 
Or again~ Dewey suggests that it is inaccurate to call a per-
son a candidate. He is only a candidate in connection with 
an on-going sequence of events in which a future election is 
an indispensable part. 4 
1John Dewey and J. H. Tufts~ Ethics~ p. 290. 
2John Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 258. 
3John Dewey and J. H. Tufts, Ethics, p. 291 . 
4John Dewey~ Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical 
Library~ 1946)~ p. 25 • 
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The important emphasis upon critical judgment in 
evaluation, then, has at least three aspects: First, Dewey 
places his confidence in the potentiality of intelligence to 
foresee the consequences of behavior and to direct subsequent 
action. Secondly, he hopes to transfer all of the rigors of 
the scientific method to the area of value judgments. Third-
ly, Dewey emphasizes the contextual, the organismic, the con-
tinuous aspect of life. This is to say that experiences of 
pleasure, challenge, and satisfaction are not separated from 
all other kinds of experiences but must be · seen in the con-
text of the whole. This last claim of critical judgment is 
so important that it warrants further amplification. 
b . Values are of One Kind 
If Dewey were writing about the conflict between the 
"sacred" and the "secular" which is receiving so much attention 
today, he would inevitably take the position that there is no 
sharp distinction between sacred and secular experiences. 
Rather, Dewey insists that experiences are set within the 
context of a maze of life situations . Only through critical 
judgment can the experiences be evaluated. He believes that 
sharp divisions between the "material 11 and "spiritual," "low" 
and "high~' are false. Such artificial divisions , he thinks, 
indicate a carry-over from early dualistic philosophies . 
Dewey's contextual point of view is developed in 
The Quest for Certainty. One passage summarizes his view: 
For the latter terms Lfdeal or spiritua!7 if 
they have any concrete application at all sig-
nify something which is a desirable consumma-
tion of conditions, a cherished fulfillment of 
means. The sharp separation between material 
and ideal good thus deprives the latter of the 
underpinning of effective support while it opens 
the way for treating things which should be em-
ployed as means as ends in themselves. For 
since men cannot after all live without some 
measure of possessing such matters as health and 
wealth, the latter things will be viewed as 
values and ends in isolation unless they are 
treated as integral constituents of the goods 
that are deemed supreme and final. 1 
Throughout the above statement, and in his entire 
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discussion, Dewey attempts to make clear the danger of separat-
ing 11 low" or "material 11 values from "high 11 and 11 spiri tual 11 
ones. At the same time he points out the necessary connec-
tion between means and ends, between instrumenta l values and 
intrinsic values. He suggests that means and ends are so 
inextricably intertwined tha t they cannot be separated. 
Ends separated from means are either sentimental 
indulgences or if they happen to exist are mere-
ly accidental. 2 
Similarly, Dewey argues against an attempt to con-
s truct a hierarchy of values which might stand once and for 
1John Dewey, Quest for Certainty, p. 270 . 
2 Ibid., p. 279 . 
all as a kind of catalogue in which values are arranged in 
order of their eternal ascending worth. Any such effort, he 
says ;, 
is to indulge in a gloss on our ability to 
frame intelligent judgments in the concrete. 
Or else it is to dignify customary choice and 
prejudice by a title of honor~ 1 
Dewey does not propose to say that all experiences of 
value are of the same quality. Such a claim is like suppos-
ing that every object which is perceived has the same cogni-
tive force as every other. On the contrary;, he believes that 
our common experience tells us that this is not the case. 
There is no value without satisfaction;, but 
there have to be certain conditions fulfilled 
to transform a satisfaction into a value . 2 
Even though values are of different quality, Dewey 
maintains that the distinction between "ideal" and "practical, 11 
11 sacred" and "secular;, 11 11 high 11 and 11 low;," cannot be absolutely 
made to last eternally;, nor can such specific distinctions 
be made prior to each judgment. Rather;, valuation discovers 
qualities of meaning;, o~ richness, of unique flavor in each 
experience. That which absolute theory may have classed as 
low may occasionally be productive of the highest value. 
1John Dewey;, Quest for Certainty, p. 266. 
2Ibid.;, p. 268. 
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c. Ends-in-view 
Dewey is well aware of the ends or ideals which are 
central in traditional ethical systems. He is cognizant of 
the summum bonum of Aristotle, seen in other philosophical 
writings as various objective goals of the good life. Dewey 
also takes note of the subjectivistic view of Kant in his 
principle that 11 only the good will can be absolutely con-
sidered good ."1 
But with this awareness of other systems, Dewey still 
expresses dissatisfaction with any absolute end in a theory 
of value. His dislike for absolute values is similar to his 
unwillingness to posit any absolute ontological being . Fur-
thermore, he feels that his refusal to admit absolutes is 
strengthened by scientific theories regarding change and flux 
as characteristic of the natural world. Dewey, then, repudi-
ates any absolute end in his axiology. 
The term "ends-in-view" is used to express the es-
sential element in Dewey's value theory. This term refers 
to his summum bonum, although it is radically different from 
that concept in the traditional philosophies of value . 2 In 
1
see John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co., 1920), pp. 162 f. 
2This entire argument is seen most clearly in Human 
Nature and Conduct although it is also developed in the Quest 
for Certainty, Chapter 9; Reconstruction in Philosophy, Chap-
ter 7; Experience and Nature, Chapter 3; and "Theory of Valua-
tion," Chapter 5. 
72 
developing this position, Dewey begins wi1h the genesis of 
aims in human experience. He claims that !aims or goals never 
constitute static finalities. Rather thei are means to aid 
man in satisfying his needs or to solve pfoblems of the here-
and-now. The target of the archer, for example, serves as 
I 
a means for more effective shooting; the animal in a hunt 
I 
serves for better eating , or prestige, or
1
some other practical 
desire . 
I . 
Furthermore, Dewey believes that when a single end is 
selected as the desired consequence of an lact or acts, the 
most important consequences usually are di fferent from any 
single goal . In fact, the actual results lmay not be seen at 
all if one is narrowly intent on one high finality. 
Whenever ends, then, are regarded! as ends in them-
selves, rather than as directive to preseht choice, those ends 
I 
either become frozen and isolated from life, or they become 
I 
such an obsession for the person that he pecomes a fanatic in 
his search for them. 
Furthermore, Dewey believes that r hen a person has 
an end, rather than ends-in-view, ends anp means become con-
fused. One easily rationalizes a means which he thinks will 
surely bring the anticipated goal. He evr n may accomplish 
his end, never seeing that the means has rroduced other 
consequences which could not be approved I f the vision had 
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been clear enough to see them. 1 
Dewey admits that his concept of l nds is normative 
and that persons actually do become attacJed to fixed, ex-
ternal goals. But such a static devotion lis explained by 
Dewey in terms of man's difficulty of ovebcoming habitual 
I 
ways of thinking. Such stereotyped thinkt ng is caused by in-
security and fear, and by man's unwillingless to depend upon 
empirical evidence and intelligent critict sm of possible con-
sequences.2 In an eloquent if negative manner, Dewey closes 
I 
a chapter on 11 The Nature of Aims" in Humah Nature and Conduct 
with these words: 
Fixed ends upon one side and fif ed principles--
that is authoritative rules--onl the other, are 
props for a feeling of safety, phe refuge of the 
timid and the means by which the bold prey upon 
the timid. 3 
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Precisely, then, what does Dewey r ean by ends-in-view?_ 
He is convinced that there is no such thirg as value in the 
abstract. Value is a particular quality If experience which 
may enhance, vivify, revitalize, strengthl n, and enrich life. 
Such quality is possible through valuation. Every person, he 
says, has times of choice which emerge inJ daily life. These 
appear in situations of intense conflict r hen assumed values 
1see Dewey's 11Theory 
thorough discussions of this 
with ends and values. 
I 
of ValuatioJ 11 for 
issue. Chapter 5 
I 
one of the most 
deals especially 
2John Dewey, Human 
3Ibid., p. 237. 
Nature and Co~du~, p. 231. 
come into competition for one's loyalty. 
tion, then, consists in 
IThe art of delibera-
1 
selecting some foreseen consequ~nce to serve as 
a stimulus to present action. ft brings future 
possibilities into the present scene and there-
by frees and expands present tendencies. 1 
In Dewey's frame of reference such ends-in-view avoid 
I 
the limitations of absolute ends. Yet thj y provide direction 
from the here-and-now tm'lard a clear look I at future conse-
quences. In turn the consequences, if desirable, expand over 
I horizons to further exploration of the good until one can see 
the continuity of one's own progressive d~cisions with the 
on-going processes of the world . 2 
Finally, Devvey believes that man hoes not have the. 
problem of living without commonly accepted values. Health, 
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honor, friendship, aesthetic appreciation, learning, justice, 
benevolence, and the like are a ll recogni~ed by man.3 Yet he 
argues that it is impossible, outside the~ context or a particu-
lar problem, to see just how one should decide when any con-
flict arises among these valuable ends-in-view. The problem, 
Dewey continues, is to avoid casuistry, tp avoid bare utili-
tarianism, to avoid fanaticism and other ~imited methods of 
making decisions. His hope is that man w~ll make decisions 
1John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct , p . 234 . 
2Ibid., p. 263. 
3John Dewey, Reconstruction in PHilosophy, p . 166. 
I 
with the realization that many consequences will follow, and 
I yet that he will foresee those consequences and approve of 
them. 
It has been seen from these pages lthat Dewey rejects 
much that is characteristic of classical value theories. 
However, he is profoundly convinced of the importance of 
wise value judgments. This is so importaJ t in his thinking 
I that he writes: 
I . 
I have become more and more troubled by the 
intellectual scandal that is inyolved in the 
dualism ••• between something called "science" on 
the one hand and something called 11morals 11 on the 
other. I have long felt that t~e construction of 
a logic , that is, a method of effective inquiry 
which would apply without abrup~ breach of con-
tinuity the fields designated by both of these 
words, is at once our needed throretical solvent 
and the supply of our greatest practical want . 
This belief has had much more to do with the 
development of what I termed, for lack of a bet-
ter word, "inS'rwnentalism," than most of the 
reasons that have been assignedr 1 
Such a rationale helps clarify Derey's intense concern 
for building a value theory. His devotiop to values, coupled 
with his belief that values, although varaable, may well be 
ultimate, 2 gives one a clue to the vitality 
I 
I 
of this interest. 
1 John De'w'1ey, "From Absolutism to kxperimentalism, 11 
American Philoso h , ed. Geo~ge P. Adams and Wm. 
P. ew York: The Macmillan Co., 1930), p. 23. 
2John Dewey, 11 The Problem of Valujes,''pp. 268ff •. 
I 5. Dewey's Concept of Religion 
I The working hypothesis set forth I n the introduction 
of this investigation is that religion, in any or all of its 
forms, is related to values. Furthermore l it is assumed that 
whatever values are · regarded as ultimate become the central 
core of one's religion, directing one's life organization. 
I 
Such a point of focus in religion is not f eant to exclude 
other aspects or qualities. Rather it is l an affirmation 
that an inescapable factor in any religio~--and it is here 
believed to be the most important factor--is the concept of 
and devotion to supreme values held implibitly and explicitly 
by a person. I 
What, then, is Dewey's concept ofl religious values? 
His philosophy at this point is not perfectly integrated. 
He often speaks of religion in contexts of her than value 
theory. This demands careful attention. I To complicate mat-
ters further, two separate meanings of t~e term "religion" 
are seen in Dewey's writings. Both meanings will have to be 
described. 
In some of his books and articleJ , Dewey appears to 
see the method of scientific inquiry as J ntithetical to re-
ligion. He often speaks of religion as ~ structure of belief 
based upon the idea of fixity. 1 Similarly he sees religious 
1Johri Dewey, A Credo, p. 5. 
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principles as coming from supposed divine authority, while 
scientific conclusions are subject to rev sion as inquiry 
l proceeds. 
In one of his early writings, DewJy appears to be-
l ieve religion to be a body of authoritarian "truth," once 
and for all delivered to the saints and handed down to man 
I 
with fixity and absoluteness. 2 In this 
believe that religion is identified with 
stitution which continues always to bear 
stamp. 11 3 
article he seems to 
I ~he church, "an in-i dogmatic and feudal 
Again, the early pages of Quest f@r Certainty reflect 
the opinion that religion is related to s~perstitious rites 
of primitive men in terms of which the primitives tried to 
overcome supernaturally evil powers or get on the right side 
of that force. 4 
In so far as Dewey considers reli~ion to be a pattern 
of fixed beliefs, rooted in the supernatu~al, or when he sees 
religion as absolute directives for human lbehavior, he ob-
viously can have nothing but contempt for l it. Such views are 
Journal 
I 1 John Dewey, Problems of Men, p. ~72. 
2 J ohn Dewey, "Religion and our Schl ools, 11 Hibbert 
6 (1908), 796ff. 
3Ibid ., p. 798 . 
4 John Dewey, Quest for Certainty, l pp. 10-14. 
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I 
I 
I 
contrary to his metaphysics o change and flux, and contra-
diet his emphasis upon intellectual creativity. They oppose 
his experimentalist theory of knowledge. They are out of 
• I harmony w1th his instrumentalist theory o~ value , his em-
phasis on ends-in-view rather than a sing e summum bonum. 
One might conjecture hat Dewey's use of the word 
"religion" in the manner desc ibed above ~s mostly for 
polemic purposes--as somethin against which he can argue . 
It is likewise not un ealistic to suppose that in 
Dewey's emotional make-up thee was a revolt against the 
evangeli stic interest of his ay. Such aJ opinion may be 
drawn from the following I 
I was brought p in a conventionally evan-
gelical atmosphere f the more '1liberal" sort; 
and the struggles t at later ardse between ac-
ceptance of that fa th and the discarding of 
traditional and ins itutional creeds came from 
personal experiences, not from the effects of 
philosophical teach n gs ••• I have not been able 
to attach much impo tance to religion as a 
philosophic preble ; for the effect of that at-
tachment seems to b in the end Ia subordination 
of candid philosoph~cal thinking to the alleged 
but factitio
1
us needs of some spelcial set of con-
victions. 
As a reader moves 
he notes that the author 
ugh Dewey's !writings, however, 
treats religion in a different 
manner . More often than not his second view appears in re-
lation to value theory . Whe Dewey writes about religion 
1 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to 
16, 20 . 
I Experimentalism," 
I 
I 
pp. 
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in this second manner, it is 
term ''religion" not as 
he rejects religion in 
is the description of a 
way that he prefers the 
lear that he conceives of the 
I but as an adjective. In fact, 
ditional sedse. For him, it 
y of experiJnce in the same 
ival use of value. Often he 
speaks of experiences which a e religious· yet these are not 
of a special kind, marked off from aesthe ic, scientific, or 
moral experiences. Rather r 
that may belong to all exper 
volves "those attitudes whic 
ligious expel ience is a quality 
ences of valj e. 1 Religion in-
lend deep and enduring support 
to the processes of living." 
In another context D wey writes: I"The religious at-
titude is a sense of the pos ibilities of lexistence and de-
votion to the cause of these possibilities. 11 3 Implicit in 
such a statement is the view that the higl est value for man 
is his growing search for ne ness and for [enriching qualities 
of intelligent living. I 
Whether or not Dewey's consistent passion for whole-
ness is an emphasis derived rom his early Hegelian interest, 
it is evident in all of his ~r;tings. Th}s concept 
occasionally takes on a reli .ious quality l for Dewey 
I 
of unity 
as he 
1John Dewey, A Cornmo Faith (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1934), p. 10. 
2Ibid., p. 15. I 
3John Dewey, Quest f~r Certaint 'i p. 307. 
I 
80 
suggests that persons should search for 
all meaningful qualities of life. This 
a ~ connection among 
eJfort is a striving 
for relationship of each person to other persons, to choices 
past and present, to all ide l-ends, and f elationship with 
the universe. This search for wholeness, !Dewey believes, is 
one function of religion. 
It is the off"ce of art an~ religion to 
evoke such appreci tions and inlimations; to 
enhance and steady them /fdeal-endi? until they 
are wrought into t e texture of iour lives. The 
religious experiende is a reality in so far as 
in the midst of ef ort to foresee and regulate 
future objects, we sustained and expanded in 
feebleness and fai by the s j nse of an ex-
panding whole. 1 
The most precise, an in fact the lonly major, work on 
religion by John Dewey is hi A Common Faith, first given as 
the Terry Lectures at Yale U9iversity. Here his religious 
philosophy is most adequatel~ clarified. !Throughout the book, 
one can see not a new Dewey an enlargement of the value 
theory to which he gave so m attention J 
In the first place, e maintains that supernaturalism 
which grounds ideals in some realm beyond lnature has neither 
an intelligent justification nor a practiial benefit in 
motivating value choices. RJ ther he emph sizes the high 
possibilities of man ' s achie ement within l the natural world. 
1John Dewey, Human Nl ture and Conl uct, pp. 262-3. 
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Both man and nature take on importance in his concept of re-
ligion. In reviewing this a pect of Dewey's position, John 
I Herman Randall, Jr. writes: 
The bond with our ellow men--J nd . a bond with 
nature--both produ e intense r~ligious satis-
faction for Mr. De~ey. In fact he moved them 
so closely togethe , in his im~ginative feeling, 
emotion, and thoug . t that he usually speaks of 
these two facets ~ogether. They are for him the 
two indissolubly united sources of vital religion 
• • • piety toward nature and qeep devotion to 
the community of ~telligent persons. 1 
Secondly, A Common J aith is an e~ression of Dewey's 
conviction that the religioJ s quality in llife is both de-
votion to values and action l pon those vJ lues. This ideal, 
he believes, can be achieved in the ordinary and natural 
processes of living. 2 ReliJ ion is the oJ ganized direction of 
I 
man's life in devotion to t e ideal possibilities discerned 
in imagination.3 I 
One passage charactjrizes especially well this de-
termination to link action nd values with religion: 
Any activit{ purs ed in behalf lof an ideal end 
against obs acles~and in spite lof threats or--
personal loss bee use of conviction of its gen-
eral enduring val e is religioj in quality. 4 
1selected from Johnj H. Randall, lr., "The Reli~ion of 
Shared Experience, 11 The Phi .oso her of the Common Man (New 
York: G. P. Putnam's f- • 
3Ibid., p. 128. 
I 
I 4John Dewey, A Comm n Faith, p. 27. Italics are 
added for emphasis. 
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Likewise, Dewey considers God to be the name given 
to those values toward which men strive. 11 God is the unity 
of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action. 111 Or 
again he says: 
God means the ideal ends that at any given time 
and place one acknowledges as having authority 
over his volition and emotion, the values to 
which one is supremely devoted. 2 
It is evident, then, that devotion to and action upon values 
are central in Dewey's religious views. 
I Thirdly, A Common Faith is a re-affirmation that in-
telligence is essential for life at its b1st. Just as Dewey 
emphasizes intelligent criticism of immedf ate experiences be-
fore values are born, even so are the valhes which he calls 
religious dependent upon intelligence. Truly, Dewey speaks 
often about imagination which creates ideal ends to guide 
action, but such idealization must be forever guided by in-
telligence.3 
The fourth major point of view in Dewey's Terry Lee-
tures is his expanded concept of unity an wholeness. In 
many of his writings he deals at 
relatedness: personal integrity, 
man's relation with the universe. 
length wfth man's desire for 
man's re~ation to man, and 
Yet in A Common Faith the 
1 John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 42. 
2Ibid., p. 42. 
3Ibid. See especially page 79 for a summary of this 
position.-
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quest for unity or wholeness is clearly 
religious quality of life. Three brief 
a j dimension of the 
q otations demonstrate 
each of these aspects of unity. 
6. 
Unity with the self: 
Religious faith is the unificatJ·on of the self 
through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends which 
imagination presents to us and o which the 
human will responds as worthy o~ controlling 
desires and choices. 1 
Unity with one's fellow men: 
Shared experience is the greate~t of human goods. 
Life achieves its richest signi£icance when 
human beings undertake and unde~go things to-
gether, with that conscious interplay of finding 
out each other's interests and ~alues that at-
tends a community of purpose. 2 
I Unity with the universe: 
A religious attitude ••• needs the sense of a con-
nection of man, in the way of b~th dependence 
and support, with the enveloping world that the 
imagination feels is a universe. 3 
Implications for Reli~ion in Tea l her Educati6~ 
I 
An attempt to draw together the implications of Dewey's 
I 
thought for a philosophy of religion, applicable to teacher 
education, is no easy task. The problem is especially diffi-
cult since Dewey refuses to set religious values apart from 
Shared 
1John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 33. 
2Quoted from John H. Randall, Jr., 11 The 
Experience, 11 p. 109. I 
3John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 53. 
Religion of 
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all other goods which man progressively discovers. It is 
likely, therefore, that from Dewey 1 s point of view, there 
' 
will be little difference between "adequate education11 and 
an education inclusive of "religious values. 11 Yet on the 
basis of the previous discussion, it is p0ssible to extract 
certain elements from Dewey 1 s axiology which possess a re-
ligious quality and which indicate a religious dimension in 
the training of teachers. 
First, teaching a body of content about religion, 
so that the prospective teacher may possess a wealth of in-
1 formation or that he may be able to transmit such knowledge 
to future pupils, is out of harmony with all that Dewey be-
lieves. Teaching about religion, on the other hand, is ap-
1 propriate in so far as it is a means of meeting the interests 
and needs of the prospective teacher, an instrument for help-
ing future pupils solve their problems, of a guide toward 
further enriching experiences. 
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In other words, Dewey 1 s axiology and educational theory 
do not imply that religion should be taught for the sake of 
religious literacy. Rather, such study i ~ desirable only as 
I an instrument to problem-solving and as consequences accrue 
which expand the student 1 s experiences. 
I Still another issue arises in a pragmatic view of 
teaching religious information. If religion per se is taught, 
Dewey believes that some particular creed or dogma will be 
the content of instruction.1 This problem is partially 
solved, however, through Dewey's own conc j pt of religious 
values. In his view, religion is a quality of experience, 
not a structure of belief. Thus teaching lany belief as "true" 
is irrelevant to religio~s value. In fac t , Dewey _believes 
that teaching religiously santioned "trutl s" may be detri-
mental to the process of valuation. 
Nevertheless, religious beliefs, Jymbols, history, 
and institutions might be studied, it would seem, when such 
content is intrinsic to particular proble~s being solved. 
The alternative is to ignore all referencf s to religious sub-
ject matter, even when it might be instrumental to the accom-
1 
plishment of ends-in-view. Such omission is not consistent 
with Dewey's value theory and educational lphilosophy. 
It should be emphasized that for Dewey all super-
natural sanctions, whether for ecclesiastl cal dogma or for 
cultural mores, must be meticulously avoir ed in public edu-
cation. Such abstract grounding of values in the supernatural 
I 
weakens creative investigation, destroys human progress, and 
easily leads the teacher to use any means! to 
desired and pre-conceived theological end. 2 
I 
accomplish the 
1John Dewey, "Religion and our schools," p. 802. 
I 
2see John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, Part 3, 
Chapter 6. 
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What, then, are the additional positive implications 
regarding religion in teacher education in Dewey's theory of 
value? 
1. Obviously since 
tial influence is so great, 
carefully his ends-in-view. 
the prospectif e teacher's poten-
it is essenti~l that he explore 
Remembering that religion has to 
do with unity of these ends and with all t hat gives perspec-
tive to life, such a task is not only sound educationally but 
a religious imperative as well. 
2. Dewey's axiology further implies that the pro-
spective teacher should use his utmost inJelligence1 to ex-
amine the means of instruction which he wt ll employ, since 
means and ends cannot be separated. This is not to suggest 
that teacher education must concentrate oJ methodology or 
pedagogy exclusively. 2 Yet it is consisti nt with Dewey's 
theory to believe that all values--educational, social, 
I 
aesthetic , and religious--are bound to one another and to 
the means through which they are taught. !For Dewey, how one 
teaches is inseparable from what he teachf s. 
3 . Thirdly, De\'Tey Is ins:Etence upr n critical intelli-
gence in the evaluation of ideal ends, of means to achieve 
1rt is necessary to remember that by 11 intelligence, 11 
Dewey never is referring to innate ability. Rather he means 
critical inquiry \'fhich takes into account I even emotion. 
2John Dewey, Experience and Education, pp . 64ff. 
I 
I 
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them, of social mores, and of established ways of thought 
points toward a religious quality. This is the virtue of 
intelligence itself. 
No educator would attempt to argue that intelligence 
is unnecessary in higher education. But is it religious? I . 
It is at this point that Dewey's claim for a single continu-
ity of all values is relevant. He insists that the value of 
critical and creative inquiry is not of a different kind, but 
is joined with religious or high values. Training in criti-
cal thinking, the method of the sciences, is thought to be a 
supreme- end-in-view in Dewey's philosophy of education. 
Those who believe in religion a~1 a natural ex-
pression of human experience mu t devote them-
selves to the development of th ideas of life 
which lie implicit in ••• science land ••• democracy. 1 
I 4. Dewey's concern for unity--inJ luding inner whole-
ness, cooperation with one's fellowmen, a ld a sense of one-
ness with the universe--is part of his religious ideal. In 
order to work for the achievement of the ~deal of wholeness 
or integration, the teachers college should foster the values 
of personal integrity and respect for oneself. This ideal 
also implies the need of developing social values and of 
creating the best possible interpersonal relations among 
1 John Dewey, 11Religion and our Schools, 11 p. Boo. 
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students. Finally, such wholeness could be achieved as pro-
spect ive teachers learned to feel a sense of unity with 
nature. Such religious qualities might be called a religion 
of personal strength, shared responsibility, and of awe 
toward the universe. The latter is a kind of religious awe 
about which Dewey speaks in the lines: 
That sma ll effort which students put forth is 
in turn connected with an infinity of events 
that sustain and support it. The consciousness 
of this encompassing infinity of connections is 
ideal. When a sense of the infinite reach of an 
act physically occurring in a small point of 
space and occupying a petty instant of times 
comes home to us, the meaning of the present act 
is seen to be vast, immeasurable, unthinkable. 
This ideal is not a goal to be attained. It is 
a significance to be felt, appreciated. 1 
5. A fifth value is implied in Dewey's concern for 
continual growth toward ideal ends. If a prospective teacher 
is to guide his future pupils toward their maximum growth, 
certainly he must be alert to all of the dynamics of human 
personality which the science of psychology can contribute. 
Thus a firm background in psychology would seem to be an 
educational and religious necessity for all future teachers. 
6 . Finally, those who teach teachers would have the 
responsibility about which Dewey speaks so vividly in the 
2 
closing lines of A Common Faith. Thus each teacher should 
1 John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p . 263 . 
2John Dewey, A Common Faith, p. 87 . 
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feel the challenge to maintain, conserve, transmit, rectify, 
and expand the heritage of values which he has received from 
his culture. Moreover, it should be his hope that students 
may receive those values even more firmly and securely under-
stood and generously imparted than the teacher himself re-
ceived them. Dewey insists that such conserving, transmitting, 
enlarging, and sharing human values is a deeply religious art 
and comprises a faith which has always been implicitly the 
common faith of mankind. 
7• Evaluation of Dewey's Position 
A review of the six implications regarding a philosophy 
of religion for teacher education listed above, and those 
values affirmed in the Seventh Yearbook of the John Dewey 
Society, 1 reveals that the values in both lists are s i milar 
in content. All of the qualities might be spoken of equally 
well as "higher" or "spiritual 11 values. 
The single addition in the implica tions set forth 
here appears to be the possibility of objective teaching of 
r e ligion. This might be done, as has b een suggested, as such 
materia l is useful in meeting interests and needs of the 
student, as it is instrumental in helping the prospective 
1J. s. Bruba cher (ed.), The Public School and Soiritual 
Values (New York: Harper and Bros., 1944). See also Chapter I, 
Section 3 of this study. 
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teacher guide his pupils in problem solving, and as such 
religious teaching becomes a guide toward further enriching 
experiences. Such teaching, however, would not be approved 
if it led to sectarianism or if it in any way hindered the 
expansion and continuity of further enriching experiences. 
Even though the intelligent use of religious data 
within the learning experiences of students appears to be per-
missible in Dewey's philosophy of education, nevertheless, 
the major emphasis upon religion is approached by way of moral 
and spiritual values. 1 
The adequacy of this position, then, rests upon the 
validity of Dewey's value theory. 2 Few educators would dis-
agree with the point of view that values are essential to 
teacher education. They are not all agreed upon the specific 
values. The question must then be faced as to whether or not 
Dewey's axiology is defensible in its entirety. Is it the 
most adequate theory which the educator can support? Is it 
the value theory in terms of which religion can best be dealt 
with in public teachers colleges? 
lsee Chapter I for an elaboration of this movement in 
the public school. 
2A strong case could be made for the position that the 
movement stressing moral and spiritual values is built upon a 
pragmatic theory of value for which Dewey is a chief spokes-
man. Therefore weaknesses or strengths in Dewey's axiology 
would have relevance for the entire moral and spiritual values 
approach. 
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Before any judgment can be placed upon the entire 
value theory developed by Dewey, a critical evaluation is 
demanded . Strengths in Dewey's approach to education and 
values should be stressed. If his axiology is in any way 
questionable , or if it lacks scope and depth--in whole or in 
part--then an examination of other philosophies is essential 
if a meaningful religious perspective for teacher education 
is to be built. 
a. Strengths 
l. Dewey's demand for an objective approach to every 
problem, whether educational, political, or religious is one 
which encourages man's best thought. His unwillingness to 
take "pat 11 or traditional answers opens the door to a new 
philosophical method and spirit. In his own philosophy, 
answers are never meant to be final but rather the best in-
terpretation of his environment which he can give in order 
that future action may be guided by intelligent purposes. 
Such a melioristic view of life is a challenging one and 
prods many thinkers into a renewed look at life's perplexi-
ties and hopes. 
2. Dewey's shift from the content centered school 
toward the student centered one is based upon a value judg-
ment--that persons are of more importance that information. 
Yet, the critics who misunderstand Dewey accuse him of 
eliminating academic facts. Rather, he places the importance 
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of subject matter in relation to the growing student who 
learns as he utilizes facts to solve practical problems. 
Hence the student is involved personally in the material and 
learns it more thoroughly than he otherwise would . Here we 
see one of Dewey's commendable emphases, that one of the 
highest values is persons and their continuous growth toward 
self-fulfillment. 
3. Dewey lived and wrote in a day when authoritarian-
ism was continually raising its head among men. It could be 
seen in Protestant fundamentalism and in some aspects of 
Roman Catholicism; in Fascism during the two world wars; in 
the totalitarian approach of some schoolmasters; in social 
and economic injustice in this land; and in the newly emerg-
ing Russian communism. 
It was against every form of authoritarianism which 
hinders man from intelligent judgment and action which Dewey 
spoke. His voice was one which tried to help keep alive 
man's dignity, his hope , and his confidence that he has the 
potentiality of foreseeing consequences of his behavior and 
of moulding the future to his own deepest desires. 
4. Dewey's emphasis that an unworthy means may well 
destroy noble ends can be empirically verified by any person . 
This emphasis is needed in the human struggle to build a value 
theory and in all of man ' s search for goa ls which a re believed 
to be ultimately valuable. Otherwise, short-sighted ·· persons 
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might easily rationalize some questionable means as essential, 
failing to see the inevitable destruction of the otherwise 
ideal end-in-view. 
b. Wealalesses 
1. It is Dewey's claim that he rejects all absolute 
''highest goods" of the classical philosophers. Rather, he 
suggests that no summum bonum can be decided upon prior to 
a particular judgment. Nevertheless, Dewey does assume a 
swnmum bonum and commit himself to it. His "ends-in-view for 
persons" comprise his ultimate goal. Since it appears that 
he has, in effect, postulated such a goal, his assumption can-
not be proven according to scientific method which he demands 
for all verification. It rather stands upon the same assumed 
basis as the postulated values in the thinking Aristotle or 
Mill whom he criticizes. 
This is not to say that Dewey's assumption is untrue. 
Rather it is to suggest that Dewey's axiology does not stand 
infallibly above, but on the same ground, as other theories 
of value. 
2. It has been asserted in Chapter Two that Dewey 
holds to a naturalistic ontology upon which his axiology is 
built; and, furthermore, that his ontology is based on the 
method and content of the natural sciences . This metaphysical 
foundation of Dewey's philosophy cannot rest undisputed. 
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Science itself is based upon methodological and 
axiological assumptions without which scientists would have 
no way of working, no trust in fellow scientists, no reasons 
for their vocation. Therefore, in so far as Dewey eliminates 
a more-than-human quality to his religious values on the 
basis that science denies it, he is using science beyond the 
scientific scope. 
Similarly, Dewey maintains that the scientific method, 
or experimental empiricism, is the only method of gaining 
knowledge. Whenever he is referring to the controlled ex-
perimental method of the laboratory, this method is decidedly 
inadequate for a study of values. Several writers have pointed 
out scientific limitations: 
The more we pursue scientific investigation 
the more we discover that it does not lead 
to knowledge of the intrinsic nature of things. 
The knowledge it attains is symbolic knowledge 
rather than intimate knowledge; behind the sym-
bolism there is a reality which escapes the 
measuring techniques. 1 
Nels F. s. Ferr~ in discussing this same subject, 
maintains that science, as science, can only contribute de-
scriptive data about the physical world and give technical 
information. It cannot point to the reality of values nor to 
lHugh S. Taylor, 11 Physical Sciences, rt Religious Per-
spectives in College Teachin~, ed. Hoxie Fairchild (New York: 
The Ronald Press, 1952), p. 26. 
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ontological truth. 1 
Dewey's axiology would be much stronger if he had 
meticulously emphasized the s irit of scientific search--of 
open mindedness, of hypotheti· al thinking, of tentative ab-
solutes--rather than the meth d of the sciences. 
4. One of the confus ng elements in Dewey's value 
theory concerns the qualitative similarity and difference of 
values. If one interprets Dewey as believing that all values--
those of play, work, search for truth, aesthetic and religious 
values--are of the same quality, then Dewey is not being true 
to human experience. All of us do recognize higher and lower 
values. 
Moreover, there are certain depths of life arising 
from situations of birth, marriage, death, challenge of 
service, friendship, courage, and the .like which elicit the 
most significant meaning for man. It is through these and 
similar conditions and their fulfillment that men have found 
religious values. Value potential arising from man's exis-
tential circumstances is not developed sufficiently by Dewey 
to do justice to all dimensions of life--especially .religion. 
lsee Nels F. s. Ferre: Christian Faith and Higher 
Education (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), Chapter 8. Dr. 
Ferre's discussion which develops this point of view is care-
fully documented by references to writings by A. N. Whitehead, 
Albert Einstein, and James B. Conant. See especially pp. 168, 
170, 172, 175. 
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Finally, the categories of "intrinsic" and "instru-
mental11 are, fo~ the most part, denied by Dewey. Recognizing 
that every intrinsic va lue may also be instrumental, it is 
I 
here held that such distinctions are necessary if man is to 
make intelligen~ choices among conflicting loyalties. 1 
5. One iof the weakest aspects of Dewey's value theory 
rests upon his refusal to posit any ideal or goal toward which 
I 
man ought to strive. Experiences should be of the quality 
which foster new experiences, and these should produce further 
experiences, he says. In this perpetuality of experiences, 
Dewey clearly s~pports the growth of persons, and he has con-
fidence in man's potentiality to remake his environment. Yet, 
I 
the lack of content in his instrumentality renders his system 
hardly practical for the guidance of human decisions. Only 
as man has some lspecific end, tentative as it may be, can he 
have the necessrry vision to know what he is after, and moti-
vation to work f or it. Only in terms of specific goals will 
life be worthy of the ceaseless struggle for new and enlarg-
ing experiences. Such a criticism implies the need for edu-
cational aims, needed criteria for judging good art and high 
religion, as we~l as an imperative for one or more highest 
1see Sir Walter Moberly, The Crisis in the University 
(London: SCM Press, 1949), pp. 76-88. 
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goods in an entire value theory. 
c. Need for Further Study 
In view of the preceding criticisms, it does not 
seem unreasonable that further study should be made regarding 
value theories and religion. In so doing it is not the hope 
that all of the persistent problems of philosophy, which have 
haunted thinkers since Plato's time, will be easily solved. 
Yet it is hoped that a description and evaluation of at least 
two other value theories will be of help in finding a possi-
ble approach to religion in the training of public school 
teachers. 
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CHAPTER II"I 
VALUE THEORY OF E. S. BRIGHTMAN 
1. Introduction 
Edgar Sheffield Brightman, born in Holbrook, Massa-
chusetts, on September 20, 1884, was the oniy child in a 
Methodist minister's home in which seriousness, courage, and 
deep spirituality prevailed. 1 As might be expected, this 
environment had great influence on the intellectual interest 
and the religious life of Brightman. 
Follo\'ring his public school days, Brightman graduated 
from Brown University in Providence, Rhode Island in 1908. 
Two years later he earned the Master of Arts degree from 
the same institution, after having taught during that time 
in Brown and Pembroke. When he entered Boston University 
School of Theology in 1908, Dr. Albert c. Knudson, Professor 
of Theology, became a\';rare that here was 11 one of the keenest 
minds in our student body. 112 
1see Jannette E. Newhall, "Edgar Sheffield Brightman, 
A Biographical Sketch," Philosophical Forum, 12 (1954), 9-21. 
See a lso E. s . Brightman, "Religion as Truth," Contemporary 
American Theolo§:, ed. V. Ferro (New York: Round Table Press, 
1931), pp. 53-5 • 
2Albert c. Knudson, 11Brightman: A Personal Word," 
The Persoaalist, 34 (1953), 365 . 
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After the completion of three semesters of study in 
Germany, made possible by a Jacob Sleeper Fellowship from 
Boston University, Brightman began his teaching career at 
Nebraska Weleyan University, Lincoln,Nebraska. He con-
cluded his doctoral study in 1912 amid the arduous tasks of 
a first year in a new position. ~e successful years were 
spent in Lincoln; he was then invited to the faculty at Wes-
leyan University in Middletown, Connecticut. From Wesleyan 
he went to Boston University Graduate School in 1919, where 
he taught philosophy for thirty-four years until his death 
on February 25, 1953. 
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Unlike John Dewey, a contemporary who rebelled against 
traditional philosophy, Brightman stands in the main stream 
of philosophical thinking from Plato, through Descartes, Leib-
nitz, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, Lotze, Schleiermacher, Hoffding, 
and his American teacher, Borden Parker Bowne. Furthermore, 
Brightman's personalism shows the influence of Plato•s synoptic 
method and ideal forms; the personal starting point of 
Descartes' epistemology; the pluralism of Leibnitz; the 
rationalism of Kant; and the passion for wholeness of Hegel. 
Yet Brightman does not remain wholly dependent upon any of 
the philosophers from whom he gained many insights; rather 
he demonstrates persistent personal search for truth and an 
attempt to base his philosophy "on the reality of personal 
1 
experiences as a whole." Such a quest demanded of him a 
systematic examination of the persistent problems of philos-
ophy: the problem of reality, of knowledge, and of values--
the inescapable triad for any philosophical system. 
At the same time, Brightman was a religious philos-
opher in the Christian tradition. According to Wieman, 
"personalism is most true to the Christian tradition of all 
contemporary philosophies. "2 At no time, however, did 
Brightman accept any unexamined religious concepts. Neither 
would he take seriously a fellow Christian's claim to re-
vealed truth, unless the 11 revelation" was subjected to ra-
tional evaluation and interpretation. His religious views 
were as subject to the rigors of philosophical scrutiny as 
were any others. 
Moreover, no one who knew Brightman could doubt his 
own depth of religious faith and the relevance of this out-
look for every area of human concern. If his inflexibly 
disciplined schedule occasionally made him appear impersonal, 
his warmth of concern emerged when a student or f.riend most 
needed it.3 
lsee E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, 
Revised ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1951), p. vii. 
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2n. N. Wieman and Bernard Meland, American Philosophies 
of Religion (Chicago: Willett and Clark, 1936), p. 133. 
3see Peter A. Bertocci and M. Alice Corea, 11Edgar 
Sheffield Brightman Through His Students• Eyes, 11 Philosophi-
cal Forum, 12 (1954), 53-67. 
One of the most significant facts about Brightman 
is that he never avoided any problem of human experience, 
even suffering. His rational effort to find an answer to 
the problem of evil elicited much criticism. Yet his logical 
interpretation of the evil in human experience forced even 
his opponents to take his views seriously. 
Just as the influence of John Dewey appears to be 
waning shortly after his death, it may be that Brightman's 
personalism has not the same force in philosophical and re-
ligious circles as it had in the recent past. The cause of 
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the lessening influence of these two great, though widely dif-
fering, philosophers may be a changing climate in our culture 
as a whole--a movement toward an authoritarian rather than 
. . 
a liberal approach to problems. Possibly the impact of the 
I 
tragedies of the Second World War has ; s o continued i nto a 
shaky world that human reason and human worth are depreciated. 
It is even more likely that men today are less interested in 
critically examining their philosophies of life and religion 
than in years past, that they are more willing to accept 
ready-made ideas for utilitarian use, cultural mores for 
moral guidance, and political suavity in place of a persistent 
search for ideal social relationships. 
If such be the case , Irwin Edman's quotation of 
Dewey's spoken words might have come from one so different 
as Edgar Sheffield Brightman: 
Some despair because all old values and old 
securities are in question, the old landmarks 
are gone, and the seas are rough. It is a 
wonderful era to be ••• a philosopher. Never 
was there a time that so called for fresh and 
courageous hypotheses. 1 
2. Personalism 
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The philosophy of personalism has one of its most 
vigorous exponents in Edgar Sheffield Brightman. Personalism, 
as seen by Brightman, is a philosophical system which has as 
its task to examine and interpret the whole of experience. 2 
Such a task includes taking seriously persons, values, the 
world, religion, knowledge, science--all data of human experi-
ence--and rendering them intelligible by human reason. 
Brightman's personalistic writing is in large part 
concerned with religion. Yet he is not interested in fitting 
philosophy to religion. Rather, his main concern is always 
to see 
whether or not it LFhilosophi7 is true, and 
whether it can furnish a reasonable account of 
both religious and secular experience. 3 
lirwin Edman, John Dewey, His Contribution to the 
American Tradition (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., l955), 
p. 35. 
2E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 180. 
3E. s. Brightman (ed.), Personalism in Theology (Bos-
ton: Boston University Press, 1943), p. 62. 
Religion, then, is but one phase of his philosophical 
system, a system whose foundations are built upon thorough 
metaphysical considerations, a well-defined epistemology, and 
an explicit axiology. 
a. Epistemology 
11 Person" is obviously the key to Brightman 1 s personal-
ism. For him, persons are the only intrinsic value, 1 and at 
the same time persons are the key to both ontology and know-
ledge.2 
The concept of "person" is crucia l in Brightman 's 
epistemology, since the self is the beginning of all knowledge. 
Reminiscent of Descartes ' "I think, therefore I am" is Bright-
man's statement: 
What we immediately experience as the starting 
point of all thought and action, and the present 
fact at all times is our own self. 3 
Moreover, the self as he uses the term is conceived as the 
totality of perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and desires. 
These parts make up the complex whole of the self, capable 
of reason and value . Although knowledge about the self is not 
1E. s . Brightman, "Personalism," Ency. Religion, V. 
Ferm, ed. ( Ne\'1 York: Philosophical Library, 1945), p. 576 . 
2E. s. Brightman, Nature and Values (New York : Abing-
don-Co~esbury Press, 1945), p. 57 . 
3E . s. Brightman, "Personality as a Philosophy of Re-
ligion," Crozer Quarterly, 5 (1928), p. 383. 
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self-evident, he affirms that the self is the beginning of 
all knowledge, 1 that is, persons do not experience objects 
but rather their own consciousness which interacts with, and 
always seeks to understand, objects in the environment. 
Brightman moves another step in the development of 
his theory of knowledge through introspection on the self . 
He discovers that within this complex whole is the principle 
of coherence. This principle, enlarged to a comprehensive 
logical coherence, becomes the sole criterion of truth. By 
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coherence he means not only self-consistency of man's proposi-
tions but also the "sticking together" of all systems of judg-
ment as a whole . 2 
The necessity of coherence as the test of truth: rests 
not only upon the nature of the self, but also upon the nature 
of knowledge. For Brightman, objects outside individual per-
sons exist, yet the object and a person's idea of that object 
are not identical. He believes that persons have only ideas 
about objects or ideas about other ideas. It is therefore 
the task of the philosopher to take the facts of our conscious 
life as given and to seek a coherent expression for them.3 
1E. s. Brightman, "Personality as a Philosophy of Re-
ligion," Crozer Quarterly, 5 (1928 ), p. 383. 
2E. s . Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 69 . 
3Ibid., pp. 92-94. 
Furthermore, he suggests that coherence not only reveals in-
consistencies in our ideas about reality, but it looks beyond 
the self-consistency of propositions to a comprehensive syn-
1 optic view of all experience. 
Coherence means ••• taking everything into ac-
count and seeing everything in relation to 
everything else, as far as a human being can • 
••• The task of truth-finding, then, is to or-
ganize our total experiences, eliminate contra-
diction, and establish as many relations as 
possible in the self-consistent material. Truth 
is what coheres, what sticks together. 2 
For Brightman, then, knowledge originates in the con-
scious person, knowledge has a dualistic nature, and knowledge 
is tested by logical coherence, the testing method of both 
metaphysician and scientist.3 
Brightman believes that no knowledge is final or ab-
solute. He holds to this view partially because, like Henri 
Bergson, he believes that 11 time 11 is a real movement and 
change. Since all reality is in perpetual process, knowledge 
at any one time can never be perfectly accurate. 4 Even more 
basic in his hesitancy to believe that knowledge can be 
39-40. 
1E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 
2E. s. Brightman, Religious Values (New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1925), p. 261. -
3E. S. Brightman, 11An Empirical Approach to God, 11 
The Philosophical Review, 46 (1937), 151. 
4Brightman discusses the Bergsonian concept of time in 
"The Temporalist View of God," Journal of Religion, 12 (1932), 
545-555 . 
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absolute ia the assertion that 
no hypothesis about the real world can be com-
pletely verified until all experiences have 
been surveyed--a manifest impossibility ••• Our 
belief that there is an objective world, and 
our view of what that world is, both rest on 
postulates which can never be completely veri-
fied, and yet which like all hypotheses, can be 
tested by their systematic adequacy in organizing 
all the data. 1 
Brightman suggests that a denial of absolute knowledge 
may be distorted and lead to a concept of relativity of know-
ledge. Yet such distortion need not be, he says; an awareness 
of the human necessity of practical absolutes should lead men 
toward an open-mindedness which knows no dogmatism and toward 
a search for comprehensive coherence. 2 
In summary~ Brightman in his theory of knowledge 
holds experience of persons to be the source of knowledge; 
dualism of idea and object· to be its nature; coherence to be 
the test of truth; and open-mindedness to be its spirit. 
b. Metaphysics 
One of Brightman's definitions of personalism gives 
a clue to his metaphysics: 
lE. S. Brightman, 11An Empirical Approach to God~ 11 p. 
151. 
2E. S. Brightman, 11Christianity, Philosophy, and the 
Teaching of Religion, 11 Journal of Bible and Religion, 10 
( 1942)., 21. 
Personalism is a philosophical system in which 
persons (or selves) are the sole (or dominant) 
metaphysical realities as well as the only 
ultimate intrinsic values. 1 
This definition makes explicit his belief that personality is 
the key to ontology as well as to knowledge, and as we shall 
later see, to axiology. He adds the statement: 
Not only is personality fundamental to all know-
ledge, but also ••• it may be fundamental to all 
reality. If all experience is personal, perhaps 
the energies which produce and sustain it are all 
personal; perhaps nature itself is the experience 
and energizing of a person who is more than 
nature. 2 
It should be carefully noted that Brightman's concept 
of 11person 11 is derived from self-psychology which is similar 
to the gestalt view. According to both, 
the unity of the self or person is the wholeness 
and indivisibility of its consciousness, its 
identity is the experience of self-identification 
in immediate experience and in process of memory 
andanticipation. 3 
Thus if Brightman is to be understood, the reader must re-
member that his belief about the self or person is not deri ved 
from a behavioristic, or analytic, or psychoanalytic view. 
Several key phrases help to clarify the meaning of 
"self" and "person 11 as used in Brightman's writings. The 
lE. s. Brightman, "Personalism, 11 Ency. Religion, p. 
576 . 
2E. s . Brightman, Nature and Values, p. 57. 
3E. s. Br i ghtman, A Philoso2h~ of Reli~ion, p. 357. 
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self is considered to be any conscious being and the totality 
of perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and desires of that be-
ing .1 By 11person, 11 however, he means a self that is poten-
tially selr-conscious, rational, and ideal. 2 Whenever a 
self is able to reflect on itself and realize that it is 
conscious; whenever the self can reason and recognize ideal 
goals by which it can judge its achievements, then it is a 
person.3 In another context, he defines 11 person 11 as 11 a self 
capable of reason (interpretation) and value (satisfactions--
empirical or ideal). 114 
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Beyond the particular derinitions given above, Bright-
man 1 s personalistic metaphysics includes several features 
different from the metaphysical views of other idealists~ 
His ontology is pluralistic in nature, somewhat resembling 
Leibnitz 1 system of monads. All persons are real--the human 
person and the Supreme Person. He thus supports a qualitative 
monism but a quantitative pluralism. He explains his position 
further by insisting that objects which we experience are real 
but not as material substance. Rather, objects exist as 
the volitional activity of the Supreme Person. 
1 E. s. Brightman, 11 Personality as a Philosophy of 
Religion, 11 p. 383. 
2 E. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 350. 
3Ibid., p. 350 • 
4E. S. Brightman, 11 Some Definitions for Personalists, 11 
The Personalist, 27 (1946), 370. 
There is no wholly unconscious or impersonal 
being. Everything that is, is a conscious mind 
or some phase or aspect of a conscious mind. 1 
He believes that to regard matter as a form of mind is the 
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most coherent explanation of the world. Furthermore, only 
through the concept 11 personality11 can we coherently understand 
all data of science as well as those of everyday human experi-
ence. 
Finally, at the center of Brightman's metaphysical 
view is the belief that the Supreme Person or God is the mind 
controlling the cosmic process and that He is guiding it 
to\'rard an end of the highest possible value. 2 
3. Brightman's Value Theory 
At every period in his career of writing, Dr. Bright-
man evinced a deep concern for values. This interest is 
especially clear in his Religious Values, 3 which was published 
in 19g5. Moreover, his conviction became stronger throughout 
every published article •and book, reaching a peak of concern 
in his Persons and Values4 in 1952. 
Along with Brightman's insistence on a coherence of 
all ideas, his emphasis on system, his statement of a dualistic 
1E. s. Brightman, Nature and Values, p. 114. 
2E. s. Brightman, "An Empirical Approach to God," p. 152. 
3New York: The Abingdon Press, 1925. 
4Boston: Boston University Press, 1952. 
nature o£ knowledge~ and o£ a metaphysical ground o£ all be-
ing~ is this recurring theme of values. At times~ value 
theory becomes one of the most important aspects of his 
thought, as he writes: 
A philosophy which did not include an inves-
tigation of values would belie its name; it 
would not be so much a love of wisdom as a 
barren description of facts, and it would not 
be an account of the whole of experience ••. 
Without consideration of values and disvalues 
no one can hope to find more than a distorted 
fragment of truth. 1 
Again he puts the search for a satisfactory standard 
of value at the center of a philosopher's quest: 
The purpose of all philosophizing is to enable 
the person to assume an enlightened attitude 
in his experience of values and disvalues. Our 
primary intellectual task, then, is to determine 
what we ought to value. 2 
Especially with the hostilities of the Second World 
War and the continued world struggle, Brightman appears to 
be particularly urgent in his concern for values. This atti-
tude is seen in such writings as 11 Values, Ideals, Norms~ and 
Existence, n 3 "Philosophical Ideals and Enduring Peace, ,A 
1E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 251. 
2E. S. Brightman, nvalues, Ideals, Norms, and Exist-
ence," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1943), 219. 
3Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4 (1943), 
219-224. 
4Bryson (ed.), Approaches to World Peace (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1944), Chapter 40. 
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''The Problem of an Objective Basis for Value Judgments," 1 
Nature and Values, 2 and Persons and Values.3 
In Nature and Values he sees a neglect of values as 
one of the tragedies of our time: 
It is partly because the greatest theoretica l 
minds ••• have been devoting themselves to the 
study of nature while neglecting the study of 
good. Meanwhile the most powerful political and 
social leaders have neglected both nature and the 
good and have made instinctive urges or economic 
ambitions the basis of their policy rather than 
a reasoned pursuit . of the good. 4 
Such conviction is even more clearly expressed in 1952 : 
"Every problem of existence centers about the nature of per-
sons and their values."5 These words demonstrate his per-
sistent belief that few, if any, problems deserve more atten-
tion than values. 
a. Axiological Structure 
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Whenever Brightman speaks precisely, he distinguishes 
between primary values, sometimes called value-claims, and 
1Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy and Religion 
(New York : Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 
194 3), pp • 1-6. 
2New York: Ab ingdon Press, 1945. 
3Boston: Boston University Press, 1952. 
4 E . s. Brightman, Nature and Values , p. 12 . 
5E. S . Brightman, Persons and Values (Boston: Boston 
University Press, 1952 ), p. 3. 
true values. By primary values he means 11 personal conscious 
experiences of liking, preference, enjoyment, fulfilled de-
sire, love or interest. 111 
Since for Brightman only persons are real, it is 
clear that values as defined could be only in and for persons. 
Even omitting metaphysical considerations, Brightman believes 
that purely empirical data make us aware that we have only 
those experiences of values which we consciously experience. 
To say I have an experience which I do not have is nonsense. 2 
Does this affirmation mean, as Maximilian Beck asks, 
that Brightman is agreeing with the Sophists who believe 
that "man is the measure of all things?" In effect, "Has 
not the dignity of man decreased and vanished proportionately 
to the fact that man has made the origin, end and measure of 
all values himself?"3 
Such criticism reveals an understanding of only one 
definition, that of value-claim, and demands a clarification 
of Brightman's concept of "ideals" and 11 norms." 
An experience of a primary value is no more than a 
feeling that something is enjoyable and that the person 
1E. S . Brightman, "Values, Ideals, Norms, and Exis-
tence," p. 219. 
2Ibid ., p. 220. 
3Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy, and Religion, 
p . 7 . 
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claims it to be of value, i.e., that it is worthful to him. 
Ooviously, in Brightman's system there must be some way of 
testing s~bjective values. Such testing is the function of 
11 ideals 11 and 11 norms. 11 
At most points these terms are joined. "Ideal" re-
fers to a definition of value. "It is a concept, an essence, 
l a subsistent. 11 Such a definition indicates that an ideal 
is not an intrinsic value itself, but only an instrument in 
understanding the scope and limits of value. The "ideal 11 is 
an intellectualizing of true value. 
However, there are norms which are a special kind of 
ideal. These are the ideals of 11 ought, 11 of truth and falsity 
about value experiences. It is, then, in terms of ideal 
norms that a value-claim is validated as a true value, or re-
pudiated as a disvalue. 
A norm, then, is an ideal that is characterized 
by ••• 11 requiredness" ••• ffincl a!fl imperative norm 
may be distinguished from a non-normative ideal 
by its coherent rationality. 2 
One problem in understanding Brightman's axiological 
system is that of clarifying and distinguishing 11 value" and 
''ideal norm. 11 A first consideration is his demand for an 
empirical basis of value in persons. He insists that no one 
1E. S. Brightman, 11 Values, Ideals, Norms, and Exis-
tence,11 p. 221 . 
2 Ibid., p . 222 . 
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values anything if it is not in his range of experience. 
Hence primary values are defined as subjective, personal, 
and psychological. 
Yet his second postulate is that ideal norms are ob -
jective. He is convinced that the whole order and progress 
of civilization points to values which are judged on objec-
tive s t andards . In his words, if there are no fixed laws 
of value , 
it is strange that all our knowledge of human 
history, a ll our analysis of human experience, 
has led wise men of every civilization to act 
as if there were fixed ends. 1 
This paradoxical problem is not resolved easily for 
at least two reasons. In the first place, the term 11 sub -
jecti ve 11 which he uses in referring to actual value-claims 
is often misunderstood . Secondly, the nature of ideal- norms 
is vague, at least to the non-idealist. Further clarifica-
tion on these two issues may be useful. 
In one sense, the simple experience of valuing some-
thing is subjective, that is, it is within experience. Ac -
cording to Brightman , this term 11 subjective 11 
ought to mean personal; that is, it should 
mean whatever experience of any sort occurs 
within a person-- his thoughts, his sense data 
and his memories. 2 
1E . S . Brightman, Nature and Values, p . 72 . 
2E . s . Brightman, Persons and Values, p . 9 . 
, 
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The problem here is that the word "subjective" is often used 
to des i gnate something petty or illusory and is occasionally 
interpreted to refer to private errors and prejudices . 
Brightman rejects these connotations of "sub jective." On 
the other hand he insists that dignified subjectivity is the 
starting point in all areas of knowledge. 
In short, if everything subjective and personal 
is to be rejected as unscientific or untrust-
worthy, then all science must go •••• Persons and 
values cannot be swept aside without sweeping out 
the sweeper. 1 
Even with Brightman •s insistence that values are in 
persons and are hence psycho logical or subjective , there is 
still a sense in which he speaks of values themselves as 
being objective . 
\!Then I make a value judgment it does not mean 
LQnli7 that certain feelings are going on in my 
mind. I am referring to what I believe to be a 
fact, beyond my psychological apprehension of 
it. 2 
The judgment, of course, may be erroneous prior to 
its validat ion by ideal norms. Nevertheless, in Brightman•s 
theories there is an "other than personal referent" in every 
value experience. Metaphysically speaking , the valued ob-
ject, for example, a beautiful sunset, is objective in the 
sense that the sun, clouds, and all other elements are the 
158 . 
book . 
1E. S . Brightman, Persons and Values, p . 10 . 
2E . s . Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p . 
This quotation is taken from the 1925 edition of this 
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volitional activity of the cosmic mind. 
We can conclude that in Brightman's thought~ primary 
value experiences are in persons and are hence subjective. 
Yet in so far as such value experiences refer to any object 
which exists~ there is an objective referent to every value. 
The second major problem concerns the validation of 
value-claims . For Brightman~ values become true and are 
lifted out of the "value-claim11 or 11 primary-value" state 
only after they have been subjected to the test of coherence. 
When we assert that any object is really valu-
able, we mean~ first~ that it not merely ap-
pears valuable at the moment~ but would appear 
so to an 11 imparti'al observer11 that took all 
truth into account. 1 
This statement is another way of saying that the criterion of 
true value~ as well as the criterion of all truth~ is that of 
comprehensive coherence. 
Brightman also speaks of the coherence test of value-
claims in a different way . This is a test by 11 ideal norms. 11 
Ideal norms are imperatives which the mind~ after careful 
and coherent thinking~ recognizes as laws constitutive of 
true value . Brightman sees these imperative ideals as exist-
ent ."~n the very structure of the universe. 2 A value claim~ 
1E. S. Brightman, 11Truth and Value in Religion~ 11 
Methodist Review~ 105 (1922), 46. 
2see E. s . Brightman~ A Philosophy of Ideals (New 
York: Henry Holt and Co ., 1928)~ p. 95. The above statement 
is implied in a negative assertion concerning realism. 
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then., becomes a true value when coherent with all kno\'lledge 
and value and coherent with objective ideal norms . 
Brightman insists that by no stretch of the imagina-
tion can a cr itic speak of value norms being man-made or 
created for personal whims . Rather., ideal norms are rooted 
in the nature of reality-- in the cosmic person. These norms 
are only discovered and verified by human persons . 1 
He offers two additional arguments for ideal norms 
of value . First., he says that it is far more coherent to 
hold to objective standards of value than to assert that 
there are none. He asks., "Does not reason collapse if objec-
tive norms be not acknowledged? 112 Secondly., he argues that 
it is difficult, if not impossible ., to explain the existence 
of any values in human life if the universe itself is entirely 
indifferent to value . 3 
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Therefore the axiology with 'which we are here concerned 
i s fundamentally presented in two parts . First , values as 
claimed by an individual are personal and hence subjective . 
Yet value norms are objective in that they are beyond finite 
persons., being qualities of the Supreme Person as understood 
and validated through human coherent rationality. 
1see Brightman's refutation of Maximilian Beck in the 
Third Symposium on Science, Philosophy., and Religion., p. 8 . 
2E. S. Bri ghtman., An Introduction to Philosophy., 
p . 161 . 
3rbid., p. 161 . 
b . Value Content 
Brightman sees two dangers in setting .forth a spe-
ci.fic list o.f values . First, although he insists on value-
claims being tested, he does not believe that a value can be 
absolutely true, any more than any other proposition can be 
l 
absolutely true. All rational assertions o.f truth must be 
subject to .furt her investigation; even 11 the task o.f interpret-
ing the highest values of li.fe needs to be undertaken a.fresh 
by and .for every human person . 112 
Secondly , Brightman sees a danger in holding perman-
ently to one value until judgment becomes distorted and one 
is unable to see the whole o.f li.fe. He is report ed to have 
said that ''any man ''~"ho has but one ideal, lives by it and 
refuses to consider others, is as bad as he can be. 113 
What values , then , are included in Brightman's 
system? In order to set forth a s cale of values , he .finds 
it necessary to distinguish between intrinsic and instrumental 
values . By the term Hintrinsic value 11 he means whatever is 
prized , enjoyed, or desired .for its m~m sake. 4 
1E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p . 93 . 
2E. S . Brightman, Religious Values , p . 249. 
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3Quoted by Peter Bertocci and M. Alice Corea, op . cit ., 
p . 64 . 
4E. S . Brightman , A Philosophy of Religion, p . 89 . 
Instrumental values are any values v1hi ch lead to intrinsic 
1 
values . 
The classification of 11 intrinsic11 and "instrumental 11 
is not to be taken absolutely. Brightman suggests that most 
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intrinsic values are also instrumental. The relative signifi-
cance of values must be judged on the basis that those values 
which are primarily intrinsic are more valuable than purely 
instrumental ones . Then, too, Brightman believes t hat perma-
nent values should be preferred to merely transient ones, uni -
2 
versal to exclu s i ve, higher to lower . 
vii thin t his framevmrk, Brightman sets t he content of 
hi s value theory, beginning with the following statement: 
In personality is the only truly intrinsic 
value we lr...now or can conceive ; all values 
are but forms of personal experience . Truth , 
goodness, beauty, worship--these are nothing · 
if a person does not apprehend, realize , 
enjoy, and develop them. 3 
From this point of view, Brightman maintains that 
personality is t he only intrinsic value and hence it is the 
highest value . Thus he says that '' the purpos e of life i s the 
full development of the noblest pO\"Vers of the world of 
persons. 114 
1see E. s . Brightman's An Introduction to Philosophy , 
p . 142; Religious Values, p. 81; A Philosophy of Religion, 
p . 89; and Nature and Values, p. • 
2E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p ._ 147 . 
3E. s . Brightman, Nature and Values , p. 62 . 
L~Ib . ' . , p . 63 . 
Again_, Brightman emphasizes this concept of' the vmrth 
of' persons: 
Vli thout respect for personality, all other 
values are corrup ted, without personality 
no other values exist. Unless personality 
is valued, all else i s disvalued. • • • 
Value is an experience of' persons ~>··rho approve 
or respect something. To approve or respect 
any value is to approve or respect persons in 
whom alone the value exists. l 
2 Here, then, is Brightman's summum bonum, the highest good. 
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With the establishment of' this highest intrinsic value, Bright-
man places other intrinsic goods in his hierarchy of' values. 
First in his scale are the religious values, which he 
regards as supreme. Religious values are those 
1i'fhich are experienced when man takes an 
attitude toward value experience as a whole 
and toward its dependence on powers beyond 
man. Insight into this dependence elicits 
feelings of reverence and acts of worship. 3 
Intellectual qualities are those valu es of' tru th-
loving and truth-finding . The aesthetic value is an experi-
ence in which there is an adequate expression of' purpose in 
4 
such a vvay as to stir feeling and achieve harmony. Character 
1E. S. Brightman, Persons and Values, p. 18 
2The high worth of' persons is, i n one sense , the high-
est single value in Brightman 1' s hi erarchy of values. On the 
other hand, the value of' persons must be assumed for any other 
value to exist, for i n hi s axi ology value s exist only in 
persons. Thus , the intrins ic value of persons ma y be con-
side r ed as an rr i mpri nt 11 ove r every other value. 
3E. S. Brightman, A Philos ophy of Religion , p. 99 . 
4Ibi d., p. 98 . 
values have to do with moral choices, and su ch moral choices 
depend upon worthy ends and upon a good will. 1 The social 
values--those of sharing and cooperating--complete Brightman's 
2 list of higher intrinsic values . 
Di rectly below the higher intri nsic values are those 
he calls "lower intri nsic values . " This list includes values 
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of work , recreation, and bodily values . The only purely instru-
me ntal values for Brightman are the forces of nature and physi -
cal things, such as money and property . 3 
The foregoing scale of values as set forth by Brightman 
by no means exhausts his theory of value. Each \muld have to 
be thoroughly investigated to complete his axiology. For 
purposes of t his study , only one area of values, those called 
religious _, will be examined in detail. The selection of re-
ligious values is made for two reasons. First_, the objective 
of t hi s study clearly dictates a detailed examination of 
Brightman ' s view of religious values. Secondly, Brightman 
actually deals with religion more t horoughly t han other values. 4 
1Brightman has devoted one boolc to a study of moral 
values. In this book he has built a list of moral laws upon 
an empirical and rational method . See E .· S . Brightman, I"loral 
Laws (New York: The Abingdon Press _, 1933) . 
2No specific order of values is considered final . At 
some times and some conditions, health_, for example, is more 
valuable than lmowledge. See Brightman_, An Introduction to 
Philosophy, p . 148 . 
3see Brightman_, A Philosophy of Religion_, for a dis-
cussion of a table of values. 
4The possible exception is in the area of ethical 
values_, which he develops thoroughly in Moral Laws . 
Hence his axiology is more precisely illustrated through his 
discussion or religious values than through any other phase 
of his value theory . 
4. Religious Values 
Brightman proposes that every investigation begin 
with empirical data., vvith the racts of' experience. Religion 
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is no exception . The empirical basis or his religious philoso-
phy is seen in his A Philosophy or Religion as he surveys the 
characteristic facts of the world's religions . This survey., 
he says., 11 has revealed the fundamental ract that every religious 
experience is an experience of value . "1 Even tragic experiences 
are religious ir the surrering takes on some value or possible 
value for the surrering one . 
On the basis or a scientific and philosophical investi-
gation or religion in various cultures., Brightman suggests two 
descriptive definitions of religion: 
Religion is the total attitude of man toward 
what he considers to be superhuman and w rthy 
or worship . or devotion, or propitiation, or 
at least or reverence . 2 
However., the definition which he uses to describe religion in 
A Philosophy of Religion is more inclusive and considered to 
lE. S . Brightman., A Philosophy or Religion., p. 85. 
2E. s. Brightman., An Introduction to Philosophy ., p . 169 . 
be more adequate for this study. It is stated as follows: 
Religion is concern about experiences which 
are regarded as of supreme value; devotion 
toward a power or powers believed to originate, 
increase, and conserve these values; and some 
suitable expression of this concern and de-
votion, whether through symbolic rites or 
through other individual and social conduct. 1 
Several key parts of the above definition amplify 
Brightman's beliefs abou t the values in religion. Religion, 
like all other values, begins in experience. Outside of 
persons, no religious values exist. The definition of re-
ligion also suggests that it is made up of experiences which 
are valued supremely--experiences which are of highest in-
trinsic nature. According to the definition, this concern 
is toward the conservation of values and toward the increase 
or creativity of value as ·well. .1\'Ioreover, religion increases 
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in persons a devotion beyond themselves to a source of value--
to the power or powers believed to originate and conserve the 
value. 
Finally, religion is the kind of value experience 
"'lhi ch demands appropriate behavioral change through symbolic 
rites and individual or social acts. The definition as ex-
plained above, then, includes the core of religion. 
1E. S. Br i ghtman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 17. 
Su ch a defi nition has several fUnctions. It limits t he infor-
mation to be examined. If the definition is proveQ true, i t 
becomes the norm for judging the truth or falsity of religious 
claims. According to Brightman, the definition is validated 
in so far as it adequately explains all relevant facts and i f 
t he kind of relig ion whi ch it describes is in harmony with all 
other knowledge and value. 
Nevertheless, an examination of his writings reveals that he 
includes two additional qualities in religion. In the first 
place, he suggests that while religion is a special field of 
value experience, yet it is not a unique quality of experi-
ence. It is rather "a unique way of apprehending all experi-
1 
ence." The first way of approaching experiences which 
renders them religious might be called humanistic. This 
dimension is seen, Brightman says, whenever persons have a 
richly rewarding experience, or a tragedy. In an effort to 
see the highest values in either, the person is being con-
cerned with religious values. This humanistic quality is 
also seen as persons attempt to see life as a unity or as a 
whole. Brightman believes that values may be grasped as an 
organic whole when a person seeks, not to be devoted to one 
value, but to all values which are worthy -to truth, beauty, 
2 goodness, and holiness. He declares: 
What makes an experience religious is 
the way it is taken •••• in the 
hypothesis which explains it, giving it 
coherence and value.3 
Secondly, and more importantly, Brightman's 
normative definition of religion makes explicit a dimension 
of religion which ought to be central--the theistic 
dimension. Such a quality is seen only when experi-
ences of supreme values direct a person toward the 
lE. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 415. 
2lh1d., pp. 99-100. 
3~.' p. 416. 
125' 
reality which creates and supports man and values . For him, 
those values whi ch do not have a more-than- human reference 
cannot be called religious , even though religious terminology 
is used. 1 
His nonnative definition, t hen , does not deny the 
previously described beliefs, attitudes, and behavior. 
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Rather , religion, in addition to all else, ought to be charac-
terized by 
the feeling of dependence on a personal God 
and dominated by the will to co-operate with 
God in the conservation and increase of 
values . 2 
Such cooperation with God implies cooperation with man in the 
realization of individual and shared values. 3 
Brightman, then, sees religion as giving a peculiar 
conception of the highest good to personal consciousness. 
Yet this human consciouspess i s dependent upon the universe 
v1hich itself is conscious and friendly toward values--which 
creates and sustains them. 4 
In speaking of a friendly universe which creates and 
sustains values , Bright man is re-emphasizing his theistic 
ontology . The universe is all-that-there-is, including God 
and man , nature and supernature.5 Thus whatever man experi-
ences in the world \'·Thich is of value has its being because 
lE. S. Brightman, Religious · values, p ~ ·136 . 
2E. s. Brightman , An Introduction to Philosophy, p . 1 69 . 
The 
3E. S. Brightman, A Philosophy of 
4E~ S. Br ightman, Personality and 
Abingdon Press, 1934), p. 42. 
Religion, p. 435 . 
Religion (New York : 
5E. s. Brightman, 11Some Definiti ons for Personalists, 11 
p . 371 . 
of God. This divine being 
is the objective source of life's highest 
values •.•• The divine is the person 
whose will energizes in physical nature, 
and who is creator, conserver, and 
increaser of values. 1 
Moreover, God, himself a person, is capable of reason 
and value, and in his mind are the ideal norms in terms of 
which man's values may be validated. The beliefs that God 
is the source of all that is real, and that by his ideals we 
may measure our human values, joined with Brightman's con-
viction that God is absolutely good, support: the conviction 
that it is God's purpose to maintain good for all persons. 
a. Religion and its Coalescence with Other Values 
In Brightman's theory, religion emphasizes the 
ontological rootage of values through worship. Yet religion 
is no more objective or metaphysical than other true values. 
He believes that all ideal norms are in the cosmic conscious-
ness. Such a principle has a practical consequence in the 
coalescence of values. Because of the common relationships 
in deity, all values must hang together if meaning is to be 
real in any of them. 
He asks: What value would religion have without 
intellectual, social, aesthetic, and other values? Or again: 
1E.S. Brightman, "Man and Religion," Philosophical 
Forum, 7 (1949), 5. The same article is published in 
Proceedin s of the Tenth International Con ress in Philoso h 
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vlhat value \'muld there be in any experience, outside of the 
1 
supreme intrinsic value of personality? 
It is ~ seen, then, that in this theory of value, no 
single quality of good can be separated from other valuable 
experiences . Only as one takes into account the fact of 
mutuality of values can he avoid either fanatical love or 
hatred toward one set of values. Brightman recognizes, how-
ever, that the ideal of coalescence is not a universal experi-
ence, but rather a normative ideal . 2 
Such a view of the coalescence of all values has the 
consequence of relating religion to all aspects of life , 
rather than that of permitting it to be rrother- worldly" in 
focus . In so far as religious value-claims are true , they 
will not only be congru-ent with all knO\dedge (which · is itself 
a value ) but v'li th all other values as well . One of the clear-
est statements that values ought to be chosen in relation to 
other values is seen in the "Axiological Law" : 
All persons ought t o choose values which are 
self- consistent, harmonious, and coherent, 
not values which are contradictory or in-
coherent with one another . 3 
Thus, no value can stand by itself, but only the whole system 
of intrinsic value is itself intrinsically good. Put more 
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1E. S . Brightnan, A Philosophy of Religion , pp . 104-105 . 
2Ibid . , p . 102 . 
3E . S . Brightman, Moral Laws, pp . 125ff . 
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empirically~ "the highest intrinsic value is the experience of' 
a person whose values are harmonious. 111 
b . The Problem of Evil 
Brightman handles the problem of evil in a unique 
manner. Rather than avoid evil in a theory of' t he valuable~ 
he is convinced that even the tragic sides of lii'e must be 
i'aced~ just as one considers empirical good. How·ever ~ his 
solution to the problem of' evil must be seen in the context 
of his axiological system. 
Throughout his entire axiology~ Brightman develops 
the concept of' the cosmic self' as the source of supreme value~ 
the Person toward whom men f'eel dependent; the Person deserv -
ing of' man ' s worship . Furthermore~ for Brightman this power 
is supremely valuable. 
The dilemma v'lhich Brightman i'aces is this: If God 
is absolutely po\'terful~ He controls all events in the universe . 
If' He is supremely good~ He wills only good f'or man . Both of 
these assertions cannot be true~ Brightman believes~ else how 
can the real existence of' evil in human life be explained? 
Either God's poHer must be limited~ or His goodness must be 
i'inite . 
Brightman assures his readers that the problem of' evil 
is not a result of' pure theory; rather~ the problem has been 
1E. S . Brightman~ Moral La~'ls ~ p. 135. 
forced upon him through his observation of suffering. A 
summary of such experience of tragedy which forced him to 
take seriously the problem of evil is seen as follows: 
Life has not allowed me to escape these experi-
ences. At an early age, I had occasion to ob-
serve the terrible deeds that could be performed, 
by one of the best of men when insanity rendered 
him irresponsible. A few years afterwards, I 
perceived how another could, through the merest 
accident while swimming, suffer a shock from which 
his nervous system never recovered. The ravages 
of an awful disease swiftly took a loved one away. 
My affection for Germany made the world war seem 
peculiarly tragic. These and other experiences 
have rendered me stonily indifferent to all Polly-
anna optimism and to most so-called solutions to 
the problems of evil. 1 
Even the tragic event of the Lisbon, Portugal, earth-
quake of 1775 so haunted Brightman that he had to take it 
2 into account in dealing with the problem of evil. He de-
votes two complete books to a systematic examination of the 
problem of evil.3 His conclusion is that God, being all 
good and the source of values, should not be regarded as 
the source of evil. Rather: 
God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely 
valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited 
both by the free choices of other persons and 
by restrictions within his own nature. 4 
lE. s. Brightman, "Religion as Truth," p. 75. 
2E. S. Brightman, "The Lisbon Earthquake, 11 The Ameri-
can Journal of Theology, 23 (1919), 500-518. 
3E. s. Brightman, The Problem of God {New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1931), and The Finding of God (New York: The 
Abingdon Press, 1931). 
~. s. Brightman, The Problem of God, p. 113. See 
also "The Given and its Critics," Religion in Life, 1 (1932), 
134-145. 
He calls these restraining factors ''The Given." 1 He insists, 
however, that The Given, though truly an evil within God's 
nature, is not ultimate, and God wins over the evil in the 
long run. Such a concept saves God from creating evil. At 
the same time, the concept of The Given helps persons to see 
that God is a changi ng and struggling God . This hypothesis, 
he oelieves, gives rise to certain values for men. First, 
it may give persons incentive to work for the overthrow of 
evil in cooperation with God; secondly, if reason and good-
ness have not yet been destroyed , proba bly they never will 
be . Thus hope is born . 2 
The concept of The Given is somewhat refined in A 
Philosophy of Religion. At this later writing, he prefers to 
speak of a God "whose will is finite rather than a· finite 
God." This is to say that God himself is infinite in good-
ness and love, in t ime and space, in his unbegun and unending 
duration, and by his inclusion of all · nature within his ex-
perience . 3 
The important consideration here, beyonft the specific 
and complex doctrine of The Given, is to point out that 
empirica l evil is not superficially handled nor ignored in 
lE. s . Brightman, "Religion as Truth," p . 77 . 
2E . s . Brightman, "A Temporalist View of God, II pp . 
545-555 · 
3E • s . Brightman, A PhilosoEhl of Religion, p. 337 . 
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Brightman's value theory. In fact, in one writing he asserts 
that "my theoretical philosophy of value ••• culminates in the 
doctrine of a finite creator-God."1 
• 
c. Religious Values and Human Need 
Religion is not only intrinsic value, it is instru-
mental value as well. Such religious instrumentality is the 
theme of one chapter in Religious Values. Brightman restates 
his belief that religion does not work in isolation from 
other values. On the other hand, he claims that religion 
serves the enlargement of other values in the following 
manner: 
1. It seeks to reduce suffering through a realistic 
approach to the problem of evil. 
2. It seeks to meet the problem of death through 
some concept of immortality. Religion claims 
that there is something in man 1 s life that death 
cannot stay. 
3. It seeks to deal with moral evil, in that evil is 
a hostility to values, with the conservation of 
which religion profoundly concerns itself. 
4. Higher forms of religion seek to overcome ignor- 2 ance, since religion's concern is with true value. 
In a more positive way, he affirms that religion ful-
fills human needs in that it gives unity to persons as it 
seeks the harmony of the whole personality. Religion also 
1E. s. Brightman, "Religion as .Truth," p. 77. 
2Brightman, Religious Values, pp. 89-97. 
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gives purpose to life . It gives pe1~anence and dependability . 1 
d. The Need for Truth in Religion 
Brightman often points out h i s conviction that value-
claims are not necessarily true~ even though the consequences 
seem to be desirable . Even mutually contradictory value -
claims appear to be valuable to the man who holds them . Since 
Brightman is drawn to believe that valuable results may follow 
from untrue beliefs~ he rejects the pragmatic test of value-
1 . 2 c alms . 
Then~ too ~ he believes that one can expect too much 
of religion in the way of health~ wealth~ and happiness . In 
spite of some purely pragmatic preaching, there are numerous 
types of value which religion cannot be expected to produce . 3 
The difficulty in understanding Brightman ' s refusal 
to test all values pragmatically arises from failure to recog-
nize that religion, for him, is not concerned with mere 
value -claims ~ regardless of apparent results . Religion is 
concerned with true value . Yet, in the end that which is 
true will be of benefit to man since it is real and eterna1 . 4 
1E . S. Brightman, Religious Values, pp. 97-99. 
2E . s . Brightman~ "Truth and Value in Religion," 
Methodist Review, 105 ( 1922)~ pp . 42, 47. 
3Ib id . 
4E . S . Brightman~ "Christianity~ Philosophy, and the 
Tea ching of Religion,'' p. 15. 
Therefore, every religious value - claim must be tested as to 
its truth, just as every other value experience must undergo 
critical tests . 
Furthermore, religious values are to be tested in 
similar manner to any value-claim. 
When we assert that any object is really valu-
able, we mean, first, that it not merely appears 
valuable at the moment but would appear so to an 
"impartial observer 11 that took all truth into 
account . 1 
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Then, too, a religious value is true when it conforms to ideal 
norms V<Thich the mind recognizes as laws constituting true 
value . 2 Thus, coherence is the criterion of religious values. 
It is essential to mention again Brightman's conviction that 
"all truth, including religious truth, is hypothetica l ."3 
This belief, for him, is not a surrender to skepticism; rather, 
it is a warning against dogmatism. It is to emphasize that 
persons can possess ''practical cert ainty" about value hypo-
theses. 
5. The Implications for a Philosophy of Religion 
in Teacher Education 
A philosophy of religion for teacher education which 
grows out of Brightman ' s axiology must come from implicati ons, 
1E . S . Brightman, "Truth and Value in Religion," p . 46 . 
2Ibid . 
3E . S . Brightman, "Religion as Truth," p. 67 . 
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rather than from systematic development by Brightman himself. 
In spite of his involvement in policy matters in the Boston 
University Graduate School, he wrote no book and few arti-
cles concerning educational aims or concerning religion in 
education. He was silent in .regard to the problems of 
teacher education. 
Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, Brightman was 
devoted both to the philosophical task of "seeing life stead-
ily and seeing it whole'' and, also, to a search for and con-
servation of highest values. It seems logical, therefore, 
that his systematic search for wholeness should be expanded 
to include a philosophy of education, especially its aims. 
In terms of such objectives, it may be possible to discern 
the role of religious values in teacher education. 
a. Ideal Aims of Teacher Education 
Aims refer to goals or objectives; ideal aims refer 
to those goals which ought to be achieved. The ideal aims 
of a particular institution refer to those goals which the 
institution should achieve in its particular context. In 
Brightman's philosophy, only persons are real, and thus it 
becomes necessary to discuss the goals of persons within a 
given situation. Our problem, then, resolves itself into 
the question: "What are the ideal aims for persons who will 
become teachers?" This is a question of value, a question 
of the highest intrinsic value. 
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In answer to the question of purpose for prospective 
teachers, one major solution grows out of Brightman's axi~ ­
alogy. "Only personality is the highest intrinsic value . " 1 
Therefore, "the purpose of life §nd the purpose for a stu-
den!l is the full development of the noblest powers of the 
world of persons ."2 The implication here is that "self-
realization" or the fullest development of personality is the 
aim for all education, the ideal norm for all institutions 
which guide persons. 
Self-realization, as applied to Brightman's highest 
goal for persons, does not imply individual growth as -opposed 
to cooperative good . His concern, rather, is for all indi-
victuals to develop to their fullest potential in a cooperative 
society. He writes: 
The cooperation of man with man and man with 
God in the production of worthy personality 
is not an ideal dream, but the very eternal 
good of the universe. 3 
Again the emphasis i s upon ideal achievement of values for all 
persons as seen in his Law of Altruism : 
Each person ought to respect all other persons 
as ends in themselves, and, as far as possible, 
to co-operate with others in the production and 
enjoyment of shared values. 4 
1E. S . Brightman, Nature and Values, p . 62 . 
2Ibid ., p. 63 . 
3E . S . Brightman , 11The Personalistic Method in Philo -
sophy," Methodist Review, 103 (1920), 379 . 
4E . S. Brightman, Mora l Laws, p. 223. 
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An aim for teacher education, however, must go beyond 
the prospective teacher. It must be related to the child 
who will soon be a student of the future teacher. Bright-
man1s theory of the highest good, if applied to the larger 
scope of teacher education, suggests that the purpose of edu-
cational experiences is to guide the college student toward 
his fullest development and at the same time give him the 
insights and skills for similar leadership with his future 
pupils. 
b. Educational Concerns 
It is not the purpose of this dissertation to develop 
an entire policy and program for teacher education. Never-
theless, personalism gives some important clues for these 
larger educational concerns which will be briefly mentioned. 
The question., 11 What should be taught in higher educa-
tion?11 is a problem which, according to Brightman1s personal-
ism, has to be answered also in terms of a scale of values. 
In the first place, curricular content should naturally be 
directed toward the aim of education -- the fullest develop-
ment of persons. 
Secondly, any curricular pattern should take into a c -
count every value area. These values, in Brightman 1 s axi·- -
Qbgy, include the rigorous search for all truth called in-
tellectual vGlues; the development of moral character through 
examination of ethical norms and motivation to moral living. 
Courses of study should include concern for the beautiful 
through literature, art, and music. Thus aesthetic values 
would be fostered. 
Thirdly, within the co-curricular activities, if not 
in formal classes, the college would be obligated to provide 
conditions for the development of social values, the value 
of work and play, knowledge of bodily health, a wise use 
of material possessions, and an awareness of the forces of 
nature. 
The problem of the specific curricular and extra-
, 
curricular development, vitally significant as it is, does 
not fall within the major scope of this study. It is enough 
to point out that whatever value theory an educator truly 
believes will determine the subject-matter to be included. 
The problem of choosing content within any given academic 
discipline is becoming increasingly crucial, since informa-
tion in all areas is expanding at such a rapid rate. De-
cisions as to what to teach and what to leave out demand· 
value norms upon which such decisions may be made. 
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The problem of appropriate teaching methods cannot be 
relegated to an unimportant place in a personalistic philos-
ophy of education. At least, methods which best accomplish 
the goal or self-realization must be preferred over means 
which are incoherent with such a goal. It is likewise possi-
ble to relate the values of personal i sm to such specialized 
educational services as counseling. At least one writer has 
developed the theory that non-directive psychotherapy rests 
upon the value premises of personalism.1 
Furthermore, each single educational concern must be 
considered as related to each other, since in Brightman's 
thinking, all true values coalesce with one another. 
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Although the implications of Brightman's axiology re-
main underdeveloped with reference to the problems above, 
such implementation is not the main task of this study. The 
primary concern here is with religion in teacher education. 
What place shall religion have in the teachers college? How 
shall it be taught, if it be taught at all? What relation-
ship does religion have to other aspects of education? 
c. Religious Values in Teacher Education 
In Brightman's axiological perspective, religion and 
religious values are given a vitally important place. The 
same status for religious values, it would seem, would be ap-
plicable in teacher education. Religion represents the high-
est values of life. Religion is 11 a concern about experiences 
which are of supreme value."2 It is hardly possible that 
leaders in teacher education should be unconcerned with such 
values. 
lsee Philip Olmer, 11 Personalism and Non-Directive 
Psychotherapy," Philosophical Forum, 7 (1949), 12-18. 
2E. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 17. 
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It has been pointed out that, according to Brightman, 
the religious aspect of life is not only a special field of 
1 
study, but it is a 11unique way of apprehending experience. •t 
This latter quality is a kind of perception gained when all 
values are grasped as an organic whole; when meaning and pur-
pose are seen in existence through a relationship of all 
truly valuable elements. This view of wholeness, which is 
an ideal of the religious values, is certainly a quality to 
be searched for and conserved in institutions of teacher edu-
cation. Then, too, Brightman's insistence that religion 
functions as a conserver of high values implies that when-
ever values are conserved through educational procedures, one 
aspect of religion is being advanced. 
The theistic aspect of religious values is equally 
important with other dimensions, if not more so. It would 
seem to follow that religion in teacher education should, at 
least, lead the student to see the conviction of many of the 
great minds of mankind that values are objectively rooted in 
the nature of reality . Such an approach should not be made 
in a spirit of indoctrination; rather, the student should 
come to take seriously the belief in God that many persons 
hold. The student himself must accept the hypothesis of God 
lE. s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 416. 
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or some alternate one . 
These religious values are not sectarian in nature~ 
nor are they limited to any particular religious faith . In 
so far as Brightman's axiology is true and adopted by edu-
cators in an institution~ these values should logically be 
integrated into the educational program. But how can this be 
done? 
Let us recall that personality is the highest v~lue 
in Brightman ' s axio logy . Furthermore~ the most significant 
aspect of personality or self is its capability for reason 
and value . 1 Then~ too, the epistemological demand for com-
prehensive coherence implies that it is rationality alone 
which can organize ideas in a coherent manner. It is reason 
which makes possible achievement of truth in so far as we 
have it, that tests value-claims~ that unifies life. The 
human mind, with reason as its tool~ is therefore vitally im-
portant in Brightman ' s philosophy. 
It can be supposed~ then, that education ought to be 
an a ttempt to utilize man's mind to the fullest i n developing 
the potentiality of personality to its highest . Brightman ' s 
personal idealism rests, in fact~ on the conviction that the 
nature of the universe is somehow akin to mind and that 
1E . S. Brightman, "Some Definitions for Personalists ~ · · 
The Personalist, 27 (1946), 370. 
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critical thinking can lead to knowledge of objective reality . 
Therefore, a central task of the col l ege or uni -
versity is an intellectual task -- that of using the mind, 
through rigorous academic effort, to develop the personality 
in harmony with all true values . Likei'<~ise, the values v.rhich 
are specifically religious in nature must be fostered through 
the academic program of higher education . Let us suppose that 
t he main thrust of religion in teacher educa tion will be 
primarily thr ough the curriculum . 1 
d. The Teaching of Religion and Philosophy 
The following approaches are compl ementary . The firs t 
deals with religion as a subject of its own . The second in-
volves religious content and values within the various suo -
ject-matter disciplines. The third is made explicit by 
Brightman in his writings and deals with philosophy as a 
su~ ject and a s a way of viewing a ll of life, including re-
ligious values, through reasoned criticism and interpretation . 
The first curricular approach is that of teaching the 
facts of the religions . This is the empirical method of sur-
veying all data of human experience which have any bearing 
1we do not attempt to minimize extra - curricular acti -
vities if these are intellectua l in nature, as, for example , 
the Boston University Philosophy Club. In so far as t he other 
values , such as bodily, social, and the like, are important, 
they fall outside the main function of higher education . 
on the subject of religion. Such a study, Brightman implies, 
would begin oy examining the scientific data of religion 
which a re presented by the history of religion, psychology 
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of religion, and sociology of religion. It seems reasonabl e 
to propose that, if prospective teachers are to come face-
to-face with the highest values of existence, some provision 
must be made for studying the empirical facts of the religions 
out of which claims have been made for the achievement of 
such va lues. 
Objective study about religion might be handled in 
special courses in 11 Psychology of Religion, 11 11 History of Re -
ligion, 11 or 11 Socio logy of Religion. 11 If these courses were 
offered, Brightman ' s insistence on scholarship would demand 
that they be treated as impartial l y as any scientific study . 
Brightman 's desire for impart i ality is seen in his conviction 
that no religious view is above vigorous empirical and ration-
al examination . He insists that a study of religion must 
proceed 11-1i th an 11 impart i al eye examining every fact, every 
oelief, e very problem, 11 and he is convinced that a factual 
study of religion is possible and desira ble for anyone who 
is searching for truth and for high va l ues. 
1E . S. Brightman, 11 Religion as Truth, 11 p . 53. 
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Secondly, in view of Brightman's insistence on the 
coalescence of all values and his own inclusive scholarship, 
we can sure ly suppose that his theory of religious va lues 
demands a second educational effort. This is the aim of deal-
ing with religious data and religious values whenever either 
or both are relevant to any sub ject. For example, when the 
nature of the human being is studied in psychology, a co-
herent approach would demand that man be studied as a wor-
shiping, believing person as well as a biological entity. 
Whenever in literature there is study of a writer who lifts 
high man's potentialities or who refers to any ideal achieve-
ments of the human being, Brightman would have the teacher 
face openly those religious values which are coalescent with 
others . Similarly, the interdependence of values directs the 
teachers of all the humanities, social sciences, natural 
sciences, and professional education to relate all sub jects 
to each other, to the total structure of values including re-
ligion, and to religious data whenever such a re intrinsic 
to the academic endeavor. 
Unless all values are seen in their relationship to 
each other, according to Brightman 's theory of coalescence, 
each single value, whether it be aesthetic, social, character, 
intellectual, or religious will be degraded . The movement, 
then, which a ttempts to deal with religion within the context 
of academic discipl i nes f inds logical support in Brightman ' s 
axiology . 
The third approach to teaching religion in colleges 
of teacher education is discussed by Bright man in an article 
entitled 11 Christianity, Philosophy, and the Teaching of Re-
ligion."1 The thesis of this paper is stated as follows: 
Since the aim of teaching religion is the under-
standing and application of religious truth, 
phi losophy is essential to the teaching of re-
ligion in college and seminary. 2 
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In the artic le from which the above lines were taken, Bright-
man re - emphasizes his belief that factual data are essential 
a s a bas is of phi losophical material. Yet he argues that 
courses in the history, psychology, and sociology of religion 
do not include the entire range and depth of religion. For 
examp le, they do not probe into such questions as: Are re-
ligious be l iefs true? What is the worth of man? What is 
rea lity, and does it support man's moral needs ? 
Through studies in philosophy, on the other hand, the 
values of religion can become actualized; value-claims can be 
verified; life can be seen 11 steadi ly and whole 11 -- an ideal 
of both philosophy and religion. All values, consequently, 
can be studied and verified. True values can b e conserved 
and all values ca n be related to one another. 
1Journal of Bible and Religion, 10 (1942 ), 14-21. 
2r- · d ~., p. 14 . 
It is to reinforce this same conviction that Bright-
man writes in another journal: 
Philosophy brings respect and capacity for 
clear thinking, an historical perspective, a 
sense of true values, and a new grip on life. 
• • • Religion is not lost, but more intelli-
gently found. 1 
Brightman believes that one tragedy of higher educa-
tion is that loyalty to ultimate values is often built for 
students on the basis of subtle pressures. Whenever such 
authoritarian indoctrination is substituted for rational 
empiricism in developing values, a tragic mistake is being 
made. In expressing this fear, he says: 
In our academic classrooms, students are pre-
sented with physico-chemical, historical, 
sociological, psychological, religious and 
irreligious points of view; and if they are 
not taught to view philosophically the com-
peting claims of the social or behavioristic 
or historical or religious approach to be 
the only sound method, the result of educa-
tion simply depends upon which department 
makes the loudest noise. 2 
Therefore, he believes that if religion is truly a search 
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for, creation and conservation of, and devotion to values which 
are supreme and ultimate, philosophical study is imperative. 
Through philosophy the student may develop a hierarchy of 
values which reaches an apex in loyalty to that which is the 
1E. s. Brightman{ "Philosophy in American Education, 11 
The Personalist, 1 (1920), 16. 
2E. s. Brightman, 11 Christianity, Philosophy, and the 
Teaching of Religion, 11 p. 19. 
ground of all values --to God. 1 
This same conviction of the need for philosophical 
study i s seen in the final chapter of Brightman's Religious 
Values. He suggests that every student who studies religious 
facts will go beyond those facts in his own interpretation. 
It may b e that the student's religious interpretation will 
grow in a 11Topsy 11 fashion. He may become an intolerant 
11 fundamentalistn or a dogmatic 11 humanist, 11 unwilling toques-
tion the presuppositions of his religious faith. 2 
The task of philosophy, Brightman is convinced, is to 
gui de the student toward a critical e valuation of the pre -
suppositions of religion in the light of our total knowledge 
and experience. At the same time, the philosophical enter-
prise will help the student to correlate and interpret all of 
the facts gathered by empirical studies. 
Our choice really does not lie between philoso-
phy and no philosophy; if we have any interest 
in the value or the truth of religion, our choice 
can only lie between a carefully thought-out 
philosophy and a Blipshod and uncritical one. 
If religion is worthy of the best we can give it, 
then it is worthy of our thoughtful attention, 
our best philosophical reflection. 3 
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1It should not be forgotten that Brightman insists in 
taking disva lue seriously as well as value . Thus the philoso-
phy teacher has the obligation of facing with his students 
actua l evil -- evil in the world and in persona l life. It is 
Brightman's conviction that his concept of The Given will b e 
of benefit to the student struggling with the problem of evil. 
See Religious Values, pp . 89-97 . 
2E. S . Brightman, Religious Values, p. 240. 
3Ibid., p. 254. 
Finally, it is Brightman's belief that philosophical 
study as a method of studying religion makes possible the 
development of the fulle~t dimension of religious values - -
the connection with a cosmic creator and sustainer of values. 
Such a confidence in an objective ground for values cannot 
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be naively accepted, but through philosophy, can b e rationally 
justified. 
For Brightman~ therefore, the fullest dimension of 
religious values demands metaphysical study of the ground of 
values the objective order of all religious values . Al-
though Brightman firmly believes the reality is the Supreme 
Person or God, he would leave this conclusion up to the stu-
dent 's coherent thinking about his own experience . 
Religion in teacher education, then, appears to be 
deeply related to the curriculum , if Brightman's axiology is 
to oe taken seriously. 
e. Action and Worship 
Other implications for teacher education in Brightman's 
philosophy of religion grow out of his descriptive and norma-
tive definitionsof religion. Descriptively he suggests that 
religion is characterized by 11 some suitable expression of 
this concern and devotion." He is speaking about concern for 
experiences which a re regarded as of supreme value and devotion 
to the creator and conserver of the values. 
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A suitable concern for true values should involve 
action to achieve them for all selves. If the highest in-
trinsic value is personality, it follows that if any person 
needlessly suffers, the reduction of that suffering is a re-
ligious imperative. Efforts toward peace, social and eco-
nomic justice, and racial equality are actions of a religious 
nature. Therefore, if a teachers college is to take religious 
values seriously, some provision and encouragement must be 
made for the action phase of concern for highest values. 
It does not seem unreasonable to suppose, for example, 
that when a class in sociology is studying problems of de-
linquency, slum conditions, or poor recreational facilities, 
the instructor should direct the students toward appropriate 
social action to help alleviate such conditions. Not only is 
action a part of any learning experience which will be lasting, 
but in so far as it is a celebration or demonstration of 
supreme values held py the group or by a single individual, 
it is religious in quality. Such human cooperative action, 
especially if it grows out of a desire to cooperate with God, 
is characteristic of high religion. Community responsibility, 
which is implied in t his discussion, is especially appropriate 
in an institution supported by tax funds, as are state 
teachers colleges. 
It would be unfair to Brightman to omit one final and 
inevitable aspect of religion -- that of worship. There is no 
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indication in his writing that he believes in any single 
type or form of worship. Rather, he considers worship to 
be any suitable expression of the dependence one feels on a 
personal God and the desire to cooperate with God in the 
conservation and increase of values. 1 If such impulse to 
worship is a natural outcome of the discovery of true values 
and discovery of God, and if religion 1 s fullest breadth is to 
be a part of teacher education, some provision should be made 
for appropriate worship. 
Such an implication involves difficulties in tax-
supported institutions because of America 1 s religious plural-
ism. Conflicts among Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Jews 
are especially potential. Nonetheless, inter-faith chapels 
and a group ministry as developed at Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity, schools of religion and chapel activities as organ-
ized at Iowa State University and Kansas University, and pro-
grams of religious activities conducted at Iowa State Teachers 
College, Kansas State Teachers College, and Western Michigan 
College of Education indicate that appropriate opportunities 
of worship can be provided for all persons on state teachers 
college campuses. 
1 See Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 169. 
6. An Appraisal 
Every carefully articulated and coherently developed 
philosophical system, or aspect of a system, will inevitably 
be strong through its inclusiveness and cohesiveness. This 
is true of Brightman's personalism and equally of his axi-
ology with which this chapter is primarily concerned. At 
the same time, there are at least three weaknesses which 
render the system in its entirety less than perfect. A 
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brief consideration, therefore, of both major strengths and 
weaknesses is relevant in an evaluation of his theory of 
value. The following statements, like those made of Dewey's 
axiology, are developed from a rational-empirical basis, keep-
ing also in view an eventual attempt to build a philosophy of 
religion for teacher education. 
a. Weaknesses 
Three criticisms concerning Brightman's axiology ap-
pear to be the most significant for this study. The first 
in no way renders the system untrue, but only indicates a 
possible reason for its rejection by some educators. The 
second involves a limitation in his concept of the 'tobjec-
tivity of value." The third concerns his emphasis on intel-
lectual values. 
1. Brightman, as we have pointed out earlier in the 
chapter, insists that value-norms have their objective exist-
ence in the structure of reality which is the Supreme Person 
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and His rational will. In this system of thought, each per-
son's hypothetical knowledge of and belief in a conscious 
personal God appears to be demanded if he adheres to Bright-
man's axiology. 
It is here believed that some educators would re-
pudiate this concept because o~ the difficulty in considering 
"person" as the key ontological principle. Brightman's 
definition of personality as "the totality of perceptions, 
feelings, thoughts, and desires,"1 or his definition of "per-
son" as the self that is potentially self-conscious, rational, 
and ideal, a self capable of reason and value, presents con-
siderable difficulty for some persons. 2 In spite of Bright-
man's repudiation of "vicious anthropomorphism" in favor of 
the "valid form" which asserts that 
what I find in me as the most coherent and 
reasonable thought that my mind can form is 
true of reality--or as near truth as I can 
reach, 3 
a number of philosophers still consider personalism as mere 
assertions of man's egoistic nature. 
The problem here is primarily one of communication 
concerning the term "person." Even though Brightman's 
definition may be thoroughly coherent and psychologically 
lsee Brightman, "Personality as a Philosophy of Re-
ligion," p. 383. 
2see pages 107-110 for a discussion of self and person. 
3E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 218. 
defensible, anthropomorphic imagery arises in the skeptic's 
mind. The ontological basis of an otherwise clearly under-
stood value theory is therefore difficult to defend. 
The solution to this weakness is not necessarily to 
be found in repudiation of personal idealism. Rather, per-
sonalists need continually to present their ontology in new 
ways, attempting to communicate wi~h educator s concerning 
the central meaning of the metaphysical principle of person-
ality. 
2. The second weakness in Brightman's axiology in-
volves a lack of emphasis upon the significance of the ex-
isting world as the objective referent in a value experi-
ence. In the first place, Brightman insists that a primary 
value or a value-claim is 
a personal conscious experience of liking, 
preference, enjoyment, fulfilled desire, love 
(Brentano), or interest ( cf .. · Perry). Accord-
ing to this definition~ · •• value is primarily 
subjective and psychological •••• Value is an 
attribute of personality as a conscious ex-
perience. 1 
Secondly, he believes that every value-claim is not 
necessarily a true value. For a value-claDru to be declared 
true it must be tested by ideal norms. 2 These ideals are 
logically objective in that they ought to be acknowledged by 
lE. S. Brightman, nValues, Ideals, Norms, and Exi st-
ence,n p. 219. 
2see pages 119-120. 
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all minds. These norms are also metaphysically obje·cti ve 
in that they are in the mind of God. Although in Brightman's 
later writing, most notably in his revised edition of An 
Introduction to Philosophy, he speaks of values as subjective 
and norms as objective, 2 values themselves can be thought of 
as objective in that God, the Supreme Person, achieves both 
reason and value. 3 
In Brightman's concept of the nature of values as 
sketched above, values are realized in persons, either the 
human person or God. Nevertheless, he declares that "when-
ever we talk about values, we talk about the real world. 114 
This can only be understood to mean that in every experience 
of true value, th~ . value experience occurs because of some 
reality which is actually present or ought to be present to 
the valuer. 
It is precisely at this point of a value referent that 
this writer believes Brightman's axiology is not developed to 
its fullest potentiality. He continually emphasizes that 
values are personal or subjective, failing to point out with 
equal clarity that some condition in the real world has to be 
present and possess value possibilities, else the subjective 
p. 370. 
lE. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 153. 
2Ibid., pp. 154, 16. 
3E. s. Brightman, "S.ome Definitions for Personalists," 
4E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p. 151. 
value-claim will be little more than an irrelevant personal 
dream. Added emphasis, then, upon the embodiment of God's 
will within the real world would add strength to his belief 
in the objectivity of values. 
3. The third criticism, like the second, concerns 
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an emphasis in Brightman's value theory. In spite of his be-
lief that persons are of highest intrinsic worth and that 
the fullest development of persons in cooperation with God 
is the summum bonum, one aspect of personal development is 
primarily emphasized--the mind. This writer is in agreement 
that the development of the human reason is fundamental in 
personal growth. Nevertheless, it is here maintained that 
when the emotional and social development of a person is 
dwarfed, the person's mind is in bondage to fear, insecurity, 
or distrust so that he is unable to be a "whole person 11 or 
even to think critically. Brightman's axiology would be 
stronger and would have additional import for teacher train-
ing, if his emphasis upon the social values did not suffer 
neglect at the expense of the intellectual values. 
b. Strengths 
1. Brightman's theory of value is deserving of sup-
port in that it is both empirical and rational. He begins 
with the facts of experience; yet he does not equate the "is" 
with the 11 ought'' and hence his values remain truly normative 
rather than merely descriptive. Furthermore, he develops 
his system from experience, through coherent thinking to 
ideal and objective norms which ought to be the bases of 
value decisions because of the truth of those norms. Such 
an axiology presents a bulwark against the relativistic tem-
per of our times, without a rigidity which might disregard 
human experience, need, and the persistent new demands upon 
man in an evolving world. 
2. Brightman's theory grounds value-norms in the 
structure of reality itself. Even though some educators 
adopt an alternative metaphysics to personal idealism and in 
spite of the lack of emphasis on objective values themselves, 
the objective status of ideal norms provides a stability of 
values toward which most persons reach. 
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3. The emphasis which Brightman gives to the coales-
cence or interrelatedness of all true values provides a 
rationale for the unification of all worthy aspirations. 
Moreover, it gives a basis for correcting the fragmentation 
of life which higher education is often guilty of helping to 
create. Such a concept of the coalescence of values parallels 
the current emphasis upon a required general education cur-
riculum for prospective teachers--a curriculum which links 
the aesthetic, social, character, and religious values with 
the values called "intellectual '• or "truth-seeking." 
4. One weakness in Brightman's axiology is equally 
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an important strength. This writer believes that the criti-
cisms of "anti-intellectualism" in regard to the schools, 
which have been widely and often carelessly leveled at public 
education, point toward a needed strength in the public school 
and the teachers college. This is the need of rigorous train-
ing of the mind. Thus Brightman's high regard for the growth 
of critical thinking (mental development) is not only a true 
value, but one which deserves attention among those who 
train teachers. 
5. The philosophical open-mindedness of spirit which 
Brightman demonstrates in his approach to religion not only 
lifts high a confidence in religious truth but makes it 
possible to study religion fairly in a religiously pluralis-
tic culture. Leaders in teacher education might give careful 
consideration to his insistence that religion can best be 
taught through philosophy. Such courses could be a part of 
an integrating academic experience for all students in their 
last year of college or university. Through courses in 
philosophy, it seems possible that the "category of continuity 
of experience and personal growth"as supported by Dewey 
could be maintained; a hierarchy of values could be recognized 
and conserved; the religious values which Brightman insists 
are supreme might find a significant place in teacher educa-
tion. 
CHAPTER IV 
HENRY NELSON WIEMAN: AXIOLOGY 
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
1. Biographical Sketch 
Henry Nelson Wieman was born in Rich Hill, Missouri 
in 1884. He relates that his Presbyterian-minister father 
and his religiously inquiring, yet devout, mother did not 
indoctrinate him with religious 11 truth. 11 11 I caught reli-
gion as a passion rather than as a specific set of beliefs, 11 
he says.1 
After receiving his A. B. degree from Park College, 
Parkville, Missouri in 1907, for the next three years he 
was a student at the San Francisco Theological Seminary, 
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and from 1910 to 1912 he studied at the University of Jena 
and at Heidelberg in Europe. In 1917 he completed his Ph. D. 
at Harvard. 
Wieman's entire professional career has been devoted 
to teaching and writing 'in the field of philosophy of reli-
gion. He was professor at Occidental College, Los Angeles, 
California for ten years beginning in 1917, and for twenty 
more professor of philosophy of religion at the Divinity 
School of the University of Chicago. During that period he 
1H. N. Wieman, 11 Theocentric Religion," Contemporary 
American Theology, ed. V. Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 
1932), p. 341. 
wrote, or was joint author, of fourteen major books, over 
fifty articles in professional journals, and dozens of book 
reviews. Since his reti rement from Chicago University he 
has taught at the University of Oregon and at the Univer-
1 
sity of Houston. 
2. Epistemological and Metaphysical 
Presuppositions 
Wieman's earliest books, The Wrestle of Religion 
with Truth2 and Religious Experience and Scientific Method,3 
set forth a theory of knowledge which he believes to be ap-
plicable to every area of human concern. This is the scien-
tific method, a method which he has re-defined again and 
again. The essence of his epistemology is that the only 
method of gaining and validating knowledge is the use of 
observation, analysis, inference, and experiment. He main-
tains that all knowledge emerges through observation or 
experience and must meet specified tests for its validation. 
If the tests of inference and experiment are not met, the 
claim of truth is mistaken. 4 
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lsee D. w. Soper, Men Who Share Belief (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1955), pp. 169 f; and J. Catell, 
Directory of American Scholars (Lancaster: The Science Press, 
1942), p. 892. 
2New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928. 
3New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. 
4see the discussion by H. P. Van Dusen and H. N. Wieman, 
"How Do We Know?" Christian Century, 48 (1931), 713i'f. 
Wieman emphasizes that it is not the laboratory 
method of the sciences which he uses for gaining and test-
ing knowledge; rather it is an experimental or operational 
method. In any situation where cognition takes place, one 
first perceives or observes some event and then makes an 
analysis of the event and formulates a hypothetical concept. 
The concept is true to the extent that it fulfills certain 
anticipated adjustments. 1 
Religion is not exempt from Wieman's strictly em-
pirical-rational epistemology. He agrees with many orthodox 
theologians that religious knowledge begins in revelation. 
Yet he interprets revelation as referring to that situation 
in which "some pervasive and insistent reality which encom-
passes us beats upon the doors of consciousness until at 
last it breaks through and we are aware. ''2 Moreover, he in-
sists that revelation itself grows out of observation and 
reason, and every revelation should be tested by the scien-
tific method. Claims of religious truth must be weighed by 
the same methods by which one tests any truth.3 All knowl-
edge begins in experience, moves through rational analysis 
and inference, and is finally tested operationally as the 
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lH. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), pp. 16-24: 
2H. N. Wieman, "Was God in Jesus'?" Christian Century, 
51 (1934), 590. 
3H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, p. 152. 
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anticipated results follow or do not follow expectations. 
Just as Wieman's epistemology limits his philo-
sophical system, his ontology also defines the nature and 
scope of his theories. In the first place, he holds to a 
metaphysical realism. Reality is "out there" and is not sub-
jective. In answer to the question as to whether or not the 
world would exist without persons, Wieman answers that "human 
beings and living organisms are constituent factors of the 
totality of all being."1 Since persons and living organisms 
are constituent factors of reality, they are part of the 
past and the future. Even though the universe always was 
and ever will be related to human life, still the world of 
nature is never only "my perception." I am but one strand 
of nature which itself is real. 
To express this realistic naturalism somewhat differ-
ently, we can say that nature is the ontological framework 
in Wieman's thinking. His ontology is not the mechanistic 
view of the universe to which the materialist holds. It is 
a universe whose basic "stuff" is events and their qualities 
and relations. 2 Qualities--that is, all that persons 
1H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, p. 161. 
. 2H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 6. QUality here re-
fers to such words as "Joy," "sorrow,""pleasure," "pain," 
and the like. Every quality is an experi ence of an event. 
The event is composed of numerous strands. These terms will 
be developed more thoroughly later i n the chapter. 
perceive--are intrinsic to the substance of the environing 
world; they are the ultimate substance of concrete reality. 
Qualities are ontological, not in the sense that all reality 
depends upon them, but in that they ~ the objective real-
1 ity of the world. Thus when Wieman develops an axiologi-
cal theory about qualit~es and events being the data of 
values, the values are rooted in the ontologically real--in 
ultimate being. 
Wieman's naturalistic point of view may be further 
seen in his concept of God. When he says that God is •tthat 
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interaction between individuals, groups, and ages which gen-
erates and promotes the greatest possible mutuality of good, 112 
he ascribes a naturalistic limitation to the term 11God. 11 
Again, when he insists that God is "that order of existence 
and ·possibility .•• ,"3 his God is clearly part of the 
order of nature, although He is not all of nature. 
In view of passages like the above, Wieman's natur-
alistic metaphysical theory is clearly summarized and 
defined by Sterling P. Lamprecht: 
Naturalism means a philosophical position, 
empirical in method, that regards everything 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History (Boston: The 
Beacon Press, 1949), p. 19. 
2H. N. Wieman et al., Is There a God? (Chicago: Willett, 
Clark and Co., 1932), p. U. 
3H. N. Wieman, The Issues of Life (New York: The Abing-
don Press, 1930), p. 16 • 
that exists or occurs to be conditioned in 
its existence or occurrence by causal fac-
tors within one all-encompassing system of 
nature, however "spiritual" or purposeful 
or rational some of these things and events 
may in their functions and values prove to 
be. 1 
3. From Religion to Value 
Wieman, unlike other philosophers such as Dewey and 
Brightman, does not begin his axiological system and then 
develop the implications for religion and other values. 
Rather, his starting point is religion. It is his belief 
as a philosophical theologian that religion has potentially 
a high function in human life: it ought to be man's "acute 
awareness of the realm of unattained possibility and be-
havior that results from this awareness. 112 A man is re-
ligious, Wieman claims, when he is searching for that which 
is of supreme value and when he is absolutely devoted to 
such value and to its source. Although religion includes 
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belief, it is more than belief. Religion in man's life is 
centered about his feeling and acting toward a reality which 
is worthy of universal devotion; moreover, this something to 
which the individual ought to react with his whole being is 
ls. P. Lamprecht, "Naturalism and Religion," Naturalism 
and the Human Spirit, ed. Y. H. Krikorian (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1944), p. 18. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, 
p. 135. 
believed by the person to be of highest value and an order 
of value-. 1 
Wieman maintains that one of the tragedies of human 
existence is that persons often believe that they are de-
voted to the order of value--that which creates values for 
- all men--when in reality they are dedicated to one parochial 
value. Such a limited· commitment might not be serious in a 
more primitive era when no person or group had great power 
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over other men. But in an atomic age when groups and nations 
have tremendous power to destroy or permit life, it is im-
perative that absolute value2 be discovered, and that man's 
religious calling be to serve the source of all human values. 
Similarly, one individual may think that his devotion is to 
an order of value when he is merely dedicated to a single 
value. Thus religion becomes narrow and binding. Religion, 
which at its best transforms men to new creatures through 
the work of a creative power of good, actually has often 
been something less than this. In fact, Wieman maintains 
that at times '1nothing has so persistently and effectively 
blocked the way to salvation as religion. •t3 
If, then, religion ought to be man's "acute 
lH. N. Wieman, The Issues of Life, pp. 136ff. 
2By absolute value Wieman means that which is always 
and in all circumstances good. 
3H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, p. 1. 
1 awareness of the vast realm of unattained possibilities; 
if abundant living, the goal of religion, may be increased 
without limits; if religion is to be a devotion to true 
values and their sources; then the demand is upon one to 
discover what is true value and what is the order by which 
values are created. 2 
Thus, Wieman's religious quest for ultimate value 
directs him toward a theory of value which gives content to 
religious concepts and provides a foundation for educational 
theory and for values of beauty, truth, and morals.3 He 
also shows in his axiology how the source of human good, the 
creative event, has been the directive in history. He main-
tains that when men serve this God, that is, the creative 
source of all value, new events will emerge which will be 
ultimately good. 4 It is with this theory of value and its 
implications which this chapter is concerned. 
4. Wieman's Axiology 
Wieman is true to his empirical method when he as-
serts that the original datum of value is quality.5 By 
lsee H. N. Wieman, 11 The Definition of Religion," Journal 
of Religion, 7 (1927), 301. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Issues of Life, p. 164. 
3He develops his axiology primarily in The Source of 
Human Good. 
4see H. N. Wieman, The Directive in History. 
5Ibid., p. 6. 
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11 quality11 he refers to everything which enters conscious-
ness as immediately felt. Persons indicate such awareness 
by words like 11 joy, 11 "sorrow, 11 "hot," "cold," 11 liking, 11 
"pleasure, •i 11 pain, 11 11 delicious, 11 "disgusting, 11 and the like. 
However, the claim that qualities are the data of value 
does not mean that value or value-claims reside in a per-
son's consciousness or experience. These qualities in human 
perception are not the result c£ the organism alone or- the 
object by itself; rather, the qualities are composed of 
many strands (only one of which is personal consciousness) 
which converge to form the quality. 
The term "conjunction11 is used by Wieman to suggest 
this joining of many strands in the emergence of a quality 
or qualities. For example, in the aesthetic experience of 
appreciatively viewing a beautiful sky, the aesthetic qual-
ity includes the person's visual apparatus, the vast space, 
air, sunlight, dust, an uninterrupted time of perception--
on and on the l i st continues. From such an example it is 
clearly seen that quality, the original datum of value, 
does not reside in any single strand; quality is the con-
junction of all strands. Thus value, whatever it turns out 
to be, cannot be only in the individual, or i n the single 
object, but it lies in the conjunction which makes up the 
whole event. 
As if to refute Brightman's insistence that all 
values are in persons 1 Wieman maintains that qualities do 
not reside in the mind of a person: 
The sensitive organism and the mind have 
no privileged position1 and they are no 
more bearers of the quality felt--or 
creators of it or projectors of it--
than are other strands equally necessary 
to the occurrence of that quality at 
that time and place. 1 
Just as quality does not reside only in persons 1 neither is 
it singularly in objects 1 when strands of events are taken 
by themselves. Wieman maintains that quality can only be 
understood as a "coming together" in a concrete event of 
many lines which1 when they converge, make up a quality 1 a 
conjunction1 or an event. 
The nature of quality, event, or conjunction 1 each 
term referring to the same reality 1 may be illustrated in 
Wieman's fashion by considering a specific home of parents 
and four children. At · this moment, no single strand such 
as the house 1 each person1 all persons 1 a smell of cookies 1 
the earth upon which the house is built, the heat or food 
which sustains life 1 is individually the quality. Rather 1 
quality and ensuing value can only be understood as the 
convergence of many strands into the event called 11 home." 
In Wieman's thinking, it is a mistake for persons 
to give loyalty to but one facet of an event, thinking that 
t 9 be value or the determinative factor in the value. Actu-
ally the only reality is the totality of the event or the 
1H. N. Wieman 1 The Directive in History1 p. 7. 
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conjunction of strands, and in the event alone resides 
value. Here is Wieman's realism. His emphasis is strong 
that the value is "out there, 11 just as anything else is 
11 out there, •r although the value can not be unrelated to 
human living any more than the rest of the universe can 
be unrelated to the lives of persons.1 Furthermore, this 
emphasis upon the objectivity of values gives a clue to 
Wieman's metaphysics, especially when two of his affirma-
tions are joined: first, that the qualities which are the 
content of every event are not subjective but are the ulti-
mate substance of all concrete reality; 2 and secondly, that 
"objective value is a characteristic pertaining to all the 
universe and to metaphysical reality. 11 3 
Thus far in examining Wieman's axiology we have 
seen that qualities are data of value, and they are the con-
tent of a conjunction of many strands which converge into 
an event. Value, whatever we may discover it to be, is 
part of this reality called "event. 11 Finally, each event 
is real in itself; it is ontological being. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, 
p. 163. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, pp. 19-20. 
3H. N. Wieman 11 The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, 
p. 163. 
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a. Instrumental and Intrinsic Values 
In Wieman's axiological system, all values are not 
of equal worth. In order to distinguish between lower and 
higher values, he uses the familiar categories of instru-
mental and intrinsic. In one brief paragraph, he suggests 
that any given strand of an event, since it is necessary 
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for the birth of some intrinsic value, may be thought to be 
instrumental. 1 This statement, however~ doe·s not illustrate 
his basi c concept of the values which are instrumental; 
rather~ he considers instrumental values to be those types of 
qualities which are either negligible or irrelevant to posi-
tive intrinsic value. An illustration of this type of value 
is tasteless or even nauseating food--especially when food 
is eaten by a lone person in an uninspiring environment, it 
is certainly only instrumental in that it merely sustains 
life. Or agai n, an instrumental value may be found in any 
total event when that event has no meaningful connection 
with other events. For example, the chopping of wood may 
be an instrumental value, providing other events of the home 
and family do not enrich the chopping event, thus turning it 
2 into an i ntrinsic value. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 18. 
2The distinction between types of values is precisely 
develofted by Wieman in "Intr insic, Instrumental, and Creative 
Value, t Journal of Philosophy, 42 (1945)~ 18G-185 . 
The transition that might take place in the wood-
chopping experience suggests the nature of intrinsic value. 
Such value is more precisely called rtqualitative meaning. n 
Intrinsic value is defined as a structure of events which 
endows each happening with qualities derived from other 
events. Instrumental value, in contrast, is that structure 
of events whereby each happening does not acquire qualities 
. . --
from other events; or if it does, these qualities are ir-
relevant to the value of the structure.1 
It is the qualitative meaning, or intrinsic value, 
which takes on the greatest importance in Wieman's axiology. 
In his system, reality is made up of structures of events. 
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It may be possible that these varied events are not connected 
for persons, so that the meaning of one will elicit meaning 
from another. But whenever through memory, observation, 
anticipation, or human communication the qualities of one 
event are connected to another in such a way as to enrich, 
broaden, and vivify the meaning of each event, qualitative 
meaning is born. The preciseness of this concept may be 
caught in one of Wieman's definitions: 
Qualitative meaning is that connection 
between events whereby present happenings 
enable me to feel not only the quality 
intrinsic to the events now occurring, 
but also the qualities of many other 
events that are related to them. 2 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 55. 
2Ibid., p. 18. 
It is the connection between events which is the 
value, especially when that connection between events sup-
ports one another, enhances one another, and at the highest 
level, means one another. 1 Thus, the qualities of the 
world become more appreciable when they are connected with 
one another by way of meaning and are so related as to vivi-
2 fy one another by contrast. 
Qualitative meaning is also a connection of the 
here-and-now with the far-away. Through such meaning, per-
sons understand the connection of past and present, and 
present events become •'rich, potent, stirring, overwhelming, 
or exalted with meaning. 11 It is through this kind of mean-
ing that the doors of life are opened into the most abundant 
values. 3 
Qualitative meaning certainly gives pleasure and 
satisfaction. Yet, Wieman refuses to take the hedonistic 
position that pleasure is the criterion of the good. Simi-
larly, he rejects a principle of harmony, Dewey's concept 
of intelligent foresight, or a moral law disclosed by intu-
4 ition or revelation, as a criterion of true value. 
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lH. N. Wieman and R. w. Wieman, Normative Psychology of 
Religion (New York: Thomas J. Crowell Co., 1935), p. 46. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 304. 
3H. N. Wieman, 11Value: Primary Data for Religious 
Inquiry, 11 Journal of Religion, 16 (1936), 391. 
4H. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, pp. 46-50. 
Instead, Wieman uses two main criteria by which to judge 
the relative good of qualitative meanings. First, one 
value is better than another according as it sustains a 
more inclusive and diversified system of enjoyable activi-
ties that support one another. Secondly, those meanings 
which recall another event and which have the capacity of 
stirring intense or vivid response to the appreciable world 
are preferable to those which scarcely move man out of his 
lethargy. 1 Finally, in order for values to exist and to be 
judged, qualitative meaning must be represented by signs 
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which serve to point to the structure of values as a whole. 
~----"'::~-.,-
=--- I n such a way, one can experience feeling through the sensi-
tivity of others, and hence there can be established an in-
finitely complex network of communication which can enrich 
beyond imagination intrinsic values. 
Is, then, qualitative me~ning which is inclusive, 
diversified, vivid and richly shared the highest good and 
hence deserving of man's ultimate loyalty? Wieman answers 
with an unequivocal "notr! Qualitative meaning, like instru-
mental value, is only created good. Even the highest in-
trinsic values are not absolute; that is, they are not always 
and everywhere good, regardless of persons, interests, need, 
lThese criteria are assumed throughout his writing. 
The development is seen in H. N. Wieman and R. W~ Wieman, 
Normative Psychology of Religion, pp. 47ff. 
social condition, and culture. On the contrary, qualitative 
meaning can be unreliable and even demonic. It is unreli-
able when it pretends to be the greater good or which it is 
but a part. It is demonic when it arouses an absoluteness 
and supremacy or loyalty which should only go to that which 
creates meaning. 1 The demonic nature can be seen in many 
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values, such as patriotism when it is assumed to be absolute, 
or in sexuality grown excessive and unresponsible and cut 
off rrom the mutual love and support which creates its mean-
ing. In fact, there is possible danger inherent in every 
value. 
Every value pursued in modern life can 
become demonic--beauty, trut~, morality 
alike--if and when it excludes the de-
mands of the creative good in the name of 
the false finality of what has been created. 
In so far as goods become demonic, they im-
poverish and destroy, rather than conserve 
and increase, the good or human life, for 
they oppose their creator. 2 
Wieman, in setting limits on qualitative meaning, 
suggests that which is of highest value: it is the creative 
source of all created good. This highest good ror man must 
also be absolutely good--good at all times and under all 
conditions. When creativity can be understood and served, 
man will be serving that which is absolutely good. 
1H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, pp. 22-26. 
2Ibid., p. 25. See also H. N. Wieman, "The Ultra-
Human,Jt C'firiS'tian Century, 52 (1935), 962. 
It is Wieman's conviction that all reality is made 
up of events. 1 Thus the highest good must be an event of 
some kind which produces qualitative meaning (intrinsic 
value). It must be creative at all times and in all places. 
It must be process as well as substance, since only process 
is causally efficacious. 2 This highest good must also be 
the kind of process which supports intrinsic values and 
makes them more secure. It must increase the sensitivity of 
persons. It must promote the system of values as a whole. 
The reality, then, which meets these main conditions of the 
ultimate or highest good is usually called the "creative 
event.•t This same reality, however, is also referred to as 
•rthe growth of meaning and value, n3 and nprogressive inte-
gration. n 4 
b. The Creative Event 
The creative event in Wieman's thinking is that 
reality to which all men should be devoted because it is 
not a static or created value. It has no limitations or 
174 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 21. 
2H. N. Wieman, "God and Value," Religious Realism, ed. 
D. c. Macintosh (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 155. 
3H. N. Wieman and R. W. Wieman, Normative Psychology 
of Religion, pp. 51-52. 
4H. N. Wieman, 11God and Value,n pp. 156, 163. 
conditions. It is supra-human~ not in the sense that it 
works outside of human life~ but in the sense that it cre-
ates good in a way that man cannot do. 1 Man~ at best~ can 
discover and provide the conditions for the creative event 
to work~ trusting that whatever creativity follows will be 
good; yet he has to be forever ready to suffer personal 
frustration as the power of creativity remakes him again 
and again. 
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What~ then, is this ultra-human source of human good 
which Wieman insists is the only absolute value? Since his 
system demands that all knowledge must come from observa-
tion, rationally criticized and interpreted~ knowledge of 
the reality which he seeks must come from the scientific 
method. Wieman believes~ therefore~ that knowledge of the 
creative event can be observed in human experience, and can 
be seen in a series of events which together comprise the 
creative event. 
The first subevent is observed whenever there is an 
emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from com-
2 
munication among persons. To be sure, some qualitative 
meaning is born i n the individual from his relationship to 
1H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 76. 
2see especially H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good~ 
Ch. III. The same concept is developed in Normative Pstchology 
of Religion~ Ch. III, "God and Value~ 11 and in The Direc ive in 
History, Chs. I and II. 
his environment. Yet, without intercommunication among 
persons who share their deepest thoughts, reelings, and 
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the wealth or ideas at their disposal, the range or vivid-
ness of qualitative meaning is extremely limited. Whenever 
men experience growth of meaning through communication, they 
are aware of the first aspect of the creative event. 
Secondly, a condition or subevent of creativity is 
solitude, a period of integration in the individual when 
the new qualitative meanings which grow out of creative inter-
communication are merged with previously acquired meaning. 
Such integration, Wieman claims, is nothing which man can ac-
complish in his own strength. It is that which subconscious-
ly and uncontrollably takes place if man provides the favor-
able conditions of quietness and solitude. Like any other 
single event, solitude can be distorted; joined with other 
events, solitariness becomes the creative event which creates 
all good. 
The third subevent follows as a consequence of the 
first two. Following intercommunication of meanings which 
have been integrated, the person sees and feels a range and 
a variety or rich qualities and possibilities which did not 
exist before this integration. The third subevent, then, is 
an expansion of the richness of quality in the appreciable 
world through enlarging its meaning. Beyond the actual 
achievement of variegated and deepened meaning, the person's 
capacity to appreciate the good is heightened. He thus may 
be awakened to a hunger and longing for the higher possi-
bilities of human value. 
Finally, the fourth essential aspect seen in crea-
tivity is the growth of a sense of community among those who 
participate in the total creative event. Such an awareness 
of community, which includes both the intellectual and the 
feeling part of a person, is no mere "jolly fellowship." 
The growth of community may also bring with it suffering to 
one who is sensitive to the tragedies of others. The new 
relationships demand responsibility, mutual understanding, 
and support. Willingness to suffer for ultimate good may 
be one essential ingredient in its fulfillment. 1 
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The creative event, which for Wieman is in continuous 
process, is the highest good because it transcends any cre-
ated good; it is the source of all good. Creativity is ab-
solute, eternal, and ever worthy of man's complete devotion. 
From the concept of the creative event, moral direction is 
found; good and evil are understood; and God, the object of 
religious commitment, is given meaning. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, pp. 93-97. 
c. Moral Law--Good and Evil 
The demand upon Wieman to discover the source of all 
good appears to be more than a need to discover a personal 
goal of life. He expresses the conviction that our entire 
civilization cannot continue with assurance unless some 
creative process be found. He goes on to say that the proc-
ess ·must not be 
local and peculiar to one culture, but uni-
versal, essential and everywhere found in 
human society--which is the true source and 
sanction of the moral law, in the sense that 
moral principle is the normative demand that 
it makes upon us. 1 
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He examines a number of moral theories and finds them 
wanting. Neither the principle of harmony, nor pleasure, nor 
foresight, nor revelation can serve as the human guide. Like-
wise, Wieman repudiates legal tradition or approved so.cial 
convention as adequate guides to moral law. 2 The only prin-
ciple which can guide men and nations, he maintains, is that 
pertaining to the creative event. The moral law, stated in 
precise words, is as follows: 
Act so as to meet the conditions required 
for the progressive transformation and 
creation of the world by way of conjunction 
LQr event~ that expose to appreciative 
awareness more of the depths and richness 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 45. 
2Ibid., pp. 40-71. 
of quality which is the reality of all 
existence. 1 
The requisite conditions demand deep-level communication 
among men through symbolized meaning. As secondary moral 
law, then, is the command that men meet the conditions under 
which symbolized meaning is created. Through this process 
of communicating meanings, the human mind, society and his-
tory are created. 2 Out of such creativity flows love, 
justice, and faith. 
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If it is a moral imperative to provide the conditions 
for the working of the creative event, then there must be 
evil to be overcome, else the moral law is unnecessary. Wie-
man, like Brightman, does not avoid the facts of evil by 
saying that evil is a part of good, or is God's will. Evil 
is considered real and absolute. 
In the system of values here presented, intrinsic 
value is of two kinds: intrinsic created good or qualitative 
meaning, and intrinsic creative good, the creative event. 
Similarly, there are two kinds of evil. First is the evil 
which is destructive, because it destroys created good. 
This evil, however, is not absolute evil because sometimes 
it is good to destroy created good in order to provide for 
the creation of some higher value. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 71. 
2Ibid., p. 11. 
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The second kind of evil is that which obstructs 
creativity. That which stands in the way of creative inter-
communication, or of the deepening of the sense of community, 
or of any of the subevents is absolutely evil. It is abso-
lute in four ways. It is evil under all circumstances, times 
and places. It is unqualified; that is, it is evil from 
every standpoint, human or cosmic; it is ultimate in that it 
has no cause or end that man can know; and, finally, it is 
unconfined or not bound by any limits.1 
Wieman is not convinced that the creative good .will 
ever overcome evil. Yet he is confident that whenever the 
conditions of creativity are provided, a power greater than 
man is at work, and this working in-our-midst is absolutely 
good, although the good which is created may be qualified 
good. Hence, anything is evil which obstructs the process of 
creativity. The moral imperative for man, therefore, is to 
serve the power which makes for good. 
d. God and Values 
Wieman never hesitates to move from value theory to 
theology. This is understandable since he develops his 
value theory, at least in part, out of a need to give some 
content to religion. If religion is man's search for, and 
devotion to, supreme value, then the content of value 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, pp. 90-93. 
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becomes the content of religion. Similarly, if God is "that 
structure which sustains, promotes and constitutes supreme 
1 
value," then the creative event is the philosophical name 
f'or God. The term "God" is used for religi ous and devotional 
purposes. The characteristics of the creative event are the 
characteristics of God; the functioning of the supra-human 
event is the functioning of God. Wieman insists, however, 
that God is no mere concept. He is an object of immediate 
experience, perceived as well as conceived, that operates in 
our midst. 2 
Though Wieman's axiology, the concept of God takes 
on all of the specific attributes of the creative event. 
God is not a structure or a possibility: God is the process 
which works in the world and through man; He is absolutely 
good. Just as the creative event always creates that which 
men can never predict, since creativity itself means the com-
ing to be of that which has not yet existed, man can never 
know all of God nor foresee all that He will do. In the face 
of this unknowability of God, He commands man's faith. The 
demand is to give oneself into the keeping of the creative 
event, to be trans formed continuously by it, and to serve it 
above all. But in a more specific manner, God, as here 
lH. N. Wieman, "God and Value," p. 155. 
2H. N. Wieman and B. E. Meland, American Philosophies of 
Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1936), p. 295. 
described, demands that persons decide to live in the way 
required for the continual creativity of good. The devotion 
about which Wieman speaks means that man ought to fulfill 
the conditions whereby each subevent may take place. These 
conditions include interpersonal communication, solitary 
contemplation, widening and deepening one's appreciable 
world, and an enriching of the community of persons who share 
meanings. 
Evil, previously described as obstruction of the cre-
ative event, may equally well be called sin. Such obstruc-
tion of the working of God is thwarting God's creativity. 
Obstruction is alienation of oneself from deity and from one's 
fellows. Thus for Wieman, si·n is any resistance to the cre-
ative event; sin is, as the theologians say, 11man 1 s rebellion 
against the will of God. rtl 
5. Religion 
The identification of the creative event with God is 
the basic framework of Wieman's 11 theocentric 11 religion. Yet 
religion has characteristics and functions beyond that yet 
described. Three unique attributes are evident in Wieman's 
thought. 
1H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 126. 
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a. Religion as Search ror and Adaptation to Truth 
In the background of all of Wieman's writing about 
religion is the assumption that values are the data of ex-
perience which concern religious inquiry. The highest ob-
ject of religious concern, therefore, is attained by finding 
that pattern of value which is the distinguishing mark of 
the reality having greater worth than all else.1 Religion 
is more than a search for truth. The philosopher is con-
stantly at this task, as is the scientist. The persistent 
effort to know that which makes value possible, so that one 
can adapt oneself to it, and, even more, to dedicate oneself 
to that process, is a high religious calling. 
In harmony with his general epistemological theory, 
Wieman believes that religious truth must be discovered and 
tested by the same methods by which any truth is attained. 2 
He is convinced that God can be perceived3 and that the 
method of gaining knowledge about religion must be that of 
4 
observation, reason, and experimentation. In fact, this 
lH. N. Wieman, "Values: Primary Data for Religious 
Inquiry, 11 p. 392. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, 
p. 152. 
3H. N. Wieman, 11 God Can Be Perceived, 11 Journal of 
Religion, 50 (1943), 23-32. 
~. N. Wieman, 11Reply to H. P. VanDusen," Christian 
Century, 48 (1931), 713ff. 
conviction is so strong that he writes: 
Religion is a sham unless it involves 
critical, cautious, personal, experi-
mental adjustments of one's whole life 
with a view of discovering how to live 
in harmony with the most sustaining 
behavior of the total environment. 1 
Not only does religion demand that men search for 
the truth, it demands an acceptance and adaptation to it. 
In his own theological autobiography, Wieman declares that 
his main task is to promote theocentric religion as against 
the anthropocentric. 2 By this he means that devotion to 
God must be to a God who actually exists and whom we know 
as thoroughly as possible by objective evidence. Men's 
belie~s about God must not be built out o~ wishes and needs. 
It is the task o~ theocentric religion to seek for a knowl-
edge of the ultimate source of good and to remake the heart 
to fit reality, not reality to fit the heart. 
b. Religion as Total Devotion 
Religion is even more than search and adaptation; 
it is devotion to that aspect o~ reality which is God. By 
devotion Wieman refers to 11practical effort and emotional 
appreciation, as well as intellectual inquiry. 11 3 More 
1H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, 
p. 136. 
2H. N. Wieman, 11 Theocentric Religion, 11 Contemporary 
American Theology, ed. V. Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 
1932), p. 346. 
3H. N. Wieman, ltGod and Value, 11 p. 170. 
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fundamentally expressed, devotion is giving to God, the 
integrating structure of value, the sovereign allegiance 
of our lives.1 
Moreover, this devotion to God should not be merely 
some preference of the individual who thinks that others 
can worship whom they choose. Religious devotion at its 
185 
height is so intense a dynamic dedication that the person 
acts on the premise that the object of his devotion is one 
to which all men should give themselves, 2 a commitment which 
involves the whole self in service and adoration to that 
which is thought to be supremely worthful for the self and 
all mankind. Man's devotion is not merely to this or that 
value, but to God, the supreme value--supreme because it is 
the source of all value.3 
It is for the purpose of suggesting techniques of 
religious devotion whereby religious commitment might be-
come meaningful that Wieman prepared the book, Private Meth-
4 
ods of Religious Living. Similarly, in his books, The 
lH. N. Wieman, 11God and Value," p. 170. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Issues of Life, p. 139. 
3see H. N. Wieman and R. W. Wieman, Normative Psy-
choloE!i;y: of Reli~ion, p. 313. 
~ew York: The Macmillan Co., 1929. 
Issues of Life and The Growth of Religion, 1 he gives con-
siderable space to developing the importance of prayer and 
worship, although he does not prescribe any specific way 
for all men to practice these rites of religious worship. 
c. Religion as Inspiration 
Religion is also "a way to goods of supreme value 
which cannot be found in any other· way." 2 The "way" about 
which Wieman is speaking is that of motivation, of encour-
agement, of enthusiasm. It is the function of religion, 
he says, to 
renew the courage and striving of man 
by quickening him with a sense of the 
best that is or ever can be, even when 
he cannot claim to know with certainty 
or completeness what it is. 3 
In fact, he maintains that whenever religion ceases to lift 
the aspiration of men toward the highest--beyond the con-
trolled and predictable possibilities of life--it ceases to 
serve its unique function and becomes merely a superfluous 
competitor with the arts and the sciences. 4 
Finally, it is Wieman's insistence that religion 
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lH. N. Wieman and W. M. Horton{ The Growth of Religion 
(Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1931). 
2H. N. Wieman, The Wrestle of Religion with Truth, p. v. 
~ 
3H. N. Wieman, "God and Value,'' p. 173. 
4Ibid. 
itself is not the supreme good; it can but lead persons to 
that supreme good. 1 To be religious is to become even more 
sensitized and alive to the process and possibilities of 
the creative event, God, even though this process is only 
partly known. Such sensitivity, Wieman hopes, will lead 
to a search for and devotion to the total system of values 
which Christians call the Kingdom of God.2 
What, for Wieman, is true religion? It is the 
search by rational and empirical methods for that which is 
the creative source of all good. It is complete devotion 
to this God and adjustment to the demands of this God (crea-
tivity). It is that kind of worship and ritual which quick-
ens the imagination of all persons within a communicating 
group to the possibilities of highest good--beyond that 
which any person can know--thereby giving man trust in the 
ultimate goodness of God. 
d. Wieman's Use of Christian Terms 
In Wieman's later writings, notably in The Source 
of Human Good, he suggests that Christian terms like "sin," 
"sal;v.:ation," and "resurrection" express the human predica-
ment and human hope. Thus the traditional Christian doc-
trines are used by him as symbols of religious realities. 
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lH. N. Wieman, Wrestle of Religion with Truth, pp. 135ff. 
2H. N. Wieman, 11 God and Value, 11 p. 168. 
For example, he believes that men are forever giving total 
devotion to created goods through which they gain security. 
Such limited devotion is an obstruction of creativity and 
is sin against God. The clue to man's salvation is found 
in the events surround the life and death of Jesus. The 
fellowship of those who associated with Jesus, he explains, 
was a complex creative event "transforming the disciples as 
individuals, their relations with one another and with all 
men, and transforming also the appreciable world in which 
they lived. ,, f. 
After the crucifixion of Jesus, the disciples were 
filled with despair. About the third day the creativity 
which was known by them before began to be felt within their 
fellowship. 
It was risen from the dead. • • • Some 
thought they saw him and touched him 
in physical presence. But what rose from 
the dead was not the man Jesus; it was 
creative power. It was the living God 
that works in time. It was the Second 
Person of the Trinity. 2 
Thus, for Wieman, the resurrection means that creativity, or 
the living God, is forever working in the midst of persons 
whenever there are bonds of fellowship, communication, and 
mutual support. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 41. 
2Ibid., p. 44. 
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Or again, Wieman suggests that man's devotion to 
God is not self-maintaining; the devotion is perpetuated 
by ritual, myth, and Bible when they are used to help per-
sons recover the value created by intercommunication. 
Hence, 11 ritual and myth, the symbols of the Bible, become 
the 'means of grace'." 
Wieman's identification with Christianity and its 
doctrines does not mean that he accepts traditional meta-
physical interpretations of them. On the other hand, his 
own axiology gives specific meaning to the Christian terms. 
His philosophy also gives an explanation to the key events 
surrounding the origin of Christianity. It is important to 
note, then, that Wieman does use Christian terms as ve-
hicles for communicating his philosophy of religion. Such 
an effort is especially important for those who have a 
Christian orientation. 
6. Religion in Teacher Education 
Wieman is not silent concerning major issues in 
higher education and the relevance of religion to those 
issues. His approach, however, must be seen through his 
analysis of this century. In the first place, he says, 
the advent of atomic destruction over Hiroshima in 1945 
"cut history in two like a knife."1 With such power as 
lH. N. Wieman, The Sourc.e of Human Good, p. 37. 
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we now have in the bomb, all earlier concepts of power have 
been shattered. No longer is mankind safe in the hands of 
men, for devotion turned in the wrong direction may lead to 
the destruction of all humanity. Men have already reached 
the entrance of "that narrow defile where death and life 
await them."1 Ours is a crucial period in history. 
Then, too, we are facing a time of moral confusion 
which is brought on primarily by the intermixture of cul-
2 tures. In days .past, when transportation and communication 
kept men relatively isolated, a variety of rival faiths and 
ultimate commitments were not as likely to result in confu-
sion in that each group might lead its own life. Such iso-
lation is no longer possible. 
In the face of cultural intermingling, established 
religious faiths and moral patterns which were once adequate 
are no longer secure. Men now possess more and more power 
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and at the same time are released from the coercive restraint 
of their ancient traditions. Under these conditions, men 
divide into two groups--the fearful and the courageous. The 
fearful build superficial moral restraints and 11religious 11 
walls about them. Although they condemn others, they are 
relatively harmless, if progressively neurotic in their 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 53. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, pp. 40-44. 
con~ormity. The courageous, however, may easily become 
cruel and destructive, dangerously using the increasingly 
available power of modern technology. 1 
It is in this kind o~ world context that Wieman sees 
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the task of religion in higher education. Although he does not 
speci~ically deal with teacher education, this writer main-
tains that his theories logically apply to the preparation 
o~ teachers by colleges and universities • . 
Wieman has no use ~or higher education which will 
not deal with the central problems o~ the age. In the ~ace 
o~ the two dangers o~ men in these days--conformity to local 
mores and the destructivity o~ li~e itsel~--he insists that 
education has a tremendous task. This task is to 
bring each individual over the hump from 
that way o~ living where his establisnea 
meanings are· primary to that way o~ living 
where creative communiCation o~ meanings 
is primary. 2 
To put Wieman's idea dif~erently, there is a third 
alternative road ~or modern man i~ college and university 
educators will see their job ~rom a religious perspective. 
This is the way whereby students may ~ind a new freedom to 
think and act intelligently as they come to understand and 
serve the highest good, the creative event--God. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, pp. 27~~. 
2Ibid., p. 116. 
Not all of this task falls upon the teacher of 
religion. Nevertheless, it is Wieman's conviction that 
teachers of religion will miserably fail, unless they assume 
a comprehensive view of their job. That is, teachers of re-
ligion, and all others who know a religious vocation in 
teaching, must find ways and means to impart religious faith 
in the midst of a society where many diverse faiths compete 
for the devotion of the student.1 How can this be done? It 
follows from all else that has been said that the teacher 
can but guide the student to the discovery of the conditions 
for the working of the source of human good--the creative 
event. 
a. The Growth of Religion through 
Creative Intercommunication 
It is the task of faculty members to help students 
provide three main conditions for the growth of meaning and 
religion. First, intercommunication must take place at 
deeper and deeper levels among all persons in the academic 
community. Through sue~ sharing, a kind of freedom will 
emerge where students will want the interchange of ideas and 
values. 2 Through creative intercommunication, Wieman feels 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 110. 
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2see discussion of the relationship of religious faith 
to freedom and justice, ibid., pp. 80-91. 
certain that qualitative meanings will emerge for students 
as their intrinsic values become enlarged and vivified. 
Secondly, provision needs to be made for what Wieman 
calls the second and third subevent of the creative event. 1 
These include time for the student to be by himself to read, 
to think, and to integrate the qualitative meaning gained, 
from which his appreciable world will be expanded and en-
ricbed. 
Thirdly, conditions in the college and university 
must be provided for a deepening sense of community among 
all those who participate in the creative event, the source 
of human good. The classroom unit of ten to twenty-five 
persons is the ideal situation for such a community. Dor-
mitories and rooming houses, religious organizations, clubs, 
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and even sororities and fraternities also constitute possible 
groups where persons can be closely related in the bonds of 
creative fellowship. 2 
Furthermore, if the implications of Wieman's value 
theory are to be implemented, it would follow that the same 
kind of communicating association should be fostered among 
the faculty and administration. If group planning in matters 
lH. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, pp. 59-64. 
2The concept of 11 Chri stian Community11 has been thor-
oughly developed in The Intercollegian, 71 (October, 1953). 
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of policy and curriculum were used, for example, in the man-
ner suggested by Kenneth Benne, 1 Wieman insists that meanings 
would be symbolically shared, qualitative meaning would grow, 
and the process of creativity would be at work. 
Similar bonds of communication should be developed 
between the academic community and groups surrounding the 
college, so that conditions for a common faith to emerge 
would be met, through which diverse religious faiths, differ-
ences of personalities, and patterns of culture might be un-
dergirded by mutual support and control. Such meaning, Wieman 
believes, can unite persons at levels deeper than human con~ 
sciousness, and yet it can free the individual to act with 
responsibility and creativity in his world. Such a community 
where continuous sharing of meaning takes place is the funda-
mental characteristic of religion in higher education. In 
Wieman's words: 
• • • The basic problem • • • of education 
and religion • • • is to provide and to 
maintain those conditions wherein the crea-
tive event can produce the maximum of quali-
tative meaning with minimum destruction of 
previously developed structures which enrich 
the world. 2 
b. The Arts, Sciences, and Religion 
Beyond serving the process of creativity as set forth 
lK. D. Benne and B. Muntyan, Human Relations in Curric-
ulum Change (New York: The Dryden Press, 1951). 
2H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 69. 
above, there are other demands upon higher education in 
Wieman's axiology. We recall that qualitative meaning is 
that connection of meaningful qualities whereby each event 
is made more vivid and more varied. Although persons only 
provide the conditions for the source of value to create 
these meanings, they do have to share their appreciable 
world with others. 
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Education has within its scope rich resources of ex-
panding the appreciable world of the student. The key re-
source is the vast realm of knowledge in the arts and sciences. 
As the student, for example, becomes familiar with Homer, 
Plato, Augustine, St. Thomas, Goethe, Shakespeare, Morley, 
Wordsworth, Whitman, and countless others, the appreciable 
world will be vastly expanded. The past may well be caught 
up by the present in such a way that qualitative meaning grows 
in the student. Or again, through the study of art and music, 
the student may perceive contrasts and harmonies of line, 
color, and movement so that the qualities of his own world may 
take on more vivid contrasts and be more widely appreciated. 
We could move through each academic discipline in the 
arts and sciences to show how, in Wieman's value theory, each 
in its own limited area may contribute to the qualitative 
meaning and hence to the intrinsic value for students. It 
is Wieman's conviction, however, that to obtain their deepest 
educational dimension, the arts and sciences should be 
pursued religiously. He means that the scholar should pur-
sue his discipline, not for itself alone, but for the sake 
of the important contribution which it may make to man in 
his understanding and adjustment to the total structure of 
value which is God. 1 Wieman argues that the arts and sci-
ences are vitally important in all higher education. Yet 
196 
the more these arts and sciences become specialized, the more 
religion is needed, else the source of value may be overlooked 
in favor of some created value. As each discipline enlarges 
the students' appreciable world; as it brings to their at-
tention varied and vivid meanings through relationship with 
a world of ideas; as one area of knowledge is connected with 
others; and finally, as the whole structure of meaning is 
conceived as creativity, then, truly, religion is being 
served. 
Beyond the general approach as described above, in 
Wieman's writing there are specific suggestions concerning 
the teaching of religion. He insists, for example, that 
the kind of instruction about religion which he advocates 
must become part of the curriculum of colleges and univer-
sities. Otherwise, he says, students will not be able to 
escape evil and those dangerous religions which insist upon 
devotion to some created value. Without adequate education 
in religion, it is Wieman's belief that, sooner or later, 
lH. N. Wieman, "God and Value, 11 p. 170. 
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our society will be overcome by some form of totalitarianism. 1 
Even though schools should teach the criteria of judging re-
ligions, the state schools should not provide a religion or 
a faith. Schools should not assume the task of the church. 
What the school must do is to impart the general principles 
that distinguish between good and bad religion, just as it 
imparts pri nciples of good and bad political forms. The 
student, then, should be able to recognize for himself good 
2 
religion from that which is false and bad. 
c. Philosophy of Religion 
If a college is serious about teaching the guiding 
principles concerned with the nature of good, probably the 
most significant way, in harmony with the ideal of free inter-
communication, is through the study of the philosophy of re-
ligion; in fact, this is Wieman's conviction. It is not our 
educational task to transmit the loyalties, affections and 
appreciations of one generation to another. 
The need is to give to each rising genera-
tion those methods and principles by which 
they may be able to develop their own ob-
jectives and ruling interests. 3 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 88. 
2Ibid., pp. 86ff. 
3H. N. Wieman, 11The Need of Philosophy of Religion, 11 
Journal of Religion, 14 (1934), 383. 
This task, he goes on to say, will only be accomplished 
through the intellectual discipline of the philosophy of 
religion. 
Wieman is not pleading for more professional philos-
ophers of religion, important as their work may be; rather 
he is expressing the hope that more and more of the rank and 
file of educated people--teachers as well as those in other 
professions--will take it as their task to find out what is 
essential and fundamental in the passing forms of religion. 
Then they may be able to hold on to essentials when new re-
1 ligious forms are developing. 
This kind of creative stability is especially needed 
in our nation's teachers. Amid the various community pres-
sures of this or that kind of religious instruction in the 
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public school; amid the religious pluralism and its various 
loyalties in the school; amid an age of change, of increas-
ing sophistication, and of technical advancement, the teacher 
needs to have developed a pattern whereby he knows his values 
and supreme loyalties. Wieman's belief in 11 the need of 
philosophy of religion11 thus appears timely for a curriculum 
of teacher education. 
lH. N. Wieman, 11 The Need of Philosophy of Religion," 
p. 394. 
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d. Religion and Professional Education 
Wieman's concept of the creative event has definite 
implications for teaching methods. All teacher education 
curricula have requirements in professional education which 
are directed toward instruction in teaching procedures. If 
conditions for the creation of values (including values of 
truth, beauty, and goodness) depend upon creative intercom-
munication, it is possible that the classroom, at all levels 
of education, can provide many of these conditions. If 
Wieman's concept of creativity is the clue to highest values, 
certainly the teachers college has an obligation to train 
teachers in the skills of conducting classes wherein creative 
intercommunication will take place. 
There is little doubt that many teachers of education, 
sensitive to students• thoughts and feelings, do conduct 
classes wherein freedom of expression is sought and intercom-
munication takes place regularly. In such cases, we might 
say that, if Wieman's axiology is true, a power which is 
supra-human is continually creating qualitative meaning among 
students, and hence new values are being born. 
However, given the truth of this value theory, the 
education departments of every college and university should 
not be satisfied until every prospective teacher has experi-
enced the kind of class which fosters the process of creative 
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communication. Moreover, the instructor would need to make 
clear the process being experienced. Each class should also 
develop techniques which could be applied in future teaching 
in the public schools. 
Considerable effort in this direction can be seen in 
various parts of the country. Evidence of its universality 
is lacking, as is evidence of a supporting value theory in 
all cases. However, the concern for the growth of values 
through group situations is not new. For example, student-
centered teaching arising out of the theory and practice of 
non-directive counseling is one eTort in the direction of 
building a classroom community where freedom encourages 
intercommunication.1 
Many resources are available in the area of human 
relations which are applicable for teacher training. One 
key book, Human Relations and Curriculum Change, by Benne 
and Muntyan, not only surveys the major human relations 
theories, but suggests group procedures in which prospective 
teachers might participate in planning curriculum change. 
Another book, more directly related to the training 
of teachers in group procedures, is that of Howard Lane and 
Mary Beauchamp, Human Relations in Teaching: The Dynamics 
lcarl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), Chs. VIII, IX. 
1 
of Helping Children Grow. This usable text assumes a Wie-
manian axiology that "creation is still going on and mankind 
can participate in it."2 The authors not only deal with the 
dynamics of human personality, but urge college classes to 
become sensitive to the process of communication going on in 
their own groups. 
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Whatever method is used in training students to teach, 
Wieman's theories demand that the foremost task be to pro-
vide the conditions whereby the creative source of all val-
ues may work in the midst of persons and that this method of 
intercommunication be made explicit so that devotion may be 
given to the creative event. It is probably impossible and 
hardly necessary that this group method be consciously under-
stood in the lower grades. However, that the method be 
clearly understood by teachers is imperative. 
7. An Appraisal 
Wieman's axiology, like the theories developed by 
Dewey and Brightman, has elements which strike a note of 
response in nearly every reader in that many of the concepts 
interpret observations common to all men. On the other hand, 
each theory depends upon rationally built hypotheses which 
lNew York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. 
2Lane and Beauchamp, £2.• cit., p. v. 
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seem verifiable to some critics and unsatisfactory, vague, or 
unverifiable to others. However, any attempt to suggest 
weaknesses or strengths in a value theory from an empirical 
approach is limited by the personal scope of observation and 
the particular interpretation of that experience by the critic. 
Such comments may reveal more about the critic than the sys-
tem of which he is speaking. Nevertheless, a serious study 
of any writer demands an evaluation as objective as possible. 
Also, since a frame of reference is a requisite in an evalu-
ation, in this report the perspective is centered in the de-
sire to discover the place of religion for teacher education. 
a. Weaknesses 
1. Wieman's entire philosophical system is built 
upon the presupposition that all knowledge is based upon the 
same methods of discovery and verification: experience and 
reason. We support this epistemology, but maintain that in 
his approach to knowledge about values, he limits observation 
to the one element of intercommunication. For example, he 
observes human interaction and discovers that, as a result, 
growth of meaning, vivid appreciations, and awareness of a 
variety of good inevitably emerge. This conclusion we do 
not question. But to move to the position that intercommuni-
cation is the only condition necessary for the creativity 
of values, and that the source of all value is found in only 
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one context, seems to be unwarranted. 
Wieman 1 s point of view indicates that from a vast com-
plex whole of human situations he has selected one special 
item which has become the focus of his consciousness. His 
very observations, accurate as we believe they are, may well 
indicate only one condition whereby values may be created. 
Wieman appears to overlook the limitation of his own 
perception, which is bounded by the special position in 
which he resides in relation to the data of observation. 
Thus, thinking that he has all information, he tends to use 
a single theory as a definition and an explanation of all 
that is good. God, love, personality, value, religion, 
democracy, education, qualitative meaning, the satisfaction 
of washing dishes--all are explained in terms of creative 
interaction or intercommunication. Liston Pope, in review-
ing one of Wieman 1 s books, speaks about this limitation 
whereby an extremely valuable concept becomes too inclusive. 
He suggests that Wieman has fallen into bondage to a single 
concept. 1 The weakness we are here pointing out is Wieman 1 s 
limited observation and his apparent inability to see other 
possible sources of value. 
2. Wieman 1 s optimistic belief that the process of 
intercommunication will solve all human problems appears 
1Liston Pope, Review of Now We Must Choose, by H. N. 
Wieman, Journal of Religion, 22 (1942), 214-217. 
unverifiable at this point in history, although it may well 
be one basic condition for solutions. His system does sug-
gest that one subevent of the creative event involves the 
solitary integration of meanings. This emphasis is pri-
marily overlooked when he urges more "conversation." We 
are here suggesting that we have the obligation to seek all 
possible conditions for the discovery of values. An over-
emphasis on one set of conditions tends to distort the pos-
sible range of man's search for true values and for God. 
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3. The effect of Wieman's deep concern for religion 
in higher education is weakened by his lacl{ of clarity and 
consistency. For example, he writes: 
The kind of instruction about religion 
that we have described must be put into 
our instruction of higher learning as 1 part of the education required for all. 
Here, of course, he is thinking of a search for and devotion 
to the creative source of all values. In the same chapter, 
however, he maintains that "teaching a religion and trans-
mitting a faith should not be put into the schools." 2 
Since he readily admits that his own value theory is the con-
tent of religion, and that faith in the creative event is 
demanded, his last statement would, in effect, be excluding 
from public education his own approach to values. 
lH. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, p. 88. 
2rbid., p. 98. 
It is the contention of this investigator that 
Wieman's case for religion in education would be much 
stronger if he held to the first belief and used the sec-
ond to point to a danger. His view of rel·igion is especial-
ly relevant to public education when we remember his insist-
ence upon. open-minded investigation and devotion, not to 
created good {even his own theories) but to that absolute 
good which creates man and all values. His value-oriented 
religion provides the context for progressive levels of the 
discovery of good, continuous reexamination of belief, and 
at the same time dedication to the reality one believes to 
be absolutely good. It appears that he weakens his case by 
failing to recognize at all times that he propounds a defi-
nite religious philosophy and by failing to advocate con-
sistently its relevance to education. 
b. Strengths 
1. Wieman's emphasis upon creative intercommunica-
tion as the condition for the creation of values is highly 
relevant to teacher education. It is an important concept 
in that education is always concerned with values--values 
of knowledge and truth, aesthetic values, moral values, and 
to some extent, religious values. His contribution is es-
pecially strong in that he defines the specific context in 
which values may be created, a group of intercommunicating 
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persons. His theory, then, suggests educational procedures 
for the entire curriculum of teacher education, and implies 
that an academic community or mutual support permits the 
rigors of classical education. At the same time his theory 
encourages an atmosphere of trust, honesty, and a free com-
munication of thoughts and feelings among students and in-
structors. 
Wieman's educational method of group process has 
already received support from clinical data, as the method 
1 
applies to psychotherapy. Research and practice in group 
dynamics and human relations is beginning to supply evidence 
of its value in broader educational situations. 2 
Furthermore, many elementary and secondary schools 
expect teachers to use student-centered and group-centered 
teaching procedures. Wieman's methodological theories are 
applicable for teacher education in that the prospective 
teacher will have gained personal experience in a method 
which he is expected to use. We maintain that there is no 
better way of learning teaching methods than to experience 
those same procedures in the college classroom. 
lNew York Times, January 15, 1956, p. 30. 
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2Every issue of The Educational Index lists dozens of 
research documents and interpretations of satisfactory learn-
ing results and beneficial personal growth through a group 
Ptrocess approach. See especially L. A. Cook and E. F. Cook, 
'Group Dynamics in Education," Journal of Educational Soci-
ology, 27 (1954), 385-395; K. J. Richage and W. R. S~ncock, 
"How Shall Group Instruction Works, 11 Elementary School Journal, 
54 (1953), 131-133; and o. L. Derbey, "Try Group Work," Educa-
tional Research Bulletin, 33 (1954), 125-127. 
2. The value theory of Wieman is strong in that it 
gives content to a religious search and devotion which is 
not exclusive or sectarian. He presents an approach to re-
ligion which, as he says, 
would not necessarily prevent the various 
traditional faiths from adding their own 
interpretation of the supernatural and 
transcendental. 1 
Wieman, of course, hopes that any additions are empirically 
verifiable. 
Wieman's views are highly relevant to a culture 
which has grown out of a Jewish and Christian heritage. 
The insistence, for example, that reality and its highest 
values are created in crucial events in history may prove 
helpful in understanding Jewish history. Such events as 
the exodus, the Babylonian captivity, and the restoration 
of Jerusalem may well be clues to an understanding of 
Judaism. 
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Again, Wieman's clarification of the key events in 
the origination of the Christian faith indicates that his 
axiology may give significant understandings to the early 
2 Christian community and its transforming power. Furthermore, 
1H. N. Wieman, The Directive in History, pp. 87-88. 
2H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, pp. 39-40. 
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traditional Christian concepts o:f 11 sin, 11 11grace, 11 11 salvation, 11 
and 11resurrection11 have their place in Wieman's religious 
philosophy, giving aid to the student who needs to re-inter-
pret these ancient concepts. We are maintaining here, then, 
that although Wieman's religion is inclusive enough to be 
applicable to the tax-supported teachers college, it is in-
cisive enough to give serious attention to a speci:fic re-
ligious tradition :from which most prospective teachers come 
and in which they will work. 
3. The value theory o:f Wieman is strong in that it 
tends toward a uni:fied view o:f education, rather than a :frag-
mentary one. We are assuming, at this point, that educational 
institutions should attempt to help the student integrate all 
educational experiences into some philosophy of life. Wie-
man's stress upon 11 community, 11 where meanings are shared, 
points to inter-departmental intercommunication, as well as 
to personal intercommunication. His theories indicate a 
desired relationship among academic disciplines--history, 
political science, biology, literature, and the like. Al-
though he does not detail a method whereby all academic ex-
periences may be integrated, the ideal for such integration 
is implicit in his system and hence adds strength to his 
axiology as applied to education. 
4. Finally, Wieman's entire outlook shares in the 
strength of a philosophic spirit found also in Dewey and 
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Brightman. Wieman's approach is liberal in the sense that 
he refuses to be dogmatic and final. He recognizes that many 
answers about the realities of this universe are yet to be 
known. At the same time, he is willing to speak the "truth" 
as he sees it, and to have faith in that which creates good, 
even though he does not fully comprehend the creator or what 
will be created. The tension between open-mindedness and 
conviction is a context which encourages every thoughtful 
student to contribute his share to the unanswered questions. 
This attitude encourages the student to keep his mind open 
to all new data and, at the same time, to be devoted to the 
highest value that he knows. Such an attitude is highly 
desirable. It is especially important for the prospective 
teacher. 
C~P~RV 
A SYNTHETIC AXIOLOGY AND ITS RELIGIOUS 
AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
1. Introduction 
The preceding chapters have set forth axiological 
systems of three of America's influential philosophers and 
have shown major implications of each system for the place 
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of religion in teacher education. In each of these three 
philosophies, the category and content of value is deter-
minative of religious concepts. Religion has been considered 
by the philosophers to include one or more of the following 
aspects: the highest value; a total way of apprehending 
value; a devotion to values, to the unified system of values, 
or to the creator of all values. It has been demonstrated 
that value theory is not only the context in which questions 
of educational aims, the selecting of teaching material, and 
the methods of teaching must be answered. Value theory is 
likewise the framework from which a religious ·philosophy is 
built--at least for the three philosophers. 
Furthermore, the previous chapters have suggested a 
method whereby any educator may carefully examine his own 
theory of value. Through clarification of his basic beliefs, 
he will be able critically to evaluate those beliefs, to 
develop them more thoroughly, and to discover implications for 
religion. 
It is not necessary that any educator accept com-
pletely the axiology of Dewey, Brightman, or Wieman, or its 
metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions. His task, 
rather, is to construct or clarify his own value theory, 
drawing upon his own experience and reason as well as from 
philosophical systems of others who have preceded him. 
Finally, he has the obligation to develop specifically the 
implications of his own axiological system for his task as 
an educator, especially as this task relates to religion. 
It is precisely to this end that the remaining two chapters 
are devoted. 
2. Method of Approach 
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The discussion in the foregoing chapters is not taken 
as philosophical material to be incorporated into an eclectic 
philosophy. Rather, the ideas presented serve as a guide to 
the development of a distinct value theory. The axiology to 
be developed, as can shortly be seen, makes use of many in-
sights of each of the three philosophers. Elements of Dewey's 
pragmatism will be evident, especially in regard to testing 
instrumental values. Brightman's classification of values 
and his synoptic method of gathering and testing data are re-
lied upon. Much of Wieman's concept of the creative event and 
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intercommunication which makes creativity possible is utilized. 
Nevertheless, only this author is responsible for the outcome. 
3. Values and How They Are Known 
Several key presuppositions regarding knowledge and 
reality need stating at the beginning. First, it is here 
held that there is no such thing as knowledge which is abso-
lutely true. Absolute knowledge or truth refers to a concept 
in man which has a complete identity with the reality about 
which it speaks. It is impossible for man to gain absolute 
truth in that he is aware of only those data which he perceives 
or experiences, plus his interpretation of them. He is thus 
limited in terms of personal observation and by communication 
from other observers. He is also limited by his particular 
capacity of rational understanding and by reason of the fact 
that every object as known is in part an interpretation or a 
mental construct. That is to say, the idea is not identical 
with the total event or the object as it really is.1 Knowledge 
involves a subject with his enabling and/or distorting subjec-
tive conditions. Finally, man's knowledge is finite because 
the nature of the universe is that of change, and the new is 
lThe concept of epistemological dualism is similar to 
Brightman's view of the nature of knowledge. See E.S. Bright-
man, An Introduction to Philosoph~ (Rev. ed. New York: Henry 
Holt and Co., 1951), pp. 84-99 . ee also Howard V. Hong, 
"Toward a Christian Objectivity," The Christian Scholar, 36 
(1953), 203-210. 
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perpetually emerging in place of the unique or familiar. The 
latter assumption is metaphysical in nature, although scien-
tific data and philosophic interpretation can give it strong 
support. 
In emphasizing that knowledge refers to reality beyond 
mind, the writer is not suggesting that reality is made up of 
entities or physical structures completely separate from minds 
or that the ding-an-sich is beyond all human understanding. 
If complete ontological skepticism were asserted, it would be 
by use of reason and hence would not be totally outside the 
human mind. Rather, it is here maintained that every percep-
tion is of an event--the event neing composed of many strands, 
one of which is that of consciousness. The person is equally 
as important to the being of the event as is any other strand, 
1 if not more so. 
Absolute knowledge would mean that the human personal-
ity fully comprehends himself and every other constituent part 
of a particular reality. Such absolute knowledge is believed 
to be impossible. In fact, the farther one moves from knowing 
simple techniques and skills to knowledge about ultimate and 
universal realities, the less sure he can be that his hypotheses 
lwieman's concept of "event". as the clue to reality 
is adopted as a fruitful hypothesis, though no claim is made 
for its absolute proof. 
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are absolute. 
In the face of these limitations of knowledge and the 
partial skepticism regarding ultimate truth, the writer main-
tains that various knowledge-claims may be tested in different 
ways until practical absolutes are reached, adequate for intel-
ligent action. Hence, the writer holds to a synoptic view 
regarding the tests of knowledge. This synoptic theory will 
be illustrated in relation to problems of value. 
a. Instrumental Values 
An instrumental value refers to any event or human 
attitude, or experience, which has its primary function as a 
producer of some higher good for persons. The air we breathe 
and the water we drink are also of instrumental worth in that 
they make other values possible. The most common instrumental 
values, however, are techniques or skills which persons devise 
to produce other experiences which are thought to be good. 
These techniques or skills are developed by observation or 
trial and error. 
tional methods. 
They are verified as true or false by opera-
For example, a teacher may suggest that first 
grade students can learn to read most rapidly and accurately 
by the method of phonics. She has made a predictive hypothesis. 
The hypothesis is tested through an experimental method whereby 
various procedures are tried out. If actual experiment verifies 
her theory, the prediction is accurate and her hypothesis is 
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true. 
As in the case illustrated, it is clear that the teacher 
is not dealing with intrinsic or higher values. She has only 
assumed that reading itself is or value or that it is an aim 
or elementary education. Her only stated concern is with the 
best technique, and this instrumental value is tested accord-
ing to a predictive hypothesis and operational experimentation. 
b. Intrinsic Values 
Intrinsic values refer to events or which the person 
is a part and which are in themselves felt to be good, although 
they are also instrumental. Whenever a person Lmmediately per-
ceives the totality of an experience to be enriching, satisfy-
ing, or pleasurable, he has discovered a value which is intrin-
sic. Experience is the raw material or intrinsic values, and 
rational interpretation is utilized for an understanding and 
validation of the truth of the value. Nevertheless, the 
awareness of an intrinsic good does not confront man through 
steps or logical thinking; it is immediately and intuitively 
felt to be good. For example, consider a camping experience 
on the rim or the Grand Canyon. After a restful sleep on soft 
pine boughs, the person is awakened by the chirping or birds. 
He bounds out of the tent to be met by the crisp morning air, 
clouds floating above and below, and a brilliantly colored sky 
which fades into deeper and deeper purples in the canyon below. 
The camper is immediately caught up in a feeling of awe, 
beauty, and mystery. Sounds of ecstasy may flow from his 
lips, or he may remain in hushed silence. His experience is 
aesthetic. At the moment of experience, the aesthetic value 
cannot be proved-~it just is. 
The instrumental aspect of the experience described 
may be partially tested in so far as one makes predictions 
concerning particular procedures whereby similar aesthetic 
values may be achieved. The intrinsic quality, however, can-
not be proved operationally. There is no way to test any 
unique event by future events because the future cannot ever 
reproduce the identical strands nor the complex texture of 
configuration. Thus, any quality which is felt to be good, 
even for a moment, can hardly be denied as a value-claim. 
Only through coherent reason can an experience be judged to 
be higher or 1ower than other previously felt values. 
Reflection upon our own experiences of beauty, of the 
joys of friendship and interpersonal relationships, convic-
t i ons of moral obli gation, and feelings of deep tragedy 
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through drama, points out that we do judge which intrinsic val-
ues are higher than others, which are cherished more deeply, 
and which are most earnestly searched for again. These cri-
teria seem to grow partly from our interpretation of experi-
ence, and partly from an understanding of t he nature of 
intrinsic values themselves. 
This writer proposes, then, that one intrinsic value 
is higher than another if the first elicits more intensity of 
feeling than the other; if it sheds greater meaning on other 
values and enriches their vividness; if it is an experience 
more possible for all persons; and if there is more lasting 
quality to it. Presupposing the above criteria, one value 
can be judged to be higher than another in so far as it is 
more intense, more widely related, more universal, and more 
permanent. 
With the use of these criteria, an intellectual value 
may be judged higher than a social or aesthetic value at one 
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time and lower at another. No claim is made for one intrinsic 
value being higher at all times and places than another, save 
religious values which are here believed to be the highest 
1 intrinsic value. 
The criteria for judging intrinsic values, then, are 
experience and reason. It is human reason, focusing conscious 
attention on the memory of past experiences and projecting the 
i magination toward anticipated events, by which the relative 
good of intrinsic values is judged. 
Finally, the absolute truth or falsity of any intrinsic 
value can never be proven. A true value refers to a value 
experi ence which corresponds completely with the reality as 
lsee Section 4. Religious values are cons:ldered\ to be 
hi gher than any single value because the religious ~ality is 
a search for all values as well as a devotion to the creator 
and preserver-a:f all values. 
it actually is. Such validation is complex by reason of the 
previous assertion that a person is but one strand of an 
event, the total quality of which is believed to be the 
value. The dualistic nature of knowledge involving man's 
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subjective state adds to the difficulty of proving the truth of 
a value. 
Nevertheless, each value as experienced can be judged 
as relatively true, that is, truly a value, if it supports 
the highest good, if it is in harmony with all other known 
values, and if it is coherent with all concepts about the 
1 
nature of man, the universe, and God. 
c. The Highest Good 
Every axiology has an implicit or an explicit summum 
bonum. For Dewey it is "man's perpetually enlarging end-in-
view.11 For Brightman it is "the fullest growth of all persons." 
For Wieman it is ''the creative event. 11 The system presented 
by this writer also has a highest good. It is not arrived at 
inductively nor validated operationally. Rather it is that 
presupposition without which no events have meaning and no 
1In case that one intrinsic value destroys another, or 
is out of harmony with previously experienced values or ac-
cepted concepts, either or all values and concepts may be 
false. In the face of some incoherence in value or beliefs, 
there is no other alternative than to re-examine all values 
and concepts. 
values are known. The highest good is not a value which sits 
at the pinnacle of all other values. It is the context in 
terms of which all values are possible. It can be thought of 
as a circle which encompasses all values. Although the high-
est good (not yet stated) does not give specific content to 
values, yet it is "true" in so far as values are understood 
and are realized in terms of it. 
4. A Hierarchy of Values 
Every person's hierarchy of values grows slowly. It 
develops and becomes clarified as the result of individual 
observation, experience, and reason; it takes definite struc-
ture through sharing of meanings with persons; it grows as 
diversified qualities are discovered through great ·books or 
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in admired persons. A value scheme is modified by dramatic 
and ineffable events in one's life which make vivid and rich 
otherwise meaningless episodes. The hierarchy develops in a 
person's mind through flashes of insight as particularly 
valuable experiences become related to other values. It de-
velops as man assumes what is the ultimate good and finds life 
meaningful on that premise. 
In his slowly emerging hierarchy of values, man has 
the obligation of re-examining his value structure day by day, 
realizing his inability to possess perfect knowledge. Opera-
tionally he can test instrumental values. Coherent rational-
ity based upon empirical data is the tool for testing intrinsic 
value. The highest good is :round to be "true" in so :rar as 
it gives meaning and intelligibility to all other values. It 
is truly believed in when, upon caref'ul inspection, it is 
:round to be closely identif'ied with man's deepest loyalties. 
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The highest good, according to this axiology, is "the 
continuous growth, enrichment, and :rulf'illment o:r all persons." 
This concept o:r self'-realization as the summum bonum is not 
new. It has historical roots in Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
to some extent in Hegel, and in all who support the philosophy 
o:r personalism. The view here held does not conceive o:r man 
as soul, or as mind, or as a dualistic creature o:r body and 
mind. The person or self' is rather a unitary psycho-physical 
organism which functions as mind, but also as a :reeling, hoping, 
anticipating.and communicating being. The self' is also a 
conscious being who, in the words o:r W.G. Everett, ":rinds re-
alization in a community o:r selves and in a common good. 111 
The growth o:r persons supported in this study is not 
exclusively the Platonic or Aristotelian view that the highest 
good ·is the normal exercise o:r the natural £unctions of man, 
although this is not denied. Rather, it _; is here ma-intained 
that the ultimate and speci:f'ic direction and goal o:r selves is 
not completely known, although such sel:f'-realization includes 
the f'ullest experience and integration o:r all true values. o:r 
lw.G. Everett, Moral Values (New York: Henry Holt and 
Co., 1918), p. 101. 
most importance in this theory is the conviction that the 
highest good of persons must be postulated for any theory 
of values to be intelligible and relevant to human life. 
To put the above position in another way, without the 
over-arching and interpenetrating person as the good in which 
all values are focused, values become disembodied and without 
anything with which to be related. Some one may say, for 
example, that honesty is a value--not for anyone in particu-
lar, but simply in general. Yet to speak of a value like 
honesty exclusive of its relationship to persons is similar 
to saying that a certain tree is taller. 11Taller" has no 
meaning outside of a relationship. 1 
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Personal growth, enrichment, or self-fulfillment, then, 
is the 11 pole" necessary for any conversation about or experi-
ence of values. This is not to say that persons exist prior 
to nature, or that persons exist separate from events which 
have value potential. Rather, without persons there would be 
no one to construct a value theory nor anyone for the facts 
and qualities of an event to be related to for value to be 
known. The growth of all persons, then, is assumed to be the 
highest good. 
The highest intrinsic value in this system is religion. 
1The discussion owes much to Philip Phenix, Intelli-
gible Religion (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 65-77. 
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Since re1igion is defined as a way of searching for and appre-
hending all values, a devotion to the source and conserving 
power of values, and appropriate behavior arising therefrom, 
religion is believed to transcend in worth other s~ngle in-
trinsic values. 1 
Although religion has to be defined in order to talk 
about it, those values which we call religion defy adequate 
definition. A person can but draw some rational lines 
around a group of experiences which at least ought to be 
part of religion. A. N. Whitehead catches the complexity of 
religion which this writer supports in his lines: 
Religion is the vision of something which 
stands beyond, behind, and within, the 
passing flux of immediate things; something 
which is real , yet waiting to be realized; 
sometthing which is a remote possibility, and 
yet the greatest of present facts; something 
that gives meaning to all that passes, and 
yet eludes apprehension; something whose 
possession is the final good, and yet is be-
yond all reach; something which is the 
ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest.2 
lReligious values are discussed in detail in the 
following section of this chapter. 
2A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 275. This wri ter finds 
only one phrase in the Whitehead quotation inapplicable to 
religion as supported in this study. Whitehead says that 
religion "is the final good." Rather, religious living may 
lead persons in the direction of the final good. 
Other intrinsic values in this axiology include 
everything which men claim to be enriching, satisfying, 
and meaningful and which in undistorted forms is in harmony 
with the growth of persons and all other values. The fol-
lowing values, then, characterize those qualities of life 
which many men have considered to be of significant worth 
and which are supported in this study. The order in which 
they are placed is not meant to be arbitrary or final. As 
previously discussed, the relative position of values must 
be judged in each value experience. 
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Intellectual values · are those satisfying and thrilling 
qualities which accompany the event of knowing. This intrin-
sic value forces itself upon one when some pursuit of knowl-
edge has been fulfilled or is in the process of fulfillment. 
It is felt to be good through immediate satisfaction. Its 
instrumental value lies in the productivity of man's ability 
to think critically about every problem which he may encounter 
and hence to foster the continued mental growth of a person. 
Social values are the values of genuine friendship, 
interpersonal understanding, intercommunication, trust, and 
love. Meaningful relationships are immediately felt to be 
.. 
good and to enhance life to fuller dimensions. At the same 
time, when the high value of personal growth is assumed, 
social interaction becomes one of the significant instruments 
for the development of all selves. In fact without other 
persons, no individual self could exist.1 
Aesthetic values are qualities discovered in particu-
lar kinds of experiences. Whenever persons clearly perceive 
line, color, form, movement, or any combination of these; 
whenever meanings are caught through art, sculpture, drama, 
music, or literature; whenever deep feelings are communicated 
through poetry, drama, prose, or music; and when one or more 
of these experiences immediately vivifies life by contrasting 
that particular event with other events in experience, the 
aesthetic value is present. Those qualities which we call 
aesthetic enrich other experiences through sharpening the 
human focus of attention so that a person sees and feels more 
clearly and intensely the emotions of others, or line, color, 
harmony, movement, or texture which exists about him. 
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Moreover, an aesthetic value often comes to conscious-
ness in times when contemplati9n is the dominant mood of per-
sons. In moments of quiet, s .ome men seem to have a mental 
screen through which they sift observations or thoughts into 
new patterns of appreciation, of a~e, or of wonder. Or again, 
in an aesthetic experience, one is aware of the penetrating 
lconsiderable psychological and philosophical data 
support the theory that no sel£ could exist or develop apart 
£rom other selves and in social interaction with others. This 
convincing hypothesis is developed by William Heard Kilpatrick 
in his Philoso~hy of Education (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1951), pp. 38- 1. See also George H. Mead, Mind, Self and Societ~ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1934), 
pp. 13 -226. 
qualities of an event and thus is filled with delight, joy, 
pain, or empathetic suffering. The aesthetic values are 
intrinsically good in that they immediately enrich and vivify 
life. They are evaluated and verified in the same way as 
other intrinsic values are judged and tested. 
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Moral qualities such as honesty, loyalty, dependa-
bility, and the like are important intrinsic values. Moral 
values are the imperatives of obligation which persons should 
discover and use as guides to behavior. These values, however, 
have often been construed to be the sole condition for reli-
gion and hence have, in effect, become the highest values. 
Rationally built moral laws, or even social mores and customs 
which are impressed upon human consciousness by conditioning 
and unconscious mechanisms, can easily become the idols which 
men worship. Separated from personal growth and from all 
other values, moral codes becomes disvalues. 
Work is also an intrinsic value. There is satisfaction 
in being employed--i.n being part of a world which is at 
work. The intrinsic value is especially present when the 
quality of workmanship is satisfying, challenging to the 
greatest powers of the individual, and enriching to personal 
growth. Then, too, work is an intrinsic value whenever a 
person's labor is done in relation to other values: when work 
is done in a spirit of love for family or friends; when it 
is creative or appreciative of the beautiful; when in work 
man's mind expands toward wider and wider vistas of knowl-
edge, it is intrinsically {as well as instrumentally) good. 
Finally, work is also an instrumental value in that labor 
makes possible human existence as well as many of the values 
which persons experience. 
Values of recreation may be intrinsically good even 
as they are also instrumental to health and social values. 
Through self-abandonment in play, exhilarating joy may come 
to persons. Flashes of insight concerning the relationship 
of all values occasionally emerge in the midst of the mental 
relaxation in recreation. It seems hypothetically possible 
that the release from tension which recreation brings may be 
not only enjoyable, but can free one's clouded vision to see 
clues to the ultimate nature of reality. 
Another intrinsic value is health. The joy, exuber-
ance, and sense of well-being which accompany one's physical 
and mental health indicate the value which health has for a 
person. An awareness of this value may not always be con-
scious in the healthy person, but injury, illness, or mental 
depression quickly reminds one that health is a good to be 
prized in itself. Then, too, the instrumental nature of 
health can be experienced by anyone who anticipates the 
realization of other values and finds his hopes satisfied or 
hindered by his condition of health. 
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Purely instrumental values, as previously discussed, 
include all resources of the natural world and the human 
organism as well as any appropriate technique which leads to 
an intrinsic value. At the same time, a true instrumental 
value is not destructive of an intrinsic value or a hindrance 
to the highest good. 
5. Values: Subjective and Objective 
The problem of the objectivity or subjectivity of 
values, like the problem of the nature of knowledge, cannot 
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be solved in terms of the valuer {or knower) alone. 1 The 
reality to which a value refers must be taken into consideration. 
It is the hypothesis of this writer that values are both sub-
jective and objective. 
Three factors need clarification concerning the nature 
of values. First, from the human perspective some personal 
experience of enjoyment, satisfaction, enrichment, or ful-
fillment must occur in order to speak of a value. Even though 
we might discuss the possibility of a value, that proposed 
value is a possibility for some valuer, else value lose its 
meaning, just as knowledge without a knower is similarly 
meaningless. Secondly, a value is objective in that it re-
fers to a fact in the world of existence. The word "event" 
is used in this study to mean a reality which is complex in 
lsee Section 3, pages ~l?-Pl4 . 
its component parts and of which the person is one strand. 1 
Such an event is considered to be .the datum of value. 
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Clear examples of contemporary events which have 
value potential include the development of hydro-electric 
power and irrigation in India, the United Nations, developing 
patterns of racial integration in educational institutions, 
the construction of a hospital and a youth center in New 
York, and the grant of millions of dollars to expand several 
theological seminaries. Because these events include facts 
which transcend the individual human being to which he can 
relate himself and give his support, it is necessary to in-
sist that values are objective as well as subjective. 
Furthermore ; it i s maintained by this author that all 
events in the world of reality have their ontological being 
as the concrete embodiment of God who is the ground of all 
existence. Thus the fact or event to which a value refers 
is metaphysically objective through its rootage in the ulti-
mate source of all existence. 
Thi rdly, t rue values can be said to be objective in 
that they conform to t he standard of value which is beyond 
t he subjective condition of the individual man and beyond the 
event which is the datum of value. The norm for true values 
is cosmic. It is the telos of ontological being. In Aristo-
telian terms, i t is t he final cause. Stated more personally, 
lsee page 213. 
a cosmic standard is a norm in the mind of God who is the 
ultimate source of all existence, and who intends the 
achievement of all possible values within the context of 
human freedom and a dynamic universe. 
6. Religious Values 
An exhaustive axiological system would necessarily 
present a thorough development of each of the values sup-
ported and the interrelationship of those values. For 
purposes of this study, however, religious values are se-
lected for further amplification. 
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The terms "value" and "religion" are not synonymous, 
else the distinctive meaning of each would be lost. R~ther _. 
religion, like beauty, truth, or morality is a specific 
kind of value. Religion is the highest intrinsic value, and 
it functions in three distinct but closely related ways. Re-
ligion thus conceived can best be explained from the follow-
ing definition: Religion is man's search for and devotion 
to all of the possible values in the events of life, a 
loyalty to the power or powers believed to create and 
sustain those values, and appropriate behavior of individuals 
and groups toward those values and their source.l 
In the first place, a religious outlook upon life is, 
in part, the searching for highest values and striving to 
discover a relationship with the total scheme of values. No 
one value such as beauty, or morality, i s therefore the datum 
of religion. Rather, religion is that search for and devo-
tion to all values which are in the realm of human experience 
or are possibilities of experience. Religious living thus 
conceived is not divorced from the world. It is very much a 
part of all values in the world. It is not separated from 
valid knowledge, for "truth" itself is an instrinsic value. 
Religion is a way of looking for and apprehension o~ all 
true values. It directs one to a single view of life's pos-
sibilities. 
Secondly, religion transcends particular values, or 
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the structure of values. It is loyalty to the creative source 
and sustainer of values. The power which creates and pre-
serves good is here considered to be the divine or one aspect 
of God -- the ontological ground of good. 
lTh~s definition owes much to Brightman's approach 
to religion. (See Chapter III.) It also has roots in Dewey 
and Wieman as well, although each person's religion will 
emphasize certain aspects of the value here defined. (Cf. 
Brightman: Feeling of dependence upon a personal God.) 
Nevertheless, this definiti on is believed to describe reli-
gion as it actually is, and at the same time defi ne the limits 
of how religion ought to function in a non-sectarian educa-
tional institution. 
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It is unnecessary that all persons hold to a specific 
metaphysical view or concept of God for this axiology to be 
valid for them, although values as here conceived do have 
their ultimate source in a theistic world view. The divine, 
however, may be thought of as conscious personality, cosmic 
mind, more-than-mind, or even the more-than-human source of 
all values. That there is a source of values is supported by 
human experience which discovers values which no person or 
group of persons created. Without a belief in the objectivity 
of values in reality, values become purely relative to per-
sonal pleasure or whim. A theistic hypothesis, then, gives a 
coherent interpretation to the creativity and stability of 
values. For lack of contrary evidence or a more coherent 
metaphysical view, we maintain the hypothesis that the source 
and preserver of values is what men mean by God~-or at least 
one aspect of God. 
Finally, religion ought to lead persons into some 
appropriate response to val ues and their source. Appropri ate 
response, usually called worship, may be described as the 
humility and awe which men feel when they have discovered some 
high value. It may be human labor whi ch makes possible more 
values to be more uni versally received. Worship may be pro-
viding the conditions for the creation of new values not here-
tofore known by man. It may be rejoicing in the sum total of 
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values through spontaneous exultation and joy. It may be 
searching for value in the lonely aftermath of human tragedy. 
Worship may also be reaffirming commonly accepted values with 
one's fellows through established ritual--a method of strength-
ening and deepening the rootage of those values. Worship 
should also provide the opportunity for persons to recognize 
in humility their mistakes and dedicate themselves to newly 
discovered values. Since personality fulfillment is always 
incomplete, a commitment to progressive self-examination 
and change may be a significant part of worship. Above all, 
worship should include an effort to come to a closer rela-
tionship with God, the Ultimate Source of all good. 
7. The Relationship of Religion to Education 
Religion as described above is obviously dependent 
upon education for its content. Although it might be argued 
that many values are known outside · formal education, the scope 
of values and their integration for the illiterate and educa-
tionally dwarfed person are highly limited. In fact, high 
religion cannot exist exclusive of all other values and ex-
clusive of education which makes them available for persons. 
The value of beauty, for example, enriched as it can be 
through broadened experiences in art, drama, music, and liter-
ature, gives content to religion. The intellectual values are 
equally necessary for religion and are dependent upon educa-
tional experiences. For example, ideas of philosophers, 
saints, and historians, as well as the training in methods 
of critical thinking, are the "stuff" of intellectual values 
without which religion would be unintelligible. Sensitivity 
to moral values develops as human personality is understood 
through psychological insights. Then, too, as students be-
come familiar with conditions of social and political injus-
tice, economic exploitation, racial inequality, crime, and 
mental disorders, moral responsibility becomes possible. 
Therefore if religion functions to discover and unify all of 
these values into some kind of a pattern of living, religion 
is a barren experience, save for education which gives it 
content. 
On the other hand, education needs a religious per-
spective. Isolated experiences of value, outside of their 
relationship to and integration with other qualities, tends 
to lead to fragmentation of human existence. Such fragmenta-
tion destroys full development of persons. Isolated special-
ists may be skilled in techniques. Yet their instrumental 
values will likely be cut off from intrinsic good, and all 
values will be starved in isolation, without the religious 
perspective which, at its best, integrates all values into 
one harmonious whole. 
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Neither religion nor education is an isolated entity. 
However, education has the potentiality of bringing persons 
close enough to a multitude of events that persons become 
linked to the events and the inherent qualities. Religion 
emerges at its highest level as the person relates all pos-
sible values together into a dynamic pattern of enriched 
living. 
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Religion has another distinctive contribution to make 
to education. It presents a more-than-human referent in its 
insistence that loyalty be to the creator and sustainer of 
values. Suppose, for example, that a political science pro-
fessor who is helping to prepare social studies teachers for 
the secondary school becomes totally absorbed in one political 
party. His conviction that the good of this nation is singu-
larly bound up in the particular party becomes a personal 
dogma. The teacher measures all social and political reforms 
by his one created value. He quite easily distorts teaching, 
unknowingly indoctrinates students (destroying other values), 
and gives total devotion to his parochial value. In one sense 
he is religious. Yet his religion is not defensible in that 
his loyalty is but to a human institution, not to all values 
and their creator and sustainer. Quite likely he will develop 
theories of particular techniques whereby his political deity 
may grow more influential. If his technique is operationally 
valid, he may soon give allegiance to the newly found 
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instrumental good, thus turning a means into his supreme goal. 
However, i£ he were to recognize his human limitation 
in regard to absolute truth, i£ he were concerned for persons 
and the sum total of human values, if he were loyal to a 
superhuman creator of good, then his humility before desired 
truth would be paramount, his respect for persons would rise 
above respect for a political party, and his mental resources 
would be opened for growth of new insights to share with stu-
dents. 
In the third place, education needs a religious per-
spective as a motivational factor in the persistent search 
£or all values. It is common observation and personal experi-
ence that human living is not perpetually easy, pleasant, .or 
satisfying. Persons are tortured by personal tragedy; high 
expectations are foiled; human relationships are tenuous at 
times; uncontrollable natural events are disastrous; war 
brings destruction. Just as inevitable is the drag or daily 
routine for the teacher and the student. All or these 
limitations call for some view of life's possibilities which 
will motivate persons in a continuous struggle for the best. 
Whitehead has captured this imperative for religion in writing: 
Apart from it lthe religious visio~ human 
life is a flash of occasional enjoyments 
lighting up a mass of pain and misery, a 
bagatelle or transient experience. 1 
lA.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 275. 
8. The Political and Social Context for Teacher Education 
The education of teachers, for the most part, ought 
to be an outgrowth of the best thinking of those whose pro-
fession it is to prepare teachers in institutions of higher 
education. At the same time, the professional educators have 
a public whom they serve and who grant them the opportunity 
of being educators. Hence, the political and social context 
of our nation must be seriously considered in any philosophy 
of religion for teacher education. 
a. Political and Legal Limitations 
There are three basic kinds of institutions in which· 
public school teachers are trained: state teachers colleges, 
departments of education in state universities, and schools 
of education in privately supported universities. Since the 
first two types of institutions are tax-supported and the 
third is not, it might be supposed that state colleges and 
universities are legally restricted in matters of religion. 
Such limitation is not the case. 
The federal constitution in no way prohibits 
the treatment of theology or religion in pub-
lic institutions of higher learning in a non-
discriminatory manner and on a scholarly level 
consistent with the intellectual life of higher 
education. 1 
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lnavid W. Louisell, 11 Constitutional Limitations and 
Supports for Dealing with Religion in Public Higher Education, 11 
Religious Education, 50 {1955), 289. 
Not only are state colleges and universities free 
from federal limitations, but there also are no legal regula-
tions in the states restricting religious teaching in tax-
supported colleges and universities. Louisell reports that 
there are no significant cases in legal history in this area, 
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nor are there recent cases of any significant value in respect 
to a program of religious studies in a state-supported col-
lege.1 It appears, therefore, that all teacher training in 
the three types of colleges is on the same legal footing. 
Similarly, since most prospective teachers will work 
in the public school, the same concern for their future ca-
reers should be considered in all types of institutions. The 
political problem, then, is to discover the framework of our 
nation in regard to religion in public education. The polit-
ical context, whatever it turns out to be, will serve as a 
balance or check upon the theories of the educators. The 
political tradition, at least, will provide some limit, even 
if not sharply defined, in terms of which the ideal role of 
religion may be fostered in teacher education. 
According to Anson P. Stokes, the public school in 
America has had its rapid growth, at least in part, because of 
the "almost pathetic belief in the capacity of '.) . . public 
lLouisell, 11 Constitutional Limitations and Supports 
for Dealing with Religion in Public Higher Education," p. 288. 
education to solve all the complicated problems facing a 
1 democracy." Consequently judicial support and local · and 
state initiative moved rapidly to establish public schools 
which would be organized and operated according to the 
ideals of American freedom. The school was to be a major 
instrumentality of education for a democratic society. 
At the same time, our national heritage has roots in 
the Jewish-Christian beliefs concerning the existence. of God 
as creator, of man's duty to God and his fellow man. 2 In 
order to keep a balance between religion and education-for-
freedom, most states have specific constitutional prohibition 
of sectarian or denominational teaching in elementary and 
secondary schools. 
The general political framework within which reli-
gious values are treated is that the public school should not 
teach sectarian creeds as any part of the school curriculum 
or activities. In whatever way non-sectarian religious facts 
and values are taught, such teaching must preserve freedom of 
thought in the individual, on the one hand, and never indoc-
trinate particular beliefs. On the other hand, the public 
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expects the schools to foster those religious values which are 
lAnson P. Stokes, Church and State in the United States 
(New York: Harper and Bros.; 1956), Vol. II, p. 488. 
2Ibid., p. 494. 
part of the American heritage. 
b. Social and Religious Limitations 
Two factors place further limits upon an approach to 
religion in Ame~ican schools. In the first place, it is a 
fact that the religious pattern in this country is pluralis-
tic. Scarcely a community is religiously homogeneous, being 
composed of religious sub-cultures: Roman Catholic, Protes-
tant, and Jewish. Other communities support strong Southern 
Baptist groups who claim to be part of a tradition other than 
protestantism. There are active Christian Science groups, 
Latter Day Saints, and many others. In some cases the reli-
gious loyalty is rooted in the national background of a par-
ticular group. In other cases, such as the Latter Day Saints, 
historical tradition and family loyalties weld the religious 
group together. 
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There are some evidences of unity within this reli-
gious diversity as seen in a new ecumenical interest and in 
the National and World Councils of Churches. It is likely, 
however, that many kinds of sincere personal and institutional 
loyalties will be maintained for years to come. In the face 
of this diversity of religion, the colleges and the public 
schools, if they are to deal with religion at all, must make 
an approach which is fair to religion as it is actually found 
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that is multi-sectarian.1 At the same t ·ime the religious out-
look must foster the kind of an approach to religion and all 
values which transcend such differences. 
The second limitation concerns the depth of religion 
itself. It is here assumed that for many persons religion 
involves the deepest loyalties and the most fundamental issues 
of their lives. It is quite possible that the school will be 
so concerned to develop an understanding among persons of the 
diverse religions that the 11 depths 11 of .religion will be mini-
mized. If students are encouraged to believe that 11one reli-
gion is as good as another" the grounds of their own faith may 
be destroyed. Whenever a student becomes convinced that the 
religious outlook which he maintains is inadequate, his new 
convictions should be built upon new insights about the nature 
and function of religion at its best, rather than upon nega-
tive indoctrination by a teacher. who desires to .belittle all 
religion.. In so far as a teacher may repudiate religion and 
urge students to do so, he does it upon some value assump-
tions and loyalties which he himself holds to be ultimate. 
1F. Ernest Johnson, in a recent paper, suggests that 
we run into confusion if we talk about "non-sectarian" reli-
~ion. Rather, if we deal with religion at all, it must be 
an unprejudiced looking at religion where you find it in the 
community, in the nation, in the world." .Such an approach 
is actually multi-sectarian, he insists. See F. Ernest 
Johnson, 11Religion and Education," a paper given on November 
21, 1955, at the ceremonies accompanying the inauguration of 
Dr. Hollis L. Caswell as President of Teachers College, 
Columbia University. Mimeographed .by Teachers College. 
Hence he is indoctrinating a particular sectarian or paro-
chial religious faith. Therefore, when any philosophy of 
religion is being developed and put into practice in teacher 
education, two limitations must be recognized: our religious 
and cultural pluralism, and the depth of each religion. Both 
require full respect for religious differences. 
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CHAPTER VI: 
RELIGION IN TEACHER EDUCATION 
1. Introduction 
The aims and procedures of teacher education cannot 
escape some value orientation which eventually becomes a reli-
gious philosophy. The alternative to a self-conscious and 
thorough philosophy is for each department to grow in its own 
way, each unconsciously supporting a particular set of values, 
devotion to such values, and appropriate behavior concerning 
those values. 
It is here maintained that the complex problems of 
American life and the obligation of preparing qualified teach-
ers for public schools places a rigorous demand upon teacher 
education. Not only must the college train teachers to meet 
the particular need of individual communities. The more com-
prehensive task is to decide what values men ought to serve 
and to provide the kinds of institutions which will make the 
achievement of those values possible for prospective teachers. 
This writer shares the conviction of Theodore Brameld that 
"a method or program can hardly be found, much less succeed, 
unless it is guided by clarity of goals ... "1 
Furthermore, since value concepts provide the context 
lTheodore Brameld, Ends and Means in Education (New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 8. 
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for religion, it is through the total educational policy, 
growing out of an axiological system, that religion will 
find i ts place in teacher education. The value theory as 
sketched in the previous chapter, therefore, provides the 
framework from which the following implications are drawn. 
2. The Highest Good in Teacher Training 
The highest good assumed for this axiology is the 
continuous growth, enrichment, and fulfillment of all per-
sons. The over-arching aim of teacher education, therefore, 
is the fullest possible growth, enrichment, and fulfillment 
of every student. The implementation of this aim depends 
upon a concept of the nature of persons. 
a. The Growth of the Mind through 
Liberal Arts and Sciences 
In the first place, every person is an organism, one 
aspect of which is his potential ability to ·.think or reason. 
That aspect of the person which we call ''mind" may be incased 
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in the mire of ignorance, or overgrown with bri ars of prejudi ce, 
or rusted with disuse. Yet, the mental faculties can be 
trained so that the creative thinking of the student will rna-
ture and guide his fullest development. 
Fortunately, no human being nor any generation has to 
depend upon itself for resources to aid rational development. 
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The basic problems and aspirations of mankind have been caught 
in literature~ philosophy~ and history. These and other 
liberal arts provide the foci of study whereby the student can 
both enjoy the rich resources of the ages~ and at the same 
time develop his own powers of critical thinking and broadened 
aspirations. 
This writer maintains that mental growth demands a 
thorough training in the arts and sciences. It is not supposed 
that the mere collection of information from the past will 
serve human growth and enrichment, although many students may 
discover intrinsic joy in such endeavor. Rather, the liberal 
arts and sciences should stimulate the student to break the 
shack~·es which limit his mental functioning in order that he 
may progress toward maturity -- that he will be liberated to 
think clearly about all issues with which men throughout the 
years have struggled and which he, too, faces. 
Liberal arts training which is to serve the basic aim 
of mental growth will also demand rigorous study of the social 
sciences. Certainly every professional person can hope to 
serve his community adequately only when he has some insights 
into social, political, and economic forces in our society. 
Personal development demands more than a superficial survey 
of American problems. A struggle with the most knotty prob-
lems of society, an attempt to understand this nation, the 
world, and human beings, and appropriate practical experience 
in situations of social conflict are imperative. Such ex-
periences, when wisely guided by a social science staff, are 
indispensable for prospective teachers. 
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Furthermore, a scientific age suggests other dimensions 
in education. Although few public school teachers need to be 
specialists in the natural sciences, at least some understand-
ing of the world in which we live, the biological organism of 
persons, and the methods of scientific inquiry should be part 
of the prospective teacher's formal education. 
Since intellectual development is an intrinsic value 
and since man's mental functioning is basic to his fullest 
development, we propose that every prospective teacher's edu-
cation should include thorough academic experiences in the lib-
eral arts and sciences. 
b. Social and Emotional Growth 
Man is more than a thinking being. He also has feelings 
of confidence and fear, security and insecurity, doubt and hope. 
If he is to find any fulfillment as a person, the values whi ch 
center about his positive feeling toward himself and others must 
be enhanced, and his cooperative relationships with all persons 
must mature. 
Since teachers colleges and schools of education are 
growing in numbers of students, it is highly unlikely that per-
sonal guidance and counseling will be able to a i d in more than 
the extreme cases of social and personal maladjustment. Rather, 
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the college curriculum itself should provide the basic conditions 
for the social values with which we are concerned. 
The classroom conditions which are essential for social 
and emoti onal growth are suggested in Wieman's emphasis upon 
creative intercommunication. The group dynami cs and human rela-
tions movements also attempt to provide for personal and social 
development i ntegrally related to the liberal arts and sci ences. 
Every college class which is taught in an atmosphere where per -
sonality is placed above facts, where freedom is prized above in-
doctrination, where communication of ideas and meanings may be 
freely shared will be a laboratory in human relations and a 
"green house" of social maturation. 
3. A Religious Pers!ective as Integration 
of ai Values 
Religion is not only a concern with mental and social 
growth. It is also that perspective which attempts to see all 
values in relationship with one another and to see the total 
scheme of the good. It is the religious aim that persons avoid 
the impoverishment of possessing single values, through a concern 
for all values and t heir growth and conservation in human life. 
This normative function of religion has clear implications for 
teacher education. 
Two related conditions in colleges and universities make 
an integration of values difficult--specializati on and fragmenta-
tion. Academic specialization has developed along with the growth 
of technical knowledge in this century. There are so many facts 
to be known that scholars find themselves concentrating on one 
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small, though important, area. There are a few 11 general 
scientists"; most scientists specialize in Far Eastern plant 
pathology or in the chemistry of plastics or some other sub-
division of science. Similarly, doctors of philosophy in 
history are often specialists, for example, in English his-
tory between 1800 and 1S50; the literature professor may be 
"medievalist 11 ; the philosopher pre-socratic. These scholars, 
excellent as they may be in their own field, find it difficult 
not to deal exclusively in their specialty, even with under-
graduates. 
Then, too, the elective system, beginning in Harvard 
University at the turn of the century, spread through higher 
education, leading to the addition of a multitude of specific 
courses in each department or division. With free choice in 
selecting courses, many students specialized in one division. 
Others, in cafeteria style, selected courses throughout the 
college, thus gaining only a shallow and fragmented academic 
experience. 
Many of these dangers of specialization and fragmenta-
tion are being corrected with the recent emphasis upon the 
liberal arts core, or a general education program for every 
student. It is with this trend toward basic courses for 
every student that religion, as supported in this study, finds 
its significant place. 
The religious imperative that all values be integrated 
into some meaningful whole can be striven for in every general 
education course. In fact, the teacher who maintains a reli-
gious perspective always tries to relate knowledge and value~ 
For example, the teacher of a course called 11Great Ideas and 
Events of Modern Europe 11 is not limited to the recounting of 
every military episode. Rather, he has the opportunity of 
relating the political struggles with ideas of the social 
philosophers, with man's efformtoward freedom, and with 
man's expression of hopes and fears through music, art, and 
literature. The teacher and students, in their effort to 
weave all events into some fabric of understanding, will be 
discovering what values men have prized and what, after all, 
is worth striving for. 
Courses in the humanities should be attempts to relate 
facts and values in literature, music, art, and philosophy 
in any given age. Part of the task of the integration of 
values, then, falls upon the instructor in every academic 
area. Continued faculty planning and experimentation will 
develop the vast possibilities of liberal arts teaching which 
will not sacrifice depth of scholarship but will also accom-
plish integration of values in the student's own philosophy 
of life. 
Bernard Loomer, in writing about religion in a general 
studies program, insists that 
religion can never be a peripheral matter. 
It is a central and ultimate concern that 
constitutes the core of an individual's 
life and thought. Implicitly or explicitly 
it is the foundation for that organization 
of values and meanings which form his 
personality. 1 
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I spite of the integrative function of all instructors, 
the main esponsibility of seeing all values in relation to 
each othe , and of helping the student to organize his basic 
loyalties rests upon the philosophers. It is true that the 
disciplin of philosophy should not be limited to the teacher 
of philos phy, for philosophy is a "love of wisdom11 which 
should ch racterize all scholarship. Nevertheless, college 
and unive sity students need specific guidance in learning to 
criticize and evaluate basic assumptions held by themselves 
and other • The task of ask;i..ng: ''What is knowledge? How do 
we test i ? What is truly valuable? What are God, beauty, 
morality, and man? 11 is one which undergirds all academic 
work. 
if a 
tial answers to the above questions are imperative 
nt is to see the possibilities of life as a whole. 
order to meet the philosophical dimension of 
religion, two requirements for the prospective teacher are 
proposed. First is the proposal that every student be required 
to take course in philosophy during his second year as 
part of liberal arts core. The courses should be oriented 
solving, moving from the most simple questions 
which st dents raise, toward issues concerning the meaning 
Bernard Loomer, "Religion and the Mind of the Uni -
versity,' Liberal Learning and Religion, ed. Amos Wilder, 
(New York: Harper and Bros., l951), p. 165. 
of life, the possibility of truth, the nature of right and 
wrong, and theories of reality. All of these and other ques-
tions should be dealt with in an atmosphere of honest inquiry 
and free expression so that emotional stability and social 
values will be enhanced. 
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In order that the prospective teacher might be aided 
in answering his questions, resource material should be se-
lected from the great philosophers--religious, social, moral 
and aesthetic. The background literature should be used as 
aids in focusing attention on the persistent personal, social, 
educational and religious problems which all men have faced 
and the alternative solutions. The individual student should 
be encouraged to answer questions for himself and to work to-
ward integrating his experiences and concepts into his unique 
philosophy. It is imperative, however, that all points of 
view be seriously considered, else the prospective teacher 
will expect indoctrination and, in turn,indoctrinate his fu-
ture students. 
Furthermore, it is hoped that through a philosophical 
study students will become aware of the values which they en-
counter in all other courses. Questions concerning the nature 
of beauty may loom out at them in a literature or humanities 
course. Problems of moral values should become clear in their 
study of sociology. Sophomore psychology and biology may call 
forth deep questioning about man and his worth because of the 
students' new sensitivity. These and other results ought to 
follow from the first course in philosophy. 
The second proposal is that a two-hour or three-hour 
course, extending the entire senior year, be required of 
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every student. This course to be called 11 Philosophy of Edu-
cation" might be broken into two sections. The first period 
would include an attempt to look with the student at his en-
tire college career, especially toward the intellectual, moral, 
social, and aesthetic values with which he has dealt during 
the four years. The second section should be an expansion 
and appl i cation of the various value theories to educational 
aims, selection of course 1 material, methods of teaching, 
administrative practices, and community participation. 
Some instructors might desire to take another approach. 
They could choose to keep those two facets--integration of 
values and educational problems--in perpetual tension. 
Philosophical insights could be the basis for critically eval-
uating educational issues as seen in current documents or in 
laboratory experiences. 
The most important objective is that the course in 
philosophy of education will be serving its religious function 
as it helps the student criticize and understand his values 
and organize them into some kind of personal philosophy of 
life, applicable to his future professional needs. Such a 
philosophy will be immature and incomplete. It should always 
be open to further inspection and correction. At least some 
direction for intelligent teaching should emerge from this 
intensive philosophical and religious endeavor. 
4. Religion as Subject Matter 
Not all aspects of religion are absorbed in the mental 
and social growth of st~dents or in the meaningful integration 
of all values. Religion has also subject matter of its own. 
Throughout the years, religious beliefs have emerged as a way 
of expressing man•s experiences of values and their source. 
252 
Institutions to conserve the values of each age have taken root 
in culture. Those institutions have produced writers, poets, 
theologians, artists, architects, sculptors, and the like. 
These data are part of cultural history and contemporary af-
fairs. Even though many of the religious data are sectarian 
in nature, their content can be dealt with, both as that con-
tent is intrinsic to other academic disciplines, and in sepa-
rate elective courses in religion. 
a. Teachin~ about Religion as It is 
Intrins c to Various Disciplines 
Every teacher in an institution of higher education 
has the moral obligation to be thorough, as objective as pos-
sible, and to serve the fullest growth of his students. Such 
a demand suggests that distorted teaching whereby relevant 
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material is suppressed or avoided is doing injustice to intel-
lectual values and hence to the student. Therefore, in every 
subject, information about religion should .be dealt with when-
ever such material is intrinsic to the learning experience. 
For example, religion has played an important part in the 
development of American history. Such content should not be 
avoided but described and interpreted. Again, the church and 
synagogue are relevant to sociology of the cornmunity,and reli-
gious experience is intrinsic to a study of the psychology of 
personality. 
The relationship of religion to the sciences is some-
what different. Any attempt to "drag in religion 11 is dis-
tinctly out of place. Nevertheless, the relationship of a 
scientific interpr etati on of life and a religious view· is often 
significant for an understanding of science itself. Harold 
K. Schilling, for many years chairman of the physics depart-
ment of Pennsylvania State College {now University) suggests 
that the scientist may well liken the limi tation in knowledge 
whi ch the scientist possesses to the limi tation in religious 
knowledge. Even increase in knowledge in both spheres, he 
says, does not decrease what is not known. 1 
The writer is insisting at this point that there is 
1H.K. Schill i ng, ''The Interaction of Science, Religion, 
and Theology," unpublished lecture, 1954. See also William G. 
Pollard, "The Place of Science in Religi on," The Christian 
Scholar, 26 (1953), 110-121. 
an axiological obligation for each teacher to utilize all 
data and interpretations of religion which are integrally 
related to his course. To do less is to distort teaching 
and to thwart a search for all knowledge. 
Two dangers present themselves in the position pre-
sented above. First, every teacher must be selective of 
material which is used for lecture and class assignments. 
The devoutly religious person may distort his teaching by 
too much emphasis upon religious subject matter to the neg-
lect of the "non-religious material. 11 At this point it can 
only be hoped that teachers will strive unceasingly for a 
balanced perspective, guided by their own rigorous scholar-
ship. Secondly, whenever interpretations of data called 
11 religious 11 are attempted, or whenever any events are inter-
preted in terms of value presuppositions, one kind of reli-
gion may ·be supported above all other tenable positions. 
254 
This is truly a danger, but it is a danger implicit in every 
interpretation which the teacher or student makes. There is 
less danger of indoctrination, however, when the instructor 
11 lays bare 11 his assumptions and urges that ·the students share 
in the process of evaluation and interpretation of data. Such 
honest intercommunication also helps to balance the students' 
intellectual growth with the equally important social and 
emotional development. 
b. Teaching of Courses in Religion 
Not only should the content of religion be taught 
whenever intrinsic to each subject. Religion is a discipline 
of its own. The history of religion, sociology of religion, 
the psychology of religion, and the philosophy of religion 
can be taught in the same academic environment and with equal 
objectivity as any other discipline. There appears to be no 
reason why such courses should not be offered on an elective 
basis in teachers colleges or be available to students in 
schools of education. In fact, when the teacher of religion 
is continually aware of the plurality of religious beliefs 
of his students, and when he. has a genuine concern for the 
emotional growth of those students, any scientific, histori-
cal, sociological, or philosophical course in religion will 
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give a breadth to the student's understanding of religion and 
its function in human life which he could not achieve elsewhere. 
A survey of teacher education institutions in fifteen 
mid-western states shows that one of the courses in religion 
most often offered is ''comparative religions," or sometimes 
called 11 religions of the world," or "history of religions."1 
lTwenty-five catalogues of teachers colleges were se-
lected at random. This particular course has also received 
a great deal of attention in three workshops i n 1953 to 1955 
which were sponsored by the Teacher Education and Religion 
Project of the A.A.C.T.E. 
In spite of the popularity of this course as indicated by the 
numerous colleges which offer it, care needs to be exercised 
lest negative values result rather than positive ones. 
It is reasonable to suppose that students may gain 
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a wealth of knowledge about the beliefs and practices of the 
various religions through studying "religions of the world. 11 
There is a danger, however, that students may be impressed 
with wide divergencies in religious beliefs and practices and 
conclude: "What difference does it make? No religion is true 
or false; religion is just a matter of preference. 11 A rela-
tivistic view of religion is not uncommon among academic per-
sons. Yet, such singular results hardly fulfill the aim of 
the course under discussion. 
Philip Phenix maintains that a method must be discovered 
whereby students will come to an understanding of the funda-
mental unity which underlies the various differing religious 
faiths. Otherwise the study of a multitude of religious 
faiths undermines stable religion and leads to skepticism and 
relativism, 1 both of which are often indicative of insecure 
and disturbed persons. 
He goes on to say that an understanding of the under-
lying unity of the religions cannot be seen merely by a factual 
study. In fact, an array of partially contradictory beliefs 
lphilip Phenix, 11Religion in the Schools, 11 Unpublished, 
Ch. II. 
among which the student would not be asked to decide only 
inspires confusion. 
The Phenix proposal, which has been attempted by this 
investigator, begins with the assumption of this dissertation 
that religion is a concern for life's highest values and de-
votion to the pow.er believed to create and sustain them. He 
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contends, further, that whenever persons of any age or culture 
are faced with crucial problems or possibilities of life or 
death import, those persons are forced to develop some inter-
pretation of their existential condition and Q.f · ' values which 
may be created or conserved. The method of teaching world 
religions, then, is to select universal and basic issues of 
human existence. These, for example, may inciude nbirth," 
11 death, 1f 11 lOVe, It 11hate, II "marriage, II 11 Change, !I ltdependence, It 
1 
"order," and "imperfection." Using these and similar cate-
gories, the instructor shows how different persons of differ-
ent cultures have developed religious ideas which are signifi-
cant in their discovery and conservation of values. 
In the Phenix approach, resource material from the 
various religions is used in order to discover how the par-
ticular person or group of persons found meaning in the face 
of thei r deepest concern. He is convinced that through this 
process of studying religi on, students will gain understanding 
lsee Phi lip Phenix , Intelligible Religion (New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1954), pp. 29-95. 
into the way in which religion actually functions in human 
life. At the same time diversity is appreciated, human 
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need understood, and religious beliefs respected, even though 
their particular interpretation of life may be highly un-
satisfactory to the student. 
A second course which ought to be available for every 
student is philosophy of religion. The purpose of philosophy 
as an academic discipline includes at least three aspects: 
to think critically about every area of human experience; 
to organize all data of experience into a coherent philosophy 
of life; and to criticize and evaluate basic assumptions. 
Philosophy of religion, then, is the attempt to apply this 
critical approach to the field . of religion. A coll ege course 
in philosophy of religion has potentially a high significance 
for all college students. It is especially appropriate for 
tax-supported colleges and universities in that philosophy, 
as here defined, leaves no room for the indoctrination of 
a particular point of view. 
Moreover, college students are actually facing problems 
of a religious nature which demand a philosophical approach. 
What is God? If God is all-powerful and all-goad, why does 
evil exist? Is man immortal? These are typical questions 
which students ask. Then, too, even though the gulf be-
tween science and religion is not as wide as in the recent 
past, college freshmen are often jolted when they begin to 
feel that a literalistic approach to the Bible is inadequate. 
Harry Broudy is right in pointing out that these religious 
questions are at the heart of countless nbull" sessions. 
To think these problems through in an 
objective manner where all data are fairly 
appraised would be no small contribution 
to any generation. 1 
5. A Caution--The Problem of 
Religious Commitment 
Teacher education, at least in state-supported insti-
tutions, is justifiably hindered from fostering one important 
sustainer of values. According to our definition, religion 
is more than ·a search for and loyalty to the highest values. 
It includes more than a unification of all values into some 
coherent view of life. Religion is also commitment to the 
power or powers believed to create and sustain values. From 
the political context of public-supported schools, and we 
believe from the point of view Qf democratic education, no 
act of commitment or devotion can or should be demanded of 
college students. 
The school is being untrue to its ideal of the fUl-
fillment of persons, however, if it does not help the s~u­
dent to realize that he does make ultimate commitments to 
values. The teacher should help the student discover the 
1 Harry s. Broudy, Building a Philoso~hy of Education 
(New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.t 1954), p. 44 • 
.. -
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process of commitment and the discipline required in the 
change of one's life values. Finally the teacher should 
give support as the student struggles to carry out his con-
victions. Beyond the suggestions given above, the teacher 
ought to exercise restraint even though his personal 
commitment, if he is respected as a man, will have inevit-
able influence on the students. 
6. The College and University Chaplaincy 
Colleges and universities are finding a way in which 
the opportunity for worship and service may be available for 
students without demanding specific commitment. This plan 
centers about extra-curricular activities which are given 
professional support by the chaplain. The term "chaplain" 
includes persons with titles such as "director of religious 
ac ti vi ties," or ''coordinator of religious life." Seymour 
Smith reports that in 1953 there were 273 colleges and uni-
versities which maintained full-time chaplains.1 While only 
about 30 state-supported colleges had chaplains at that time, 
Smith points out that they function in precisely the same 
way that chaplains in non-government-supported institutions 
function. 
It is significant that so many colleges support 
1seymour Smith, The American College Chaplaincy (New 
York: Association Press, 1954), p. 12. 
260 
religious work through the office of chaplain. It is also 
striking that the growth of the chaplaincy movement has 
been so rapid. At the beginning of this century, slightly 
more than one dozen colleges had a chaplain. Between 1930 
and 1939, 29 new chaplains were appointed. The same growth 
occurred during the next ten years. In 1946, 30 such posi-
tions were established; in 1947 there were 20 new positions 
1 
created; in 1949 nearly 80 appointments were made. 
The rapid growth of the college and university chap-
laincy does not indicate that at last a way has been found 
to take care of all religion. It does suggest that a pro-
gram of religious activities which includes study, worship, 
interpersonal growth, and appropriate projects has an estab-
l i shed precedent in all types of colleges and universities 
including state teachers colleges. 
Justification for a chaplain is seen in the third 
aspect of religion as defined in thi s study. It has been 
asserted that reli gion includes "appropriate expression of 
individuals and groups toward values and the power or powers 
bel i eved to create and sustain those values." Development 
of such a program, however, must be completely voluntary 
for at least two reasons. Fi rst, limitations upon state 
1smith, ~· cit., pp. 13-14. 
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colleges prohibit any compulsory religious practices and pro-
hibit sectarian teaching. The freedom to worship or to act 
out of religious interest, or not to participate in any reli-
gious activities, must be carefully guarded. Secondly, reli-
gious expression loses its meaning if it is not a free 
expression of the person. Compulsory religious programs are 
not only in violation of American social and legal tradition, 
they are a direct violation of other values such as freedom, 
integrity, honesty, and the like. 
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In spite of necessary cautions, the chaplain or direc-
tor of religious activities can function in such a way that he 
will add strength to the entire program of higher education, 
that the program of activities will respect the students of 
all religious backgrounds, and that the religious expressions 
fostered will be true to the deepest meaning of all religions 
and denominations. 
If the chaplain is to be a genuine addition to the 
college or university, if he is to serve prospective 
teachers in their maximum growth, if he is to aid in the 
search for highest values and devotion to the creator and 
sustainer of values, if he is also to sponsor appropriate 
expressions of behavior in regard to values and their sources, 
certain qualifications are required of him. 
1. He must have graduated from a theological school 
from which he gained knowledge and appreciation of all major 
faiths, or he must have had equivalent educational background 
in religion. 
2. He must have an earned doctor's degree, qualifying 
him for full faculty status in one or more academic fields. 
3. His scholarship must be sufficiently broad for 
him to be an agent in the integration of all values in the 
classes which he teaches, and in his relationship with faculty 
and students. 
4. He must be able to relate himself positively with 
faculty members, and through informal discussions, scheduled 
faculty seminars, and formal addresses, explore with the 
faculty the relationships of religion and particular academic 
disciplines. 
5. He must be sincerely willing to cooperate with 
students of all religions and denominations, finding suitable 
expression of their religious devotion through worship and 
action. He must be eager to cooperate wi th Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, and Jewish students and clergy. In many localities 
he will need to understand and cooperate with students of 
Buddhist, Hindu, Moslem, and Eastern Orthodox faiths. 
6. He must be eager to work with those students who 
feel no interest or need for formal worship but who may be 
eager for guidance in work projects where community need, 
racial tension, or political strife is a challenge to con-
structive labor. At least in so far as work activities are 
not provided by the curriculum, such opportunities fall to 
the chaplain. 
7. The chaplain must be a person whose loyalty is to 
all values, to the growth of persons, and to the source of 
good, rather than to any institution--even his particular 
church. 
8. He must have an interest in and capability of 
counseling with students on all matters of private concern. 
Opportunities will come to him to aid the student who is 
struggling with religious beliefs and commitment. He may 
also be one of the few faculty to whom students will bring 
for discussion all manner of problems. To neglect this ave-
nue of service is to shun all values and persons in whom 
values find their home. 
9. The chaplain must be skilled as a group worker. 
Knowing that 11 training the mind 11 is only part of the educa-
tors' task, he must know how to provide the conditions where-
by students' thoughts and feelings can be freely shared ·and 
accepted. Such an atmosphere of deep intercommunication is 
highly desirable within every classroom. However, since many 
instructors conceive of their task as imparting information, 
they are not alway concerned with 11non-intellectual 11 values. 
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Group discussions, under the guidance of the chaplain, 
can be psychotherapeutic; they can aid in personal discovery 
and integration of values; and such group experiences will 
often free students from emotional tensions so that they find 
new moti vation for extensive intellectual pursuit and renewed 
moral responsibility. 
?. An Ideal Teacher 
What type of teacher can be expected as a result of 
the teacher training here proposed? It is unrealistic to 
expect that a college or university can totally remake a stu-
dent . He comes to college with a certain ability as his raw 
material; his di sposition is partly formed; his own experiences 
and knowledge area handicap or advantage. Nevertheless, the 
four years of college come in a formative period of years for 
the student. He is maturing rapidly; he is serious and ques-
tioning; his ideals are taking definite form; although his 
knowledge is limited, his vocational dreams are being envi-
sioned. It is not too much to expect that the intense events 
of college will play a great part in shaping his entire future 
years. 
First, we can surely expect that the student will 
graduate with the desire and ability to think critically and 
constructively upon every issue of life. That is, through 
training of the mind in the liberal arts, he will not only 
understand the great ideas of all ages but will be able to 
think clearly in matters of politics, economics, world af-
fairs, philosoph~and religion. 
Then, too, the liberal arts should have aided his 
growth toward sensitivity in art, music, and literature. He 
will have gained insights into the method of the sciences 
and its limits. His skills in creative writing, listening, 
and speaking will have been richly developed. And above all, 
his wealth of intellectual knowledge and values will be 
"translatable" to the age level of his future students. This 
is a minimum to expect of the graduating prospective teacher. 
Secondly, the student should have made real progress 
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i n integrating the values inherent in all of the arts and 
sciences into some satisfactory, though tentative, philosophy 
of life. He will. have a philosophy which is cognizant of the 
highest values; it will give place for loyalty to those values, 
to the total scheme of values, and to whatever source t he 
student believes creates and sustains all that is good. 
Thirdly, the graduating student will be progressively 
maturing. He will have gained deepened insights into his own 
thoughts and emotions as well as those of others. He will thus 
be able to build continuing bonds of friendship, cooperation, 
and mutual support within a community of growing persons. 
Through his own maturity and hi s understanding of the psycholo-
gy of children and youth, he will be able to guide their 
social and emotional development. 
In the fourth place, through participating in demo-
cratic classes, through a study of methods, and by laboratory 
experiences, he will be able to use the best techniques avail-
able (instrumental value) for the fullest growth and fulfill-
ment of his future students (the highest good). 
Moreover, he will have a sensitivity to the personal 
needs and the background of each pupil. He will appreciate 
each one and accept him as a person of infinite worth and 
with high possibilities for future growth. At the same time 
he will help his students understand and accept each other. 
He will know that religious differences have the potentiality 
of dividing students; yet he will have knowledge of each 
faith and concern for each child so that unity among diversity 
can be achieved. 
Sixth, the new teacher's personal religious faith may 
take one of two forms. On the one hand, he will never claim 
that all religion is 11 bunk, 11 because he will have learned that 
he, too, has values, ultimate loyalties,and subsequent action. 
Although he may not participate in traditional religious 
activities in his new community, he will know that those ac-
tivities are meaningful expressions for other persons, and he 
will covet for them the freedom to behave appropriately in 
worship and action. 
On the other hand, his worship interests may have 
developed along with his total growth in college so that he 
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will want to continue to find a satisfactory means of express-
ing his ultimate loyalty with others in the community. He may, 
therefore, find that the conventional religious institutions 
provide significant avenues for his own expressions of worship. 
A final statement summarizes our hope. The good 
teacher should understand that knowledge of subject matter and 
psychological methods, though necessary, remains barren and 
may even be misleading without the inspiration that fills the 
singularity of facts and events with motive and meaning. The 
teacher should open the windows of the young and waiting per-
son to the great wonders of life of which the fullest growth 
of all persons, the possibility of knowledge and wisdom, the 
relationship of love and trust, and the vividness of beauty 
1 
are the greatest part. 
lA statement made by Robert Ulich which has been extended 
and modified. See Robert Ulich, "The Preparation of Teachers," 
Religious Perspectives in College Teaching, ed. Hoxie Fairchild, 
(New York: The Ronald Press, 1952), p. 451. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, George P., and Wm. PepperenMontague (ed.). Contem-
§orarl American Philosophy. New York: The Macmillan 
0., 930. 
American Council on Education. The Function of the Public 
School in Dealing with Religion. Washington, D. c., 
1955. 
• The Relation of Religion to Public Education: 
--~B~a-s-ic Principles. Washington, D. c., 1947. 
Aubrey, Edwin E. Secularism a Myth. New York: Harper 
and Bros., 195 • 
Bean, Waiton. "Historical Developments Affecting the Place 
of Religion in the State University Curriculum," 
Religious Education, 50 (September-October, 1955), 
275-284. 
Benne, Kenneth D., and Bozidar r.1untyan. Human Relations 
in Curriculum Change. New York: The Dryden Press, 1951. 
Bergson, Henri. L'Evolution Creatrice. Paris: Felix Alean, 
1907. 
Bertocci, Peter A., and M. Alice Corea. "Edgar Sheffield 
Brightman throu~h His Students' Eyes," Philosophical 
Forum, 12 (1954), 53-67. 
Bester, Arthur. Educational Wastelands. Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1953. 
Blanchard, Paul. Communism, Democracy and Catholic Power. 
Boston: The Beacon Press, 1951. 
Bower, \!Jilliam C. Moral and Spiritual Values in Education. 
Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1952. 
Brameld, Theodore. Ends and Means in Education. New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1950. 
. Patterns of Educational Philosophy. Yonkers-on-
----"Hu~a~son, N.Y.: World Book Co., 1950. 
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. "The Lisbon Earthquake, 11 The 
American Journal of Theology, 23 (1919), 500-518 . ---
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield. "The Personalistic Method in 
Philosophy, 11 Methodist Review, 103 (1920), 368-380. 
. "Philosophy in American Education," The Person-
-~a""';'"l'"'""i-st, 1 (1920), 15-28. 
• "Truth and Value in Religion," Methodist Review, 
--1.....,oo:"JI05-(1922), 42-47. 
1925. 
Religious Values. New York: The Abingdon Press, 
"Personality as a Philosophy or Religion," 
Crozer Quarterly, 5 (1928), 381-395. 
• A PhilOSOEhl of Ideals. New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1928. 
The Finding of God. New York: The Abingdon 
Press, 1931. 
The Problem of God. New York: The Abingdon 
Press, 1931. 
• 
11 The Given and its Critics," Religion in Life, 
____ 1_(..,.....1932), 134-145. 
. "Religion as Truth," Contemporary American Theol-
--~--. Edited by Vergilius Ferm. New York: Round Table 
'P"!'ess, 1932. 
• "A Temporalist View of God," Journal of Religion, 
-~12o:--r-(1932), 545-555. 
Moral Laws. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933. 
• Personality and Religion. New York: The Abing-
----a~o-n~Press, 1934. 
• "An Empirical Approach to God," The Philosophical 
--R.--e-viT"ew, 46 (1937), 147-169. 
• A Philosophy of Religion. New York: Prentice-
---H=a-1~1~, Inc., 1940: 
• "Christianity, Philosophy, and the Teaching or 
---R~el..-1.T"· gion," Journal or Bible and Religion, 10 (1942)., 
14-21. 
270 
Brightman, Edgar Sherrield (ed.). Personalism in Theology. 
Boston: Boston University Press, 1943. 
Brightman, Edgar Sherrield. 11Values, Ideals, Norms, and 
Existence, 11 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
4 (1943), 219-224. 
Nature and Values1. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury 
Press, 1945. 
''Some Derini tions ror Personalists, 11 The Person-
alist, 27 (1946), 365-373 • 
. "Man and Religion, 11 Proceedi~s or the Tenth Inter-
----n-a~tional Congress or Philosophy. Amsterdam, Holland, 
1948. 
3-5. 
"Man and Religion," Philosophical Forum, 7 (1949), 
----~~· An Introduction to Philosophy. New York : Henry 
Holt and Co., (1925) 1951. 
• Persons and Values. Boston: Boston University 
--'II':'Pr~e-:-ss, 1952. 
Broudy, Harry S. Building a Philosophy or Education. New 
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. 
271 
Brown, Kenneth I. Not Minds Alone. New York: Harper and Bros., 
1954. 
Brubacher, JohnS. {ed.). The Public Schools and Spiritual 
Values. New York : Harper and Bros., 1944. 
Brubacher, John S. Modern Philosophi es or Education. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1950. 
Butler, J. Donald. Four Philosophies and Their Practice in 
Education and Religion. Princeton, N.J.: The Princeton 
University Press, 1951. 
Butts, R. Freeman. The American Tradition in Religion and 
Education. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1950. 
Chave, E. J. A Functional Approach to Religious Education. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947 . 
Childs, J. L. Education and Morals. New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1950. 
Constitution of the United States. "The Bill of Rights," 
September 25, 1789. 
Cook, L. A., and E. F. Cook. 11 Group Dynamics in Education, 11 
Journal of Educational Sociology, 27 (1954), 385-395. 
Cubberly , Ellwood P. Public Education in the United States. 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934. 
Cuninggim, Merriman. The College Seeks Religion. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1947. 
Dawson, Eugene E. "Religion in Teacher Education, 11 Religious 
Education, 50 (July-August, 1955), 238-242. 
Dewey, John. 11 Religion and our Schools, 11 Hibbert Journal, 
6 (1908), 796-809. 
• 
11 The Problem of Values," Journal of Philosophy, 
----1~o~(May, 1913), 268-269. 
Democracy and Education. New York: The Macmillan 
Co., 1916. 
• Essa~s in Experimental Logic. Chicago: The Univer-
-----s~i~ty of Chicago Press, 1916. 
• Reconstruction in Philosophy. New York: Henry 
----=H~o~lt and Co., 1926. 
• Human Nature and Conduct. New York: Henry Holt 
-----a-n~a Co., 1922. 
. "Values, Liking, and Thought, 11 Journal of Philos-
----o-p~h~y, 20 (November, 1923), 617-622. 
. Experience and Nature. Chicago: Open Court 
----~Pu-b~lishing Co., 1925. 
. Quest for Certainty: A Stud~ of the Relation of 
----Kri~o-wledge and Action. New York: Minton Balch and Co., 
1929. 
• 
11From Absolutism to Experimentalism, 11 Contempo-
____ r_a_r_y American Philosophy. Edited by George P. Adams 
and~m. P. Montague. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930. 
. A Common Faith • New Haven: Yale University Press, 
-~1"""'9=-34. 
A Credo. New York: Simon Schuster, 1934. 
272 
Dewey, John, and J. H. Tufts. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt 
and Co., (+908) 1938. 
Dewey, John. Exyerience and Education. 
millan Co., 938. 
New York: The Mac-
How We Think. New York: D. c. Heath and Co., 1938. 
• Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry 
----=H-ol~t and Co., 1938. 
• Theory of Valuation: International Encyclopedia 
-----o~f~Unified Science. Edited by Otto Neurath, Vol. II. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939. 
. 
___ 1....,.9~46. 
Problems of Men. New York: Philosophical Library, 
273 
• 
11 The Field of Value, 11 Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. 
----~E-,d~ited by Ray Lepley. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1949. 
Douglas, Justice William o. Decisions and Opinions Filed 
April 28, 1952. New York: Bar~ Press, Inc., 1952. 
Edman, Irwin. John Dewey, His Contribution to the American 
Tradition . Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril1 Co., 1955. 
Everett, W. G. Moral Values. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 
1918. 
Fairchild, Hoxie (ed.). Reli~ious Perspectives in College 
Teaching. New York: The onald Press, 1952. 
Ferro, Virgilius (ed.). Contemporar~ American Theology. 
New York: Round Table Press, 19 2. 
• Encyclopedia of Religion. 
---..... L...-ib..-rary, 1945. 
New York: Philosophical 
Ferre1 , Nels F. s. Christian Faith and Higher Education. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1954. 
Gauss, Christian (ed.). The Teaching of Religion in 
American Higher Education. New York: The Ronald Press, 
1951 . 
Hall, T. William. 11An Alumni Opinion on Religious Influences 
at Kansas State Teachers College. 11 Pittsburg, Kansas, 
1951. (Mimeographed) 
Harner, Nevin C. Religion's Place in General Education. 
Richmond, Virginia: Johri Knox Press, 1949. 
Henry, Virgil. The Place of Reli~ion in Public Schools. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1 5o. 
Hintz, Howard W. Religion and Public Higher Education. 
Brooklyn College, 1955. 
Hong, Howard V. 11Toward a Christian Objectivity, 11 The 
Christian Scholar, 36 (September, 1953), 203-21~ 
Johnson, F. Ernest (ed.). American Education and Religion. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1952. 
Johnson, F. Ernest. 11 Religion and Education, 11 a paper given 
on November 21, 1955, at .the inauguration conference of 
Dr. Hollis L. Caswell, Teachers College, Columbia Uni-
versity. (Mimeographed) · 
Kilpatrick, William Heard. Philosophies of Education. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1951. 
274 
Kri korian, Y. H. (ed.). Naturalism and the Human Spirit. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. 
Lamprecht, S. P. 11 Naturalism and Religion,n Naturalism and 
the Human S~irit. Edited by Y. H. Krikorian. New York: 
Columbia Un1versity Press, 1944. 
Lane, Howard, and Mary Beauchamp. Human Relations in Teach-
ing: The Dynamics of Hel;ing Children Grow. New York: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 195 . 
Lepley, Ray (ed.). Value: A Cooperative Inquiry. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1949. 
Lewis, C. I. An Analysis of Knowledge and Evaluation. 
La Salle, Illinois: The Open Court PUblishing Co., 1946. 
Limbert, Paul M. (ed.). College Teaching and Christian 
Values. New York: Association Press, 1951. 
Lindhorst, Frank H. 11Religion in the Educational Development 
of Society, 11 Religious -Education, 45 (September-October, 
1950), 267-27 . 
Little, Lawrence C. 11 Syllabus on Religion in Public Educa-
tion,11 Religious Education, 44 (May-June, 1949), 163-176. 
Loomer, Bernard. "Religion and the Mind of the University," 
Liberal Learning and Religion, Edited by Amos Wilder. 
New York: Harper and Bros., 1951. 
Louisell, David W. 11 Constitutional Limitations and Supports 
for Dealing with Religion in Public Higher Education, 11 
Reli~ious Education, 50 (September-October, 1955), 
285- 9o. 
Lowry, Howard. The Mind's Adventure. Philadelphia: The 
Westminster Press, 1950. 
Macintosh, Douglas Clyde (ed.). Religious Realism. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1931. 
Madden, Ward. Religious Values in Education. New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1951. 
Mead, George H. Mind, Self, and Society. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Meland, Bernard E. Higher Education and the Human Spirit. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953. 
Menninger, Karl·. Love Against Hate. New York: Harcourt 
Brace and Co., 1942. 
• Man Against Himself. 
----~an-a~c·o., 1938. New York: Harcourt Brace 
Moberly, Sir Walter. The Crisis in the University. London: 
The S.C.M. Press, 1952. 
Moore, G. E. Pr incipia Ethica. New York: The Macmi llan 
Co., 1903. 
Moore, John M. 
Programs of 
Foundation, 
275 
Murphy, Arthur E. "Dewey's Epistemology and Metaphysics," 
The Philosonhy of John Dewey. Edited by Paul A. Schilpp. 
New York: enry Holt and Co., 1938. 
Nash, Arnold s. The University and the Modern World. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. 
National Education Association, Educational Policies Com-
mission. Moral and Spiritual Values in the Public 
Schools. Washington, D. C., 1951. 
National Education Association Research Bulletin, 24 (Febru-
ary, 1946). 
Newhall, Jannette E. "Edgar Sheffield Brightman, A Bio-
graphical Sketch," Philosophical Forum, 12 (1954), _. 9-21. 
Niebuhr, Richard. "Varieties of Religious Revival," The 
New Republic, 133 (June 6, 1955), 13-16. ---
Olmer, PhiliP.· 11 Personalism and Non-Directive Psycho-
therapy,' Philosophical Forum, 7 (1949), 12-18. 
O'Neill, James M. Religion and Education Under the Consti-
tution. New York: Harper and Bros., 1949. 
Perry, Ralph B. General Theory of Value. New York: Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1926. 
Phenix, Philip Henry. Intelligible Religion. New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1954 . 
• "Religion in the Schools. 11 Unpublished Manuscript, 
-----T-ea-chers College, Columbia University, 1955. 
Prospectus, Teacher Education and Religion Project. American 
Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, Oneonta, 
New York, 1953. 
Pusey, Nathan M. 11 Religion 1 s Role in Liberal Education, 11 
Religion and Freedom of Thought. New York: Doubleday 
and Co. 
Randall, John Herman, Jr. The Philosopher of the Common 
Man. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940. 
Ratner, Joseph. The Philosophy of John Dewey. New York: 
Henry Holt and Co., 1928. 
Raup, R. Bruce, Kenneth D. Benne, George Axtelle, and B. 
Othanel Smith. The Improvement of Practical Intelli-
gence. New York: Harper and Bros., 1950. 
276 
Rehage, K. J.iand w. R. Sincock. 11 How Small Group Instruction 
Works, 11 E ementary School Journal, 54 (1953), 131-133. 
ttRe ligion in State Teachers Colleges. 11 Report of the Na-
tional Conference on Religion in State Teachers Colle~es. 
Yale University Divinity School, 1951. (Mimeographed) 
Richardson, 0. T. 11 Teaching oi' Religion and Philosophy in 
Sixty-Five Teachers Colleges in North Central Terri-
tory, '1 The North Central Association Quarterly, 
24 (January, 1950), 305-310. · 
Rogers, Carl R. Client-Centered Therapy. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951. 
277 
Schilling, H. K. ''The Interaction oi' Science, Religion and 
Theology," a paper distributed to members oi' the A.A.C.T.E. 
Teacher Education and Religion Project Committee at 
Kansas State Teachers College, Winter, 1955. 
Schilpp, Paul A. (ed.). The Philosophy oi' John Dewey. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1939. 
Scott, C. Winfield, and Clyde M. Hill (eds ~ }. Public Educa-
tion Under Criticism. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
1934. 
Searles, Herbert L. 11 John Dewey and the New Liberalism," 
The Personalist, 28 (1947), 161-172. 
Shaver, Erwin L. 11 Three Years After in Champaign Case," 
Religious Education, 46 (January-February, 1951), 33-38. 
• "Trends in Weekday Religious Educati on,'' Reli-
----g~lo-us Education, 44 (January-February, 1949), 32-37. 
Shedd, Clarence P. Religion in State Teachers Colleges. 
Hazen _. Pamphlet, No. 16, 1946. 
. Religion in the State University: An Initial Ex-
----p~1~o~ration. Minneapolis: Burgess PUblishing Co., 1949. 
Shelton, W. H. 11 The Conquest oi' Dualism," The New Republi c, 
121 (1949), p. 31. . 
Smith, Huston. The Aims of Higher Education. New York: 
Harper and Bros., 1955 . 
Smi t h , Seymour. The American College Chaplaincy. New York: 
The Associ ation Press, 1954. 
• "An Exploratory Study oi' Religious Provisions in 
--3-;o;-:r::-ta~te Teachers Colleges. 11 New Haven: Yale University 
Divinity School, 1951. (Mimeographed) 
Soper, David Wesley. Men Who Shape Beliei'. Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1955. 
Status of Relirious Education in the Public Schools, The. 
Research D vision, National Education Association. 
Washington, D. c., 1949. 
Stokes, Anson P. Church and State in the United States. 
2 vols. New York: Harper and Bros., 1950. 
Sumner, William G. Folkways. Boston: Ginn and Co., 1906. 
Sweet, William W. The Study of Religion in America. New 
York: Harper and Bros., 1930. 
Taylor, HughS. "Physical Sciences," Religious Perspectives 
in College Teaching. Edited by Hoxie Fairchild. New 
York: The Ronald Press, 1952. 
Thomas, Milton H., and Herbert W. Schneider. A Bibliography 
of John Dewey. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1929. 
Trager, Frank N. "The Blooming Buzzing Confusion," Reli-
gious Education, 46 {March-April, 1951), 82-89. 
United States Supreme Court. McCullum Case, 333 u. s. 203 
(1948). 
Van Dusen, Henry P. God in Education. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1951. 
VanDusen, H. P.,and H. N. Wieman. "How Do We Know?" 
Christian Century, 48 (1931), 713-715. 
White, Morton (ed.). The Age of Analysis. New York: The 
New American Library, 1955. 
Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1927. 
Whitford, Edith L. "The Teaching of Religion and Philosophy 
in the Teacher Training Institutions of the North Central 
Association. 11 Anderson, Indiana, 1951. {Mimeographed) 
Wieman, Henry Nelson. "The Definition of Religion, 11 Journal 
of Religion, 7 (1927), 301-314. 
278 
Wieman, Henry Nelson. Religious Experience and Scientific 
Method. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. 
. The Wrestle of Religion with Truth. New York: 
----=Th~e- Macmillan Co., 1928. 
. 
-~1-=9-30' • 
The Issues of Life. New York: The Abingdon Press, 
• 
11 God and Value," Religious Realism. Edited by 
--~D~.~c. Macintosh. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931. 
Wieman, Henry Nelson,and Walter Marshall Horton. The Growth 
of Religion. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1931. 
Wieman, Henry Nelson. 11Reply to H. P. Van Dusen, ~·· Christian 
Century, 48 (1931), 713-715. 
. Is There a God? A conversation by Henry Nelson 
--~w~re-man, Douglas Clyde Macintosh, and Max Carl Otto • 
. Chicago: Willett, Clark and Co., 1932. 
11Theocentric Religion," Contemporary American 
Theology. Edited by Virgilius Ferm. New York: Round 
Table Press, 1932. 
• 
11 The Need of Philosophy of Religion, 11 Journal of 
---......R..-e-1·igion, 14 (1934), 379-395. 
• 
11Was God in Jesus? 11 Christian Century, 51 (1934), 
-~5'T"'8~9-591 • 
• 
11The Ultra-Human, 11 Christian Century, 52 (1935), 
--.,.9,.,...6="2-964. 
Wieman, Henry Nelson and Regina Wescott Wieman. Normative 
Psychology of Religion. New York: Thomas J. Crowell Co., 
1935. 
Wieman, Henry Nelson. 11Value: Primary Data for Religious 
Inquiry, 11 Journal of Religion, 16 (1936), 379-405. 
Wieman, H. N., and B. E. Meland. American Philosophies of 
Religion. Chi cago: Willett and Clark, 1936. 
vlieman, Henry Nelson. 11 God Can be Perceived, II Journal of 
Religion, 60 (1943), 23-32. 
279 
Wieman, Henry Nelson. 11 Intrinsic, Instrumental, and Crea-
tive Value," Journal of Philosophy, 42 (1945), 180-185. 
• The Source of Human Good. Chicago: The Uni-
----~v~er~sity of Chicago Press, 1946 . 
• The Directive in History. Boston: The Beacon 
_____ P_r_e_s-s, 1949. 
Wilder, Amos N. (ed.). Liberal Learning and Religion. 
New York: rlarper and Bros., 1951. 
Yearbook of the American Association of Teachers Colleges. 
TWenty-sixth Yearbook, 1947. 
Yearbook of the American Churches. Vol. 24. New York: 
The Round Table Press, 1956. 
280 
281 
ABSTRACT 
Problem. The problem of the dissertation is to 
discover the place of religion in teacher education as implied 
in three value theories and to develop an axiological system, 
showing its implications regarding the role of religion in the 
training of public school teachers. 
One of the most persistent and controversial problems 
in American education has been the relationship of religion 
to public education. Radically divergent solutions have been 
proposed by educators, citizens' committees, clergymen, jurists, 
and educational associations. No single approach to religion 
in education appears to be acceptable to the American public 
or to pro~essional leaders of religion or education. 
The dissertation argues that no intelligent solution 
will be reached and implemented exclusive of teacher education 
policy and the philosophies supported by the instructors of 
prospective teachers. 
The purpose of the study, therefore, is to discover 
the implications for religion in teacher education in the 
philosophies of three men whose influence upon education has 
been significant--John Dewey, Edgar Sheffield Brightman, and 
Henry Nelson Wieman. 
Following a description and evaluation of the theories 
of these three philosophers, an attempt is made to construct 
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an axiological foundation for religious values. The specific 
implications for religion in teacher education are then de-
veloped. 
Method of Procedure. Chapter One is a historical 
sketch of the controversies surrounding the problem of the 
place of religion in education and recent attempts to arrive 
at workable solutions. 
Chapters Two through Four are based on the assumption 
that whatever else religion has been in human history, it has 
been a search for and devotion to whatever men believed to be 
of supreme importance--of highest value. The axiologies of 
three philosophers, along with the metaphysical and epistemo-
logical presuppositions of these axiologies, are described 
and evaluated. The implications for religion in the training 
of teachers are shown in each axiological system. 
Chapter Five develops the author's own theory of value, 
using insights from the previous chapters, but also insights 
gleaned from personal reading, contact with teachers, and 
other personal experience. 
Chapter Six is a development of the role of religion 
in teacher education as implied in the value theory developed 
in Chapter Five. The role of religion in the liberal arts 
and sciences, in professional education experiences, in the 
disciplines of phi los9phy and religion, and in extra-
curricular opportunities is discussed. 
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Findings. The instrumentalism of John Dewey, his 
interest in progressive goals or ends which are ever changing, 
his insistent demand that value judgments be made after intel-
ligent examination regarding all foreseeable results of a 
given action, and his belief in the inextricable connection 
between means and ends provide the bases of valuation and 
religion. 
Dewey's axiology gives support to the approach to 
religion through moral and spiritual values. His theories do 
imply, however, that if teaching facts about religion as they 
are intrinsic to other learning situations will be helpful to 
the student in solving his own problems; if such study will be 
meaningful in future tasks of the teacher; and if it does not 
thwart the progressive enlargement of experiences; then such 
teaching about religion is desirable. 
For Dewey, all values including religious qualities 
have their significance as they prove beneficial in the solving 
of problems. Hence they are tested operationally. The reli-
gious value is characterized as "the unity of ideal ends" or 
a sense of unity with nature, with other persons, and with 
all ideals. 
The personalism of E. s. Brightman places persons and 
values at the center of a philosophical system and of reli-
gious faith. Like Dewey's, Brightman's system is empirically 
built, although in Brightman's thinking more emphasis is 
placed upon logical coherence, especially in testing value-claims. 
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Religious values, Brightman insists, are of the high-
est intrinsic worth. Rooted in the objectivity of God's mind, 
they are good in themselves and also are a way of perceiving 
all other values. Yet every religious value-claim must be 
tested for truth by rational coherence. 
His primary contribution
1
is to suggest that every 
student ought to study philosophy in order to build a sound 
outlook on life and to root his religious faith in the onto-
logically real. If the student's religion does not stand 
rigorous investigation, it ought to be modified and enlarged 
I 
by all other facts and values. Moreover, Brightman's empha-
sis on the coalescence of all values clearly implies that all 
important facts and the ability to think clearly (intellectual 
values) be linked with religious, moral, aesthetic, and social 
values within the various academic experiences of the student. 
However, he tends at times to over-emphasize the intellectual 
values. 
H. N. Wieman's naturalistic philosophy is equally 
value-centered. His main contribution to value theory is 
that the absolutely good reality which deserves ultimate loy-
alty is the creative event. This event is the supra-human 
reality which creates all good . Since the creative event 
works through human intercommunication where qualitative 
meanings ( intrinsic values) are created, he proposes that 
creative intercommunication is the condition where good can 
continuously be created. 
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Wieman's theory implies, therefore, that the total 
religious context for teacher education is in a method of 
class procedure whereby free expression, mutual support, and 
shared meaning take place. 
In Wieman's thought, in contrast to Brightman's, the 
I 
social values take precedence. Thus, basic to religion and 
education is emotional and social growth through inter-
communication. Through such permissive and supportive in-
terpersonal relationships, God, the creative event, works 
to create all values~ 
Significant strengths found in each of the three value 
theories are supported by the writer and are utilized in the 
axiology developed in Chapter Five. The general theory of 
value proposed is that valu~s are objectively real in events 
and are discovered by persons when t hey experience qualities 
which enrich and vivify life and contribute to the fulfillment 
of themselves and others. 
Instrumental values which, for the most part, are tech-
ni ques and ski lls that produce higher values may be tested as 
true or false by operational experimentation. Intrinsic values 
which appear to the person immedi ately or intuitively may be 
judged as higher or lower than other values. The criteria 
for evaluating include intensity, connection with and en-
r i chment of other values, permanence, and universali ty. The 
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truth of an intrinsic value-claim may be tested by coherence. 
This criterion involves raising the following questions: Is 
the value-claim consistent with the totality of experience? 
Is it in harmony with other previously tested values? Is it 
consistent with one's hypotheses about man, the universe, and 
God? Is the value instrumental to the continuous enrich-
ment of personality? 
The growth, enrichment, and fulfillment of persons is 
asserted to be the highest good. This summum bonum is not 
itself a value, but it is the context which provides a rela-
tionship in terms of which values can exist. Persons are thus 
considered to be the most important strand of an event wherein 
values are discovered. 
Religious values are cons i dered to be the highest in-
trinsic values in that the religious quality is a search for 
all values, a devotion to the source and sustainer of these 
values, and appropriate behavior in response to the power or 
powers believed to create and conserve values. Rel igion, 
therefore, is transcendent in value to any other single value. 
Other intrinsic va lues, which are both good in them-
selves and instrumental t o other values, find their fullest 
expression in coalescence with all other values. These in-
clude intellectual, soci al, moral, aesthetic, recreation, 
work, and health values. 
The writer is f ully aware of the political limitations 
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placed upon the state-supported institution prohibiting any 
se ctarian indoctrination or commitment. Yet it is maintained 
that some value convictions are inevitable for an institution 
and i ts administrators and teachers. In view of the value 
theory set forth and the implications for education and reli-
gion , a number of proposals are presented. The writer 
bel i eves that through the following curricular and extra-
curricular policies students will be guided toward their 
ideal fulfillment, that all values may be searched for and 
i ntegrated into a philosophy of life, and that religion as a 
unique aspect of human l i fe may have its proper role in the 
academic life and in non-class activities. 
1. The fullest realization of all persons is to 
be fostered through (a) growth of the mind in 
the study of the liberal arts and sciences and 
(b) development of emotional and social maturity 
through an atmosphere of trust, mutual under-
standing, and support in the classroom. 
2. The religious function of integrating all values 
and building a meaningful philosophy of life 
should be handled primarily in two ways: 
{a) A continuous effort toward the integration 
of all values within each general education 
course. 
(b) An introductory philosophy course for sopho-
mores and a philosophy of education course 
for all seniors. 
3. Religion as subject matter and as a significant 
aspect of our culture suggests two approaches: 
(a) Teaching about religion as it is intrinsic 
to various disciplines. 
(b) Elective courses, emphasizing the similarity 
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in the ways in which all religion functions, 
and a philosophical approach to religious 
problems. 
4. A college or university should maintain a chap-
lain whose task it is to work with students who 
desire discussions, projects, and worship. 
The dissertation is limited in that not all values 
are developed thoroughly and a total policy and program for 
teacher education is not considered. Nevertheless, it is 
maintained that the religious implications developed in the 
study are rooted in a defensi ble axiological system, that 
the democratic ideal of tax-supported education is strengthened, 
and that adequate consideration is given to religious pluralism 
as well as deep religious convictions. 
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